Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

144. Memorandum of Conversation Between the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) and the United Arab Republic Ambassador (Kamel)⁰

Washington, November 22, 1961.

At Ambassador Kamel’s request I had lunch with him today.

He first made a number of general points.

1. The U.S. must not take the neutralists too seriously or let their position on world issues annoy us. It is a major asset of this Administration that it is believed to be prepared to help the neutralists maintain their independence, despite disagreements on some world issues; and this asset should not be lost. In particular, he hoped that we would not break off our connection with Tito who, on balance, is a major Free World asset. U.S.-Yugoslav relations are taken as a touchstone of U.S. policy by some of the neutralists.

2. Arab-Israeli relations in the Middle East are quiet; in his view they should be left alone for a time. The possibilities of a more basic settlement will gradually emerge as domestic progress is made by all parties. There is no inclination on the part of Cairo to exacerbate the situation.

3. The U.S. should try to bring the Arab states together on a constructive basis; but if that is not possible, it should avoid setting the Arabs at each others throats—a situation which only leaves openings for Moscow to exploit.

4. We should try to concert our policies with our major Western European allies. When they conduct policies which are not in consonance with our own, Cairo argues that either the U.S. is incapable of asserting leadership within the Free World or we are being devious in letting our friends do our dirty work.

5. He then turned to U.S.-Egyptian economic relations. He said that he thought it was crucial to the future stability of Egypt and to U.S.-Egyptian relations to expand systematically our economic cooperation. There are three items in particular on which he is most anxious for a prompt U.S response:

a. Long-term PL 480 assistance;

b. The DLF loans for grain storage and distribution;

c. Extremely urgent, a U.S. loan of short-staple cotton to cover the major gap in this year’s cotton harvest, so that long-staple cotton may be exported and the domestic demand for cotton goods by the peasantry may be met.

In the longer run we might want to envisage a systematic exchange of long-staple for short-staple cotton.

6. We then talked about the possibility of moving towards a consortium arrangement through the IBRD, which would organize Western assistance behind the Egyptian 5-year plan. He said that he understood that my observations were merely personal and exploratory; and that on his own authority he would try to elicit a reaction from Cairo. I emphasized that the crucial element in any consortium arrangement was the organization of a domestic program that was persuasive to the major lending countries and to such institutions as the IBRD, citing Indian, Pakistani, and Nigerian experience.

7. He emphasized several times that the policy of the Egyptian government was not merely independent but actively anti-Communist: in Egypt; in the Middle East; and in Africa. Despite possible differences on some issues, there was an ample area of common political interest between the U.S. and Egypt to justify a closer working relation.

WR

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, United Arab Republic, 11/61–12/61. Official Use Only. Drafted by Rostow on November 22. A copy in Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 64 D 40, Egypt I.B. General, bears handwritten marginal notations presumably made in the Office of Near Eastern Affairs.