Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

141. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, November 16, 1961.

SUBJECT

• United States Policy Toward the United Arab Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic

REFERENCE

• National Security Action Memorandum Number 105 of October 16, 1961¹

In response to your request, we have prepared the following comments upon the question raised in National Security Action Memorandum No. 105:

I. United States Policy Toward the United Arab Republic

Our approach rests on four basic assumptions that appear valid at present, namely, (1) Nasser is firmly enough established to retain power in the U.A.R. for the time being; (2) were Nasser to be overthrown soon (he is more vulnerable now than in the past several years) the government which would emerge might well be less stable and more troublesome for us; (3) despite the blow to his prestige from the loss of Syria, continuation of Nasser’s considerable political influence in the Middle East and Afro-Asian world generally is shown by the caution of the governments in those areas in recognizing the new Syrian regime and in appointing ambassadors thereto; and (4) the leadership in the U.A.R. is striving to strengthen its ties with the West.

Given these assumptions, and given the undoubted geo-political importance of the U.A.R., it appears obvious that we must continue to do business with Nasser and the U.A.R. and make the best of it. The virtues and vices of Nasser, nine years after the Egyptian revolution, are well known. One virtue, the ability to profit from experience, taken in conjunction with the fact of the importance of Nasser and the U.A.R, would appear to justify an effort on our part over the next few years to endeavor to restore our relations with Nasser and the U.A.R. to something resembling the pre-1955 period and to concentrate the attention of Nasser and the U.A.R. more generally on internal development.

While we are not enchanted by what Nasser appears to have in mind with regard to both internal and external affairs, the current psychological setting would appear to be more favorable than at any time since Suez for sympathetic attention to the U.A.R. ‘s aid requirements. Nasser’s pride and prestige have suffered a blow in the defection of Syria; the United States not only failed to “kick him when he was down” but treated him with utmost consideration; by adopting publicly a statesmanlike attitude during the Syrian crisis, Nasser has recouped some of his prestige; a promising personal relationship between President Kennedy and Nasser has been developed through exchanges of letters; Nasser appears to desire to devote more attention and effort to internal development (and to securing his rule); the U.A.R. has taken effective measures to promote economic development and is publicly committed thereto; and U.S. assistance along with that of other Western countries is needed for the implementation of U.A.R. development plans.

Although circumstances do seem relatively propitious in some respects, there are certain factors that buttress our belief, based on hard experience, that our approach to assistance to the U.A.R. must be undertaken with utmost care. Not only are there our support of Israel, a deep-seated Egyptian suspicion of our objectives and motives, and serious divergences of U.S. and U.A.R. policies, action and attitudes in Africa, in Latin America, and in the Middle East itself which periodically lead to strains in our relations, but also there are emerging the clear lines of the type of state Nasser is trying to establish in Egypt as well as the nature of the political base he is seeking to create, and his intention to abet the creation of similar states and similar power bases in the other Arab states (except, perhaps, Iraq where these already exist to a considerable degree). By the economic decrees of July 23² and the recent sequestrations of private property, including that of hundreds of minority groups, Nasser has precipitated Egypt into an “Arab socialism” that eliminates private enterprise, domestic and foreign, from any meaningful role in the Egyptian economy, that denies participation of the ablest members of the Egyptian society in the development of the country, that concentrates all economic power in the hands of the state, and that perpetrates injustice in the name of “social justice”.

The political power base Nasser is now seeking to create is not exactly attractive, resembling Peronism and including some features of Mussolini’s corporate state. One foot is planted in the Army, the other in the masses of dispossessed. In between are such intellectuals and young people as can be persuaded to go along. The structure of the monolithic supporting political organization will be based on a selection of membership according to occupations. What degree of enthusiasm will be found in the general population remains to be seen as does the effect on the loyalty of the Army. While we would not wish to imply that Nasser’s house will soon collapse about him, we would question a policy of moving rapidly to shore him up or of becoming too deeply committed to something in which we cannot believe and with which cooperation is tenuous at best.

We also think it would be incorrect to assume that the energies of Nasser and the U.A.R. will be devoted entirely to internal affairs. While Nasser may reduce his activity in Africa and in world-wide neutralist circles, he is unable to abandon or even slacken in his self-assigned mission of leading and uniting all Arabs. Into his October 16 speech on elimination of “reactionaries”³ we read not only a need to apply stern measures domestically but also, both to protect his program at home and to achieve his wider ambitions in the Arab arena, to seek to undermine and destroy the ruling elements in the other Arab states, with most of which we have friendly relations, and who generally oppose his ambitions and to create the image of the new Egypt in each one of them, relying on those classes that most avidly desire “Arab unity” and worship Nasser. In pursuing the experiment of seeking to draw closer to Nasser and the U.A.R. by stressing assistance to the U.A.R. plans for development we must bear in mind that we shall in effect be strengthening a leader and a state against other Arab states as well as against Israel. Hence we may find it both desirable and necessary to increase our economic and/or political support to certain other states of the area to the extent required to preserve stability. A careful balance and impartiality in our words and actions is essential.

With regard to the Soviets, we believe that if U.A.R. requirements for developmental assistance are met sufficiently (which may be difficult), it would seem unlikely that Nasser would again wish to face eastward. We would not rule out, however, a tacit unholy alliance between U.A.R. agents and local Communists plus other elements in the Arab states with a view to overturning existing regimes.

In addition to the negotiation of a multi-year PL-480 agreement with provision for annual review, selective DLF and Export-Import Bank financing and possibly a new approach to a stabilization program under IMF guidance, all of which we believe appropriate in the circumstances, perhaps the only slight hope we have for turning Nasser and the U.A.R. in the direction we wish them to go is personal diplomacy by President Kennedy. In the next few weeks we may recommend to the President that in the absence of seriously adverse public relations factors an invitation for a state visit be issued to Nasser very early in the new year, the visit to occur no later than early in March 1962. At that time the President could bring to bear his great prestige and persuasiveness with a view to heightening Nasser’s sense of statesmanship and bringing new perspective to his approach to domestic development.

In putting forward briefly our views and our proposals above, we consider that certain additional cautionary remarks are required. For more than three years we have conducted our affairs with the U.A.R. largely on the basis of “quiet diplomacy”, seeking to avoid violent pendular swings in the state of our relations, to emphasize those areas in which a satisfactory relationship is possible and to avoid public controversy when we disagree. The fact that we may undertake to expand economic assistance and to tighten our bonds will not lead the U.A.R. to lessen its fundamental hostility toward Israel nor to adopt positions satisfactory to the U.S. on issues on which our interests diverge. Further, it is essential in working out with the U.A.R. any given program that Egyptian officials understand clearly at the outset the obligations they must assume and the limits of the assistance within which we must work. In negotiating programs with the U.A.R. and in implementing them, we must not seek to push too far too fast. A step by careful step approach is called for. For years to come we expect the U.S. to bear most of the obligations while giving the barest minimum in return. We must not expect from the U.A.R. more than its circumstances permit, we must have infinite patience, we must not fluctuate frequently in our policy and actions, and we must be prepared to deal in a steady, consistent and understanding manner with the U.A.R. despite the provocations we may be called upon to endure. To do so will require a maturity and a constancy that will test our statesmanship and the political sophistication of our public.

II. Estimate of the Staying Power of the Present Syrian Government and Implications for United States Policy Toward Syria

In respect of the question regarding the staying power of the present Syrian regime there is enclosed a study prepared by the Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research entitled “The Outlook for Stability in Syria”.⁴ As will be observed therein the prospects for political stability are poor and hence our present principal political objective in Syria is to strengthen the present friendly regime and to discourage internal realignments detrimental to our interests. Actually the problem is external as well. An unchanging fundamental in the Syrian equation is practically unanimous Syrian fear of Israel and widespread distrust of the principal Western friends of Israel. This heritage we cannot escape, nor can we ameliorate it satisfactorily. A further external complication is that historically Syria has been a focus of area rivalries, the Egyptians pressing from one direction, the Saudis from another, Iraq from the east, and Turkey from the north. The U.S.S.R., of course, is in a position to exert pressures both from without and from within Syria, exploiting Syrian fear of Israel and the rivalries of other contenders, and facilitating penetration by internal Communists. Further, the British and French in the past have interfered in Syrian affairs. To the extent that these pressures (including that of Israel) can be eased, Syria’s prospects for stability will be enhanced. At the same time, to the extent that we ourselves place pressure on Syria or interfere in Syrian domestic affairs we shall not only reduce our influence but also shall hasten the process of internal political deterioration we seek to impede.

