Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

116. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, April 27, 1962.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Relations toward Pakistan and India

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. M. Masood, Minister, Embassy of Pakistan
• Mr. M.A. Jafri, Second Secretary, Embassy of Pakistan
• NEA—Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary
• SOA—Charles W. Naas

Minister Masood stated that in the two letters of December 23, 1961,¹ and January 2, 1962,² from President Ayub to President Kennedy and the Aide-Memoire of January 3, 1962,³ several questions had been raised. The President had replied in a brief letter of January 26, 1962,⁴ and the Government of Pakistan wished to know whether this brief answer was final as the Pakistan Ambassador had understood that a more complete reply would be forthcoming.

The four questions were:

1. Should not the U.S.-Indian Military Sales Agreement be terminated in view of India’s violation of the terms by its action in Goa?; or, could U.S. economic aid in some way be limited to prevent India being able to spend so much on armaments?

2. Would the U.S. make public its reassurances to the GOP that U.S. assistance would be forthcoming in the event of aggression from any quarter?

3. If the U.S. is not willing to make a, public statement, would the U.S. at least agree to informing Prime Minister Nehru privately that assurances had been given again to the GOP?

4. In view of the increased threat from India would the U.S. increase its military assistance to Pakistan?

Mr. Talbot stated that it was his understanding the points had been discussed fully by the President and Ambassador Ahmed and that we had promised to consult with the GOP only if there were new developments or changes in policy. At this time we had nothing to add. However, Mr. Talbot agreed to spell out the U.S. position so that there would be no misunderstanding.

We believe that the assurances given President Ayub by President Kennedy meet Pakistan’s needs; a public statement or a reiteration to Prime Minister Nehru privately are not necessary and would serve no useful purpose (points 2 and 3).

Mr. Talbot, in referring to points 1 and 4, said the U.S. anticipates no further action. He stated that the U.S. is very conscious of the problem of differentiating between military and economic assistance; obviously large scale economic aid permits a country to divert its own resources to the purchase of arms. The U.S. believes that it is in Pakistan’s long-term interest, as well as of the rest of the free world, to have India’s economy develop. The U.S. has no reason to believe that, if U.S. economic aid to India were decreased, ipso facto military purchases would decrease. Each nation establishes its own policies and priorities; India would probably decide to maintain its forces and, if necessary suffer the consequences in economic development. The U.S. also believes that economic assistance should not be tied to a particular decision within that country unrelated to the purposes of the assistance. Rather, the best way of meeting the arms race problem is by discussion between the two of their mutual problems. For example, the U.S. is now trying at Geneva to grapple with the arms race; perhaps, the same efforts can be made at the regional level.

Mr. Talbot continued by commenting that in his personal view there are three ways the progress being made in South Asia could be upset:

1. direct Sino-Soviet intervention;

2. major domestic political failures; there remains a certain fragility to the governments, a condition which is natural in view of the manifold problems and the short period of independence;

3. regional disputes become the overwhelming preoccupation of the governments; if this occurred points 1 and 2 easily could follow.

Mr. Masood said that the GOP did not wish to see Indian economic development suffer, but were there not other pressures the U.S. could bring to bear? He noted Pakistan’s concern over the Kashmir question and the “30% increase of the Indian military budget” He asked whether, following the ill-fated Black proposal, the President and Department had given consideration to what further steps the U.S. could take in assisting a solution to the Kashmir problem. Mr. Talbot replied that much thought had been given, but that for the time being the Security Council had the issue before it and that further U.S. proposals would depend on the Security Council’s actions.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.90D/4-2762. Secret. Drafted by Naas on May 2.
1. In this letter to Kennedy, Ayub warned that what he saw as Indian aggression against Goa could be a prelude to Indian aggression elsewhere. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Pakistan, General, 1/62-2/62)
2. Document 83.
3. See footnote 2, Document 84.
4. See Document 100.