Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

273. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot)⁰

I–17391/62

Washington, May 23, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Conversation with Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Shimon Peres¹

As you know, Mr. Peres, during his visit concluded today, paid calls on Messrs. Gilpatric and Nitze in DoD as well as on my brother in the White House. I was myself invited to a dinner in his honor last night by Ambassador Harman and at the insistence of the Israeli Military Attaché, Colonel Prihar, I also accepted an invitation to breakfast this morning with Peres on his last morning before leaving. At the close of this conversation, he indicated that he regarded it as a serious presentation of his government’s viewpoint which he wished to have considered and replied to, although apparently not to be regarded as a formal matter for correspondence at the present time. The points covered in the conversation were as follows:

1. Basic Thesis. Peres urged that the U.S., if possible, undertake some marked new initiative designed to stabilize the situation in the Middle East, and above all to relieve Israel’s sense of isolation. As alternative means to this end, he suggested such possibilities as a U.S. or tripartite guarantee of the present territories of Israel (perhaps coupled with a declaration that we would join in resisting any external encroachment by Israel from these territories) or some form of association by Israel with the U.S. alone or with NATO, either by way of membership or some form of participation in research and development or other subsidiary activities.

Peres continued that, if such a major initiative were not possible, the U.S. should at least be prepared to take a more major role alongside France as a supplier of military equipment under sales arrangements. Specifically, he urged that, over and above existing small arms, Early Warning equipment and SONAR orders now pending, the U.S. should supply a Hawk missile unit.

2. Elaboration of Point 1. Peres said that Israel had had considerable success in expanding its relationship with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] as well as with several countries in Africa and even Latin America. While this was psychologically consoling, Nasser and Syria remained hostile. The Israeli would never trust Nasser and would always be afraid that he would attack Israel if he achieved a sufficient preponderance of military power, which he was now building up quite rapidly. Therefore, Israel, feeling itself both a democracy in principle and a stabilizing force in the area, believed that some recognition of these facts by the U.S. was both deserved and a contribution to stability and peace in the area.

3. Elaboration of Point 2. Peres noted that although the French had been willing suppliers in the past, they were clearly going to seek to expand their influence in the Arab world once Algeria was settled. Couve de Murville had complained personally to him that France had been taking the onus of supplying Israel for years, and would feel much relieved if others could pick up a part of the burden. Meanwhile, the British apparently believed that “less and less” dealings with Israel were essential to the maintenance of their own position in the Arab world; Peres disputed this thesis, arguing that the French had maintained a better standing in the Arab world than the British notwithstanding or perhaps even because of their support for Israel, and that some Britishers were now thinking that possibly a policy of “more and more” support for Israel might be a better gambit on the Arab problem or at least provide the opportunity to meet rebuffs by unpleasant action.

Speaking more concretely as to the military need and situation, Peres noted that the UAR had many IL–28 light bombers, and was now receiving MIG-21 fighters. In addition the Israeli had firm evidence that UAR technicians were being trained in the USSR in the operation of missiles; thus, he said it could only be a question of a short time before some form of missile was in the hands of the UAR, most probably the SA-2 surface-to-air missile.

From this, Peres concluded that the Hawk represented a vital element in Israeli military requirements for putting up a convincing deterrent to UAR and/or Syrian attack. He also argued that the true test of a weapon should be its purpose, and that the Hawk was purely defensive whereas some non-missile hardware, such as a bomber, might be equally clearly offensive.

4. Additional Comments. Colonel Prihar indicated that they regarded the Early Warning sales transaction with us as just about wrapped up, since an Air Force team had just surveyed the site. (We had long doubted whether they were serious in this transaction, or whether they were trying to get a better line on the capacity of the equipment through the device of asking for it.) Colonel Prihar also indicated that the SONAR transaction was a sure thing as far as they were concerned. Both Peres and Prihar indicated that they had no other pending sales problems of any consequence, but Peres reiterated that the real key was our willingness to supply something that would be a demonstrable indication of our concern for supporting Israel and maintaining a military balance. He noticeably did not mention any bomber aircraft (which he had appeared to suggest in his conversation with Mr. Nitze).

With reference to the Mirage III purchased from France, I asked Peres about the price and credit terms, and he replied without strain that the cost per aircraft was now $860,000 for the basic airplane, which with fire control systems and initial spares brought the total cost to about $1.2 million per unit. They have a 3-year credit from the French at 7% and an escalation clause on the price providing for a 7% annual rise to meet French labor cost increases. He indicated that the French had given them no special reduction of any sort, but that the price seemed to them fair and reasonable. However, he did indicate that it was a major financial strain on his annual budget situation. (This would suggest that they might seek some form of credit terms on the Hawk if we agreed to let them buy it.)

At the close of our discussion, which diverged over a great many other subjects as well but came back to these points both at the beginning and end, Peres made clear that he was not making a formal request for the Hawk at the present time since to do so might court a formal refusal. However, he clearly wished his ideas to be conveyed to the State Department and others, and expected that we would find some way of indicating whether we were receptive to any part of it.

Comment. From the military standpoint, DIA believes that the Israeli Air Force remains qualitatively superior to the UAR and would probably win an air battle, “if an effective defense of Israel’s air facilities could be maintained.” The Israeli are particularly short of all-weather fighters. Thus, while one can read into their present insistence all sorts of collateral political motives (such as a desire for a gesture of support from us at a time when they are bulling through the Jordan River development project), there is nonetheless a valid military basis for their concern and for their selection of the Hawk as an item of key importance in their military posture.

As to the question of the UAR acquiring missiles, we have no clear-cut intelligence when the Soviets will deliver but there have been reports pertaining to site preparation in the Sinai.DIA believes the missiles to be furnished Egypt and Iraq will be primarily surface-to-air, but that some surface-to-surface types might have been ordered. Reports from Iraq lead DIA to estimate surface-to-air missiles may be delivered to that country by this fall.

WP Bundy

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/5–2362. Secret. The copy sent to McGeorge Bundy is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Israel, 4/2/62–5/31/62.
1. Peres, who was on an “unofficial” visit to the United States, participated in talks in Washington May 21–23. For a briefing memorandum, prepared by Talbot for McGhee on May 18, see Supplement, the compilation on Israel.