202. Memorandum for the Record0
SUBJECT
- Presidential Meeting on Sino-Indian Conflict
PARTICIPANTS
- Dean Rusk
- Phillips Talbot
- W. Averell Harriman
- James P. Grant
- Roger Hilsman
- William Sullivan
- William Gaud
- Robert McNamara
- Paul Nitze
- William P. Bundy
- Maj. General A. Goodpaster
- John McCone
- Huntington Sheldon
- D. FitzGerald
- Carl Kaysen
- R. W. Komer
The meeting began with an intelligence briefing to explain to the President the locale of the recent Chinese gains. Secretary Rusk asked about Chicom logistic capabilities. Mr. McCone felt that the Chicoms could support about 300,000 men in the fighting area (170,000 in combat), assuming no interdiction of their road net, but that this would take about 35,000 trucks out of a total Chicom inventory of 200,000.
[Page 395]While the meeting’s purpose had originally been to get approval of the US/UK Memorandum of Understanding1 prepared during the London meetings, Rusk suggested it seemed overtaken by events. The situation was already getting to a point where we and others could no longer act as if it were normal. He agreed that the Commonwealth ought to be moving faster. We were already supporting most of the countries around the Communist Asian periphery, hence there was some advantage to the Commonwealth taking the lead in helping India while we trailed somewhat behind.
McNamara urged that the first move be to find out what the real situation was. If we were to put our prestige and resources at risk, we must find out the score. He proposed sending a small high-level military mission immediately to Delhi. He doubted that the Indians were asking for enough, but felt that we couldn’t appraise their plans without detailed knowledge. Hence the JCS should select 10-15 officers to go out to size up the situation. They could be ready in 2-3 days.
Rusk queried whether strategic and technical advice shouldn’t come from the UK in the first instance, but McNamara doubted whether this would come soon enough. Rusk acknowledged that the Assam Valley could be in Chicom hands within a week and urged that transport aircraft be sent soonest because they would be needed in any case. We needed to get some C-130s on the way while we were making a more systematic evaluation. Otherwise, the Indians might get kicked out of Assam. Komer argued that doing so would help deter the Chicoms by signaling that we would get involved in a big way if this happened. There was also some discussion of the Indian need for spare parts for their C-119s.
The President indicated that we should ask Macmillan about Commonwealth plans, what they could do about Australian and other wheat to Communist China and what military missions the Commonwealth might be planning to send out (he had Ormsby Gore called over to meet with him and Rusk).
At the President’s request, Grant explained the rationale behind the US/UK recommendations, particularly the five-division package. It was impossible to say what share the UK would take. McNamara doubted that the British would be willing to go 50-50 on any such substantial [Page 396] amount. The President agreed that the UK ought to take the lead. This wouldn’t last long, but we ought to start them up in front.
There was discussion of whether Sino-Indian negotiations were likely. Rusk said that we suspected Nehru was still hoping for some kind of a deal. We were aware he had proposed one involving a Chinese return to the November 1959 line and an Indian return to the 8 September 1962 line. This might be why Nehru hadn’t declared war.
The subject of Pakistani reactions was also discussed. Talbot indicated that there could be a wide swing in Pakistani attitudes if Assam was really threatened.
McNamara again urged getting a high level mission out to Delhi, including State and Intelligence people in order to concert a plan of action with the Indians. We needed a mission on the lines of the Taylor mission to Vietnam. Rusk preferred to see the UK take the lead on this mission, with us participating if desirable, rather than a straight US mission. It was pointed out that the more we got in front the more we would push Moscow toward Peiping.
The President decided that we should: (1) get a mission off to Delhi; (2) send some C-130s; (3) take care of the C-119 spare parts; and (4) push the UK to get the Commonwealth in, and decide what we want to tell Macmillan.
Rusk and Harriman showed the President a proposed press conference statement for Tuesday, indicating language which we had used previously in the Cabot-Wang talks to indicate to Peiping that we meant business. The President decided we ought to review the proposed press conference statement and put the Western response on a broader basis than that of the US alone. We should push the UK to get the Commonwealth involved.
McNamara couldn’t understand why the Indians didn’t use air. They could certainly tear up the Chicom roads.
There was some discussion of the desirability of using Tibetan guerrillas.
Talbot reminded the President of the “gentleman’s agreement” limiting FY 63 aid to India. Gaud explained that in the light of new PL 480 needs we would run afoul of this agreement if we spent more than $25 million on military aid to India. The President preferred not to go to the congressional committee yet; however, he told Talbot to bring Senator Symington up to date.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 11/26/62-11/27/62. Secret. Drafted by Komer on November 27.↩
- The text of the U.S.-U.K. memorandum of understanding concerning the Sino-Indian conflict was transmitted in telegram 1865 from London, November 14. It is summarized in Document 198. A copy of the memorandum of understanding is attached to a November 19 memorandum from Rusk to Kennedy, recommending the President’s approval of the agreed U.S.-U.K. approach to the conflict, subject to some minor suggested changes in language. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 11/19/62)↩