Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

226. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, December 16, 1962.

The attached report of your Sino-Indian Subcommittee¹ highlights four main issues requiring US decision and then discussion at Nassau:

(1) How hard should we press the Commonwealth to stay out ahead in help to India? Aside from firming up agreement to a 50-50 division in the emergency phase, should we plan to limit our aid in general to what they will match?

(2) Should the US, UK, or both make an air defense commitment to India and provide some form of air defense package for the near and longer term?

(3) What Kashmir strategy should the US/UK pursue? Who should have the laboring oar?

(4) Should we head off any premature UK effort to bring India into alliance status or to raise a fuss over India’s taking MIGs?

Our approach to all these tends naturally to caution. The JCS worry over any redeployment of US forces at the expense of existing commitments. DOD seems to look askance at large new MAP outlays, which might involve diversions from other MAP clients and be difficult in any case to justify to Congress. Some in State are concerned lest we get drawn into a major Sino-Indian war. Others fear that our Pak interests will suffer unless we gear our help to progress on Kashmir. Such reservations largely underly our desire to push the UK out in front. But, judging from Macmillan’s letter,² the British attitude is similarly cautious; indeed they show less sense of urgency than we.

Against such concerns that we will overcommit ourselves or waste our substance must be weighed the sheer magnitude of the opportunity handed us by Peiping. If we exploit it fully we may not only bring about a Kashmir settlement and Pak-Indian reconciliation, but induce an aroused and strengthened India to join us in the containment of Red China.

But in deciding how best to promote this grand design, one fundamental must be kept in mind. It was a Chinese blunder which gave us the opportunity and it is only a continued active Chicom threat which will compel Ayub and Nehru to compromise on Kashmir in the interest of meeting the larger threat.

Thus it is as much in our strategic interest to keep up a high degree of Sino-Indian friction as it is to prevent it from spilling over into large scale war. While, in the last analysis, our ability to do so may be marginal as compared to what Peiping and Delhi themselves decide, to the extent that we can reassure India of US/UK support and backing, we stiffen Indian determination not to settle too cheaply.

Yet the cease-fire and Chinese withdrawals have already led to a hiatus period. Peiping, having achieved its objectives and doubtless fearful of over-extending itself, is skillfully disengaging. It has thrown on India the onus of re-opening hostilities, which it knows India is incapable of doing at this point.

While hostilities may yet flare up again, the more likely outcome seems to be a gradual petering out of the Sino-Indian affair. While Sino-Indian relations will never be the same, and Indian public opinion will bar any negotiated settlement, the trend may be toward de facto acceptance of the Chinese terms, particularly if the latter are wise enough to carry out their proposed withdrawals.

Certain US/UK actions might well contribute to this trend: (1) if we push the Kashmir issue out too far in front of the Sino-Indian dispute, thus diverting Indian focus and reviving old Pak-Indian animosities; (2) if the US/UK seem to be holding back unduly on further support, thus rousing Indian suspicions that we are either reluctant to assume major commitments or unwilling to do so until Kashmir is settled.

In short, against the risks of overcommitment are those of loss of momentum—which might contribute to a premature damping down of the Sino-Indian dispute. My comments on the issues before you are framed in this light.

Pushing the Commonwealth to the forefront. The major advantages in getting our cousins to share as much of the burden as possible hardly need enumeration. But, aside from Galbraith’s worry lest the British gain kudos with the Indians we want for ourselves, it is open to serious question whether we should (in our desire to keep the UK to the fore) confine ourselves to moving no faster than they. Macmillan’s latest note suggests that the UK will be most cautious about committing itself to anything with a large price tag, or about backing India in a Sino-Indian war. It also suggests, despite his reminder that we shouldn’t overplay our hand, that the British have in mind setting several conditions—a Kashmir settlement, joint Pak-Indian defense, and Indian membership in our alliance system—as the price for extensive US/UK aid or defense commitments.

Despite its obvious anxiety to keep up its end, moreover, the UK is no doubt concerned lest if the bill gets too large it will strain UK resources and eventually force the UK to settle for a secondary role to us.

The Air Defense Package. Nehru’s two letters³ citing India’s air defense needs require some sort of response. This problem breaks down into two parts: (1) how to meet India’s immediate needs in event of early resumption of hostilities—which would require use of US/UK forces; and (2) the longer term need to develop some Indian air defense capability.

