Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

194. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, October 27, 1961, 5 p.m.

1378. Re Deptel 1131.² Shortly before my 3 pm appointment I was informed Gromyko would see me after all. When I made points set forth Deptel Gromyko replied by reading me statement, text of which follows in separate tel, containing Soviet protest same incidents.³

I observed his statement alleged we had acted in violation established procedure. I pointed out contrary was case and East German police had changed practice which had existed for 16 years. He merely said we had made lots of changes on our side. He referred to his talks with Secretary and understanding that both sides would avoid steps which would lead to complications. He said action US military in Berlin contradicted this understanding and it followed that evidently American side had changed its mind. If so Sov Govt would be compelled to draw appropriate conclusions. I again pointed out it was their side that had initiated action and I could not understand this at time when we were preparing negotiate settlement problems with Sov Union. Gromyko said sovereign rights of GDR could not be subject of negotiation. US should take account of this in its actions. I asked him if they had already signed separate treaty with GDR. He said when treaty was signed many other things would be implemented and he had discussed these in detail with Secretary Rusk. He said all information available to Sov Govt made it clear there was no basis for statement I had made to him and that our side had sole responsibility for incidents on border. All police were trying to do was establish who people were in these vehicles. If US sincerely desired détente it should not complicate situation. He referred to use of tanks and jeeps. I said I thought it possible to settle this problem and that we would be prepared to discuss it either here or in Berlin but he showed no interest in pursuing subject. At end conversation I asked if he thought it would be useful to instruct our people in Berlin to attempt find solution. He replied Soviet representative would not take part in check point procedure and would not be sent to check points. I remarked this was not only possible solution but he said he was aware that General Watson had discussed this problem with Soviet authorities and that position he had taken was not correct. He said Soviet officials had also made representations to ours in Berlin.

At one point Gromyko said no one had right infringe on sovereignty of GDR. I pointed out that logic of his position was that East Germany would also stop our military personnel in uniform particularly as he had remarked that uniform itself was not proof of identity. He replied I could draw any conclusion I liked.

In view Gromyko’s unyielding position I did not put forward suggestions contained Deptel 1146.⁴ I pointed out we did not recognize sovereignty of GDR and that they were apparently trying force us recognize it in East Berlin prior to negