Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

107. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State⁰

Belgrade, November 6, 1961, 1 p.m.

708. Eyes only for Under Secretary Bowles. In view forthcoming NSC review policy towards Yugoslavia, must request your personal attention to following.

I have, as you know, made various recommendations over recent weeks concerning general policy and aid to Yugoslavia: particularly despatch 41, July 20; series three messages following Belgrade conference (485, 493, 507); and telegram 614 reporting Todorovic’s approach and suggesting nature our reply.¹ President’s personal message (434)² of October 11 gave me impression approach embodied in these messages had met with his approval. Am now troubled by two circumstances, to wit:

1. Letter from Kohler, dated October 12,³ indicated basic disagreement with me on analysis Yugoslav situation and general policy, but did not specifically mention my recommendations concerning aid.

2. I now understand on basis indirect and informal information from AID that Department, without notifying me or communications in any way, has approached AID with proposals concerning future aid programs for Yugoslavia which take no visible account of my recommendations and are in most respects in conflict with them. Assume it is intended results this consultation between Department and AID will be laid before NSC as agreed paper. Am thus constrained to fear that unless something is done my own views will not come to attention NSC at all in context forthcoming review.

Do not mind being disagreed with but do dislike being silently by-passed. No one in Department has at any time commented on my recommendations re AID or suggested to me they were unacceptable. Feel I should be given opportunity for consultation and rebuttal, before Department commits itself to contrary views. Importance of AID concept within framework general policy is such that out of hand rejection, without consultation, would, if based on President’s authority, seem to raise serious question of confidence. Besides, in view present temper public opinion should think it obviously disadvantageous that Congress be faced with AID decisions for which Ambassador on spot could not share responsibility. Hope therefore you can see to it if contrary views are to be presented to NSC, my opinions are also made known to that body and that President, in particular, is made aware existence and nature of differences.

For your convenience, differences as I understand them on basis this indirect information are these:

A. I have recommended DLF assistance be continued unchanged; EUR proposes to cut it.

B. I have recommended no new technical assistance contracts along previous lines be concluded: EUR proposes to continue this program for at least several more years.

C. I have concluded programs of private agencies (CARE, Church World Service, etc.) no longer called for by circumstances and have, with concurrence local representatives here, recommended they be gradually tapered off over two or three years and terminated; EUR challenges this judgment and proposes continue them unchanged.

D. Have no idea what Department proposes to do about PL 480 aid, in coming period, but if this differs sharply from my recommendations, would very much like to know this and to know reasons therefor before Department finally commits itself in NSC.⁴

Kennan

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.68/11–661. Secret; Priority.
1. Telegram 493 is printed as Document 97. Regarding telegrams 485 and 507, see footnotes 1 and 4 thereto. Regarding despatch 41, see footnote 2 thereto. Telegram 614 is printed as Document 104.
2. Document 101.
3. Document 102.
4. In telegram 535, November 7, Bowles replied that “whatever emotional reactions may have existed here a few weeks ago in regard to Yugoslavia have largely been brought back into fair balance.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.68/11–761)