We believe that our approach to the problem of Syria must be from several directions concurrently:

1. Israel: While the Israelis to date have shown commendable restraint in order to avoid creating complications for the new Syrian regime and recently for the first time in several years are reported to have used the ISMAC in connection with a border problem, Israel has always regarded Syria as dangerously intransigent and the Israel-Syrian frontier has been the scene of literally thousands of incidents in the past thirteen years. We must be alert to any problems that appear to be developing along that border and be prepared to encourage Israel to continue indefinitely its recent restraint and its renewed participation in ISMAC.

2. U.A.R.: At present probably the most important external influence playing on Syria, the U.A.R. hopefully will eventually be able to accept a modus vivendi with Syria although some modification of the present Syrian regime to include elements friendly to the U.A.R. might be necessary. Indirectly our policy toward the U.A.R. is designed to contribute to such an effect and we believe that pressures from other Arabs will push the U.A.R. in this direction as may an ultimately less anti-Nasser and anti-U.A.R. policy on the part of the Syrian regime itself. We would seek quietly to encourage Syria in this direction.

3. Turkey: Should Turkey contemplate exerting pressure on Syria or interfering in internal Syrian affairs we would wish to dissuade her.

4. Britain and France: We believe it is possible to reach agreement with the U.K. on our approach to the problem of Syria. France, however, undoubtedly will again wish to conduct largely a unilateral policy toward Syria. To the best of our ability we shall seek to encourage constructiveness in such a role as France may wish to play in Syria. Economically France continues to maintain a mutually beneficial relationship with Syria despite absence of formal official relations. It is not impossible that the French will find it in their interest to meet at least a portion of Syrian arms requirements, reducing Syrian dependence on the Soviet Bloc in this respect.

5. Saudi Arabia: Given Saudi rivalry with both the U.A.R. and Iraq as well as the sensitivity of our own relationship with Saudi Arabia, it is doubtful that we are in a position to bring much weight to bear on Saudi policy. However, we probably can assume that in general Saudi activity in Syria will be less detrimental to our interest than that of others.

6. Iraq and Jordan: Both of these states have a more natural attraction for Syria than does Egypt other than the factors of the person of Nasser and Egyptian military power as an element of security against Israel. Both Jordan and Iraq are believed to wish to work out eventually a closer association with Syria, and many Syrians believe that Syria should seek such a relationship with Iraq and Jordan. While such a development, roughly the Fertile Crescent, would probably be in our interest in tending to create a better equilibrium in the Arab world and to concentrate the energies of the three states for some time on the development of institutions and operational frameworks, we believe that its stimuli must come from within and that over-pressure in this direction would be counter-productive not only in creating a negative reaction within the three states but also in creating a serious strain on our relations with the U.A.R. In our view the U.S. should in no way oppose such a development and upon occasion should in an extremely discreet manner let it so be known in proper quarters.

7. U.S. Relations with Syria: The principal limitations on U.S. policy vis-à-vis Syria are: (a) the close association of the U.S. with Israel in the popular Syrian mind, (b) our inability for domestic political reasons and long-standing area considerations to engage in the sale of significant quantities or types of arms to Syria, (c) our need to avoid antagonizing Nasser seriously, and (d) our earlier role in Syria. Within these limits we wish to find ways of effectively supporting the present ruling elements politically and economically; of undercutting the Soviet Bloc and the domestic Communists; and of maintaining a relationship with other significant non-Communist elements that will permit us to work with them satisfactorily should they take control of Syria.

