Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

313. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, March 5, 1962, 4 p.m.

2118. SHAPE for Norstad and US Element Live Oak. Deptel 2358.² In preliminary quadripartite discussions, Embassy has assessed corridor situation along following lines:

Apparent aim of Sov tactics since Feb 8 has been to introduce new procedures and flight practices designed to hamper and ultimately to deny Western use of the corridors. No single technique has been exhausted and abandoned, but rather several are being tried. USSR apparently plans to achieve interruption of air services to Berlin essentially by process of intruding Soviet flights into corridors. Governing characteristic of past practice for 16 years has been for Western powers to utilize corridors almost exclusively through system of BASC notifications based upon supposition and fact that Communists adjust their flights to Western convenience. Present moves seem to aim at providing completely new frame of reference which will a) replace prevailing Soviet accommodation by Allied adjustments to Soviet flights; b) complicate flight schedules in corridors and landing patterns in Berlin control zone; and c) change present character and role of BASC by altering conditions for which its present capability and functions are adequate.

If acquiesced in, Soviet practices obviously can be intensified to point of seriously affecting flights and landings and takeoffs in Berlin.

Major political aim of exercise is to degrade Western capability of air access, with effect of inducing popular nervousness as to safety of air link and of frightening civil airlines. Additional but perhaps even more visible goal is to establish flight regimen over East Germany which will establish or fortify GDR “sovereignty”. By establishing new unilateral criteria for flights, and withholding agreement to Western flights which do not conform to criteria, USSR is also creating prerequisite situation which could later be used as pretext for quitting BASC, or reducing Soviet function there to that of observers. This trend of action, therefore, points to ultimate intention to transfer control of Allied flights to the “GDR”. Other isolated demands converge toward same end, such as potential request for communication with GDR radio, and Stromov’s three requirements, including variation that USG should furnish Mansbach beacon time. It is this appreciation which has led Embassy to emphasize importance of withholding passage time over Mansbach (Embtel 2009).³

Soviet tactics so far have been gradualist, as evidenced by primarily technical instead of political approach, staying below 7,500 feet so as to avoid interference with routine traffic, efforts to conform to BASC proprieties by filing flight plans, stopping fighter harassments just short of what might have provoked equal response, and offering compromises on procedural demands. Low-key procedure reflects realization of dangers in introducing major change and probably is designed to reduce Allied reaction. Although moves give impression of experimentation, they are more than probe, since flights are continuing, and Soviets have introduced changes in BASC procedure which could remain as residuals even should flights stop. Considered as probe, however, they have revealed certain limits of Western reaction.

Serious recent development is scheduling of Soviet flights through Berlin control zone. Although it would be difficult for USSR physically to “saturate” corridors to unusability for Western military flights, this could be achieved with lesser effort for civil flights. Control zone could also be blocked even easier, particularly if USSR gives imprecise flight data and declines to adjust to local traffic control patterns.

Soviet moves face Western powers with two general sets of alternatives, either to make determined effort to stop Soviet flights in corridors and control zone, or to adjust to flights.

Possibility of effective Western adjustment to Soviet flights depends largely on level of Soviet activity. Adjustment can take two forms, first of which is present ad hoc scheduling of flight patterns and altitudes not in conflict with Soviet flights, thus recognizing sort of Soviet primacy in air. In long run it would be unworkable. Even if method could be maintained without yielding to Stromov’s three demands, it would require more accurate exchange of and adherence to flight data than is now customary in BASC. Outcome would probably be increasingly anarchical flight conditions with progressively greater dependence on radar and visual observations to ensure flight separations.

Trend of second type of adjustment would be through increased correlation of Eastern and Western flight information toward more effective integration of procedures than is possible through BASC and present rival ATC systems at Tempelhof and Schoenefeld. End result could be single unified ATC for all Berlin flights, which Communists would insist should be located at Schoenefeld.

Since both variants of second alternative are politically unacceptable, we conclude that means must be found to halt Soviet flights in their present form. We are now reviewing data and hope to be able to make specific recommendations in near future.

Dowling

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/3-562. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to SHAPE, USAFE, Berlin, Moscow, London, and Paris.
2. Telegram 2358, February 26, asked for an analysis of Soviet actions and demands in BASC including a description of Allied procedures and an assessment of the effect of Soviet actions. (Ibid., 962.72/2-2462)
3. Dated February 24. (Ibid.)