289. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State0
4276. Secretary met Nehru for one hour 45 minutes Friday morning May 3. Ambassador, Talbot, M.J. Desai, Gundevia and R.K. Nehru also present first 75 minutes, after which they withdrew to permit Prime Minister and Secretary to have half-hour talk alone. Nehru detached and remote during Secretary’s presentation of broader world issues, responsive on subject of China, and fully engaged when discussion turned to Pakistan issues.
[Here follows discussion unrelated to South Asia.]
[Page 573]Secretary suggested that Chinese may have timed their attack on India last fall with knowledge that Russian build-up was occurring in Cuba. They may have considered that whether the missile plot succeeded or failed, US would be likely to be fully occupied with Cuban crisis and thus unlikely to be able to turn attention to actions in Himalayas. Chinese had had intelligence personnel in Cuba and doubtless knew what was up. Secretary was not nearly so sure that Russians knew about Chinese intentions toward India. Gundevia agreed that later indications, specifically, an accusation by an East German communist leader that the Chinese had mounted an attack on India without consultation with the socialist parties, was further evidence that the timing of the attack had come as a surprise to the European countries.
Turning to Indo-American relations, Secretary assured Nehru that there was not the slightest reason to doubt US sympathy and support to India in its conflict with China.
Pointing out that US not responsible for Kashmir problem, which is result of other peoples’ unfinished business, Secretary said in American national interest we must be concerned with security of entire subcontinent. If India and Pakistan should develop close, cordial and cooperative relations, subcontinent would be invulnerable; no nation would dare attack it. If, on other hand, India-Pakistani differences vitiated national efforts it would be difficult to support American efforts to help defend these countries. Thus US has strong and specific interest in settlement of problem just as it does in supporting India against Chinese threat. Emphasized that with a million men in uniform stationed outside the US, every American family is vitally concerned such problems. Nehru referred to Chinese attack on India and to Sino-Soviet relations which he described as not merely ideological, but also reflecting a clash of national interests. He said that “possibly” China would not attack India this summer, but the longer range prospect was more uncertain. He showed that he continues to feel the heavy pressure of further prospective Chinese aggression.
On Indo-Pakistan relations, Nehru embarked on long account of familiar facts of pre-independence Hindu-Muslim relations and of post-independence Indo-Pakistan quarrels. Called Kashmir the result rather than the cause of “anti-Hindu” and “anti-India” policies of Pakistan. Secretary told of concerns he had heard expressed in Pakistan that some Indian leaders do not accept partition, thus not just Kashmir, but the existence of Pakistan itself would seem to be issue between two countries. Nehru accepted that the Indian leaders have been reluctant to accept partition but emphasized in long historical statement that ultimately they had, in fact, done so. Then asked how they can persuade the doubting Pakistanis of this. India, but not Pakistan, has been ruled by popular leaders. Indian leaders had thought the Pakistani hatred of India would [Page 574] die down, and so far as people concerned it has. Nevertheless, it has been kept alive by politicians. Some might say that Kashmir issue keeps it alive. He wanted the Secretary to know that Indians wanted to solve the Kashmir issue, but cannot do so at the cost of other relationships. Trouble is that Pakistanis blame Indians for everything, even their troubles in East Pakistan, though India has nothing to do with that. Nevertheless, Indian leaders are worried because anything that happens in Pakistan affects India. India wants good relations with Pakistan. Secretary suggested that if present hurdles could be got over, new areas of cooperation could be found and maximum frontiers could become less important. He recalled that in western Europe settlement of Saar had made possible almost breath-taking progress in common institutions. Nehru said that Indians had same idea, unless something untoward happens. He assured Secretary that on no account would India upset the partition. Secretary spoke again of our keen interest in relationships with India, looking at the question from perspective of our own burdens and responsibilities. If India is again attacked by the Chinese, the US is and will remain India’s friend. No question about that; it has to do with overriding crises of our time. When we see the difference between the safety of the subcontinent if the two countries—India and Pakistan—work together, or if they don’t we utter “a cry of anguish” at the present situation.
Nehru said that with regard to Kashmir he believed India might well have come to agreement with Pakistan already but for fact Paks had been encouraged by UK and to some extent by US.
Secretary observed that one point he need not conceal is that our people believe just powers of government derived from consent of governed. With regard to Kashmir or other issues, we can’t avoid this at home. He hoped Prime Minister understood that. Nehru said he quite understood then launched into description UNCIP processes culminating with assertion that constituent assembly in Kashmir, elected by people, confirmed Kashmir’s accession to India. He said premier Indian [objection?] to plebiscite is that it likely to so arouse Islamic sentiments as to bring trouble to minorities in Kashmir and India generally.
At this stage Prime Minister and Secretary excused other participants for private talk.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. Received in the Department of State at 5:03 a.m. Repeated to Karachi and London.↩