Given the peculiar characteristics of Syria and its position in the Middle East, we believe that our policy must be conducted with utmost skill, circumspection and understanding of the Syrian scene and of the influences working on it. Apart from measures outlined above we propose (not necessarily all-inclusively):

A. Political: In the near future we should appoint an ambassador who is thoroughly familiar with Syria. We should favor resumption of an active Syrian role in U.N. organs. We should encourage other Western and certain Latin American countries to establish representation in Syria. Selected Syrian political figures should be invited to the U.S. and Western European countries should be encouraged to issue such invitations. Other forms of educational and cultural exchange should be encouraged. As appropriate, Syrian leaders should be assured that the U.S. continues to be prepared to prevent aggression in the area. Carefully selected anti-Communist intelligence and propaganda should be disseminated by appropriate means. Efforts should be made to direct Syrian arms requests to Western European countries and to encourage those countries to satisfy such requests within reason (we believe that ultimately the direction from which arms are supplied to Syria will influence significantly the political stability and political orientation of Syria.) We would seek an adequate but unostentatious presence in Syria, limiting our personnel to the extent compatible with requirements. Any form of intervention in internal Syrian politics would be avoided. We firmly believe that Syria, given half a chance, will prove both willing and able to prevent Communist domination if Western nations conduct a sound overt policy even though Syria may at times appear to be approaching the brink. Further, we believe that Western intervention in Syrian internal affairs would in fact only serve to strengthen the internal Communists as well as Soviet Bloc influence. We should avoid seeking to identify Syria with the West and equally should avoid public squabbles with Syria.

B. Economic: Syrians already have discussed certain training and technical assistance needs with our Embassy in Damascus and are also discussing at least three loans with the DLF. While recognizing that these proposals require careful evaluation, we are giving urgent and sympathetic attention to them. Resolution of the problem of a legal basis for U.S. operations in Syria is being expedited in order to permit determination of feasibility of proposed assistance projects. We wish to be as responsive as possible to Syrian requests. In so doing we shall endeavor to support what is essentially a conservative, free enterprise system. We are meeting promptly Syrian requests for surplus foodstuffs under PL-480. In the development category we are prepared within reason to act favorably on sound and properly documented projects. If necessary we shall examine our own means and encourage the IMF, other friendly nations and commercial banks to cooperate in assisting the Syrians to meet short-term requirements for a stabilization program and restoration of a free currency. We shall seek actively to promote trade between the U.S. and Syria, and we shall propose U.S. participation in the next Damascus Fair. Discreetly we have encouraged Tapline to meet the Syrian request for an early settlement with Syria, which involves a lump-sum payment of probably something over $8 million by Tapline.

In summary, Syria must be dealt with with the same delicacy as the U.A.R. Too close an identification of Syria with the West must be avoided yet a clear and beneficial political and economic interest in Syria must be shown by the West. Western pressures on Syria and interference in Syrian internal affairs must be avoided. Since achieving independence in 1945 the Syrians have been unable to rationalize their internal affairs and we cannot do for them what they are unable to do for themselves. Means must be found to satisfy such arms requirements as the Syrian Army may have, and, if necessary, Israel must be encouraged to treat Syria with kid gloves. While we seek to sustain the present ruling elements we must avoid prejudicing satisfactory relations with other significant non-Communist groups who may succeed to power.

(This paper has been circulated in draft to Defense, Treasury and CIA. On date of submission no response had been received from Defense. CIA has indicated informally that it cannot accept exclusion of covert political operations.)

L.D. Battle⁵

0. Source: Department of State, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 105. Secret. Drafted by Strong and Barrow (NEA/NE) on November 2 and concurred in by Meyer (NEA), Gold (E) in draft, McCoy (AID) in draft, Meloy (G), and Costanza (Treasury) for economic portions.
1. Document 128.
2. A description of the decrees is in telegram 144 from Cairo, July 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 886B.19/7–2161)
3. The Embassy in Cairo reported on the speech in telegram 713, October 17. (Ibid., 786B.11/10–1761)
4. Attached to the source text but not printed.
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.