183. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State0
764. Deliver Immediately to Secretary Talbot. Policy. Embassy telegram 762.1 I broached Sino-Indian crisis with President Ayub in same October 26 conversation outlining serious implications of Indian reverses both in NEFA and Ladakh, especially former, and stating our [Page 354] conviction of ChiCom aggressive intent and action, limits of which not yet definable. I stated the strong case for GOP making positive gesture of sympathy and restraint to GOI. Emphasized identity of interest of both great countries of subcontinent in repelling common threat which cast same shadow over both. I spelled out that if ChiComs keep pushing south of McMahon Line in northeast, even graver and more immediate threat to Pakistan existed. I said explicitly that United States shares and sympathizes with Indian anxiety at mounting ChiCom threat. In this context I suggested that it would be helpful and appreciated move as well as major step to improve climate for future GOI-GOP negotiations, for President Ayub to send to Nehru, publicly or even privately, some expression of sympathy, assurance against any GOP diversionary move and understanding of dangerous position faced by GOI. I particularly stressed our view that an action by GOP to renounce opportunity to capitalize on present situation would be in its own interest in making GOI more tractable and flexible in later bilateral negotiations.
President Ayub assured me somewhat testily that his government of course had not taken and would not take any action which hamper GOI fight against Chinese Communists. However, he firmly rejected any possibility of special GOP message of comfort to Nehru. He did not consider such message would be either helpful or necessary. In first place, he did not believe such message would improve Indian military position vis-à-vis Chinese. Indians knew they did not need to keep existing large concentrations of troops on Pak borders, and could not use or logistically support any greatly increased troop strength in narrow and isolated mountain passes against Chinese anyway. Secondly, while Ayub fully recognized common danger in long-run of Commie China to India and Pakistan, he was not as concerned as we were by current Chinese penetrations since, in Pak view, they probably do not portend major thrust far beyond McMahon Line into India proper or a challenge at this time to fundamental national security of India.
Basically, Ayub indicated little sympathy for Indian position. He felt Indians had handled situation badly, issuing rash and boastful statements on intentions push back ChiComs, giving ChiComs some excuse for countermeasures and then proving totally incapable of handling subsequent military actions.
In commenting on the Indian attitude, Ayub also reverted to several favorite themes, unlikelihood GOI will reduce its military forces on Pak borders despite ChiCom threat and fact that Indians have alienated all their neighbors except USSR. He mentioned that Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan were fed up with Indian treatment of them as protectorates, which policy was throwing them into arms of Commie China. He thought Burmese and Ceylonese were likewise increasingly resentful of India.
[Page 355]Ayub then suggested that this might be an opportune moment for United States to use its good offices to urge India to settle its difficulties with Pakistan. When I pinned him down, he acknowledged that what he had specifically in mind was that we use our influence to induce GOI to proceed now to a settlement of Kashmir dispute. I responded immediately that there was no reason to believe that this emergency was appropriate time for such an initiative. It would undoubtedly be considered by India as effort to take advantage of its extremity vis-a-vis China.
President viewed his proposal in different light, feeling that India, chastened by adversity, might be impelled to honor its commitment. He dismissed all other Indo-Pak differences as relatively trifling. Kashmir was the only really destructive issue.
My comments on general aspects Pak reaction to Indian plight will follow in separate message. I think it is clear however from course of our talk that, despite great seriousness ChiCom threat, it will require a near miracle in both India and Pakistan to wipe away the corrosive bitterness and establish cooperative basis for dealing with the crisis.
We can take some satisfaction in Ayub’s assurance, even though privately expressed only to us, that GOP has no intention taking advantage of India’s trouble.
Although we are not authorized by Ayub to convey this to GOI, we are not prohibited from doing so either.
If situation deemed to warrant it, I would recommend that we inform GOI of this assurance at high level in strict confidence.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/10-2762. Secret; Niact. Received in the Department of State at 3:09 p.m. Repeated to New Delhi.↩
- In telegram 762 from Karachi, October 27, McConaughy reported on the part of his conversation with Ayub in Rawalpindi on October 26 which dealt with the Cuban missile crisis. McConaughy delivered a letter to Ayub from Kennedy which set forth the basis for the U.S. response to the crisis and indicated the desire to work in close concert with U.S. allies. Ayub responded by strongly endorsing U.S. actions. (Ibid., 611.3722/10-2762)↩