The JCS proposals⁴ add up to making both a Commonwealth responsibility, with our role confined to providing chiefly three (and then three more) radars, to be Indian-manned. This program, which would require two years to complete, would not meet the immediate need. But neither Macmillan nor the JCS want to get involved in any interim commitment to shore up India’s air defense with US/UK forces. Nor, as Macmillan suggests, would the JCS division of the longer run effort be acceptable to the UK. We suspect that the financing problem plays a large part in their reluctance.

Against the risks involved in air defense commitments we must balance the cost of turning down or stalling on Nehru’s request. To do so might well rouse Indian suspicions that the West was either unwilling to support India if the conflict escalated or insisted on a high price. In either case, the net effect might be to sap India’s confidence in Western support of its position vis-a-vis China. If our interests are best served by continuation of the Sino-Indian dispute, we want if possible to avoid such a development.

Indeed, I believe that the Indians (and probably also the Chinese) already assume from our posture that we are prepared to come to India’s help. Our failure to do so would, as Galbraith suggests, be a grave blow to Indian morale. But we will be unable to do so effectively unless prior preparations are made.

Moreover, we must take into account the possibility that our failure to provide air defense support, should it become known, might encourage Peiping to escalate, whereas evidence of such support would greatly deter them from doing so. I fear, therefore, that not providing such support may create greater risks of escalation (and subsequent US/UK involvement) than the opposite course.

As to the US/UK division of effort, I cannot see the UK committing fighter squadrons unless the US does the same. The UK simply will not risk involvement in a Sino-Indian war without the US by its side.

Kashmir Tactics. It is painfully apparent that neither Paks nor Indians are yet ready for compromise. So for either side (or the US/UK) to press too hard at this juncture might scuttle the talks before they really get underway. Nor do we want to divert Indian anger from China to Pakistan.

These concerns suggest that our immediate objective must be, not to promote any particular solution, but to insure that the talks don’t break down. We can even insist on this minimum as a condition for our support, without outraging Nehru. Ergo:

(1) We should press Ayub and Nehru to avoid above all the pitfall of a breakdown in the talks, arguing that this could dissipate the last chance for an amicable solution and would inevitably color US/UK support of both countries. You could send letters to both parties along these lines.

(2) Perhaps the best result obtainable would be if the talks ended with a communique expressing: (a) recognition of both parties that an early settlement is imperative; (b) determination to keep talking until one is reached; (c) explicit recognition that any settlement will involve a compromise in some respects unsatisfactory to both parties; (d) intent to create continuing organs of consultation, i.e. technical committees; and (e) agreeing on certain interim steps toward a solution. Galbraith and McConaughy should press this theme.

(3) State’s idea of technical committees is good but, by itself, does not entail sufficient momentum toward a solution to satisfy public opinion, especially in Pakistan. So we should examine what “interim steps” might be feasible in addition. I have in mind mutual withdrawals from the cease-fire line, trade concessions, etc. To the extent that such moves had a joint character, they might (though billed as interim expedients) actually start a trend toward an European-type solution by getting people used to it.

The above comments add up to suggesting a more costly and more risky strategy than currently favored by many, but one more commensurate with the stakes. As to cost, there are few places in the Afro-Asian world where we could more profitably employ our aid—let’s divert MAP from elsewhere if necessary. As to risks, it is now more and more apparent that Peiping never contemplated a major attack on India. To me, it is all the more unlikely to let the affair escalate if India has visible US/UK support.⁵

R. W. Komer

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 12/16/62. Secret.
1. The undated attached report from the Subcommittee on South Asia to the NSC put forward recommended positions to be taken by President Kennedy in the talks with Prime Minister Macmillan that were scheduled to begin in Nassau on December 18.
2. See Document 224.
3. See Document 222.
4. See Document 225.
5. An agenda prepared for the December 17 meeting of the Executive Committee of the NSC lists South Asia as one of four topics slated for discussion. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee Meetings, Vol. III, 12/6/62-12/17/62) A memorandum of the conversation at the meeting, prepared by Bromley Smith, indicates that only two of the scheduled items, Cuba and Congo, were actually discussed. (Ibid.)