319. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State0

1661. From Stoessel. General Norstad visited Athens September 24–25 to speak at opening session of annual conference Atlantic Treaty Association, derived following principal impressions from his numerous conversations:

1.
Regarding build-up of NATO forces, military authorities stated those necessary actions within present Greek means are being taken and those requiring reallocation of funds within overall present capability are being considered, but acknowledged that full response to present situation dependent on level of defense support and military assistance funds. Norstad found military authorities (he called on interim Defense Minister and met with Chiefs of Staff) in virtual ignorance of measures being taken in light of Berlin situation by other NATO members, including US.
2.
Norstad’s contacts reflected general expectation October election would return Caramanlis to office, with no strong convictions more precisely formulated. Prime Minister Dovas, among others, noted opinion of “political experts” that party’s showing might improve by a few percentage points probably leaving Caramanlis short of Parliamentary majority.
3.
Greeks with whom Norstad talked were unanimous in view that Exercise Checkmate1 had been useful to Greek people, with a positively good effect.
4.
During an analysis of Communist protests and threats prior to Checkmate, General Frontistis remarked that Averoff had interrupted Bulgarian charge’s reading of protest note (Athens 337 to Department),2 declaring it couched in unacceptable terms, and abruptly dismissing charge. Frontistis considers Bulgarian claims (in Athens and Sofia) to be worried about Greek actions not genuine, but merely propaganda. Greeks believe Bulgarians are increasing forces by holding conscripts longer and by calling additional conscripts and reservists, but note that an apparent increase of 20–25,000 is partly due to seasonal factors so that actual increase is about 15,000. Frontistis believes many of signs of reinforcement (temporary closing of roads to diplomats, stationing of tanks where clearly in evidence, etc.) are staged for effect, though he has evidence of some build-up in Struma Valley extension.
5.
King and Queen, after exchange of pleasantries, opened conversation by saying they intended to be frank and asking “If there is attack against Greece by Bulgaria, even small, are you coming to our defense?” Norstad replied, “Yes, Sir, without any question,” and elaborated from viewpoint of commitments and capacity of Alliance and of US record, beginning with Truman Doctrine and reinforced in word and action since. He mentioned Sixth Fleet presence and observed that Checkmate had demonstrated capacity for further reinforcement in matter of hours. King and Queen expressed warm appreciation for response and in return offered assurances that a border incident was farthest from Greek desire and that if one should occur government would go to great lengths to prevent it expanding.
6.
King and Queen look forward eagerly to visit and lunch aboard US nuclear submarine Shark, remarking they had learned of vessel’s port call “by accident”. When Norstad surmised US officials had perhaps wished to avoid embarrassing them, reply was “We do not embarrass easily”. Said they wished visit submarine to show its presence was all right, election or no, had been waiting for chance to make such public gesture “after what happened in Denmark and elsewhere.”

Comment: Norstad felt that warmth of response to his assurance of US and NATO support demonstrated both need for it and acceptance of it for the moment. Need is somewhat perplexing, especially in light recently renewed US pledge. Norstad concludes for time being that posing of question was but another manifestation of need characteristic of Greek Government for recurrent reassurance.

Gavin
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375/9–2661. Secret. Repeated to Athens and Sofia.
  2. NATO exercises in Thrace.
  3. Telegram 337 from Athens, September 3, reported Averoff’s response to the Bulgarian demarche. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.54/9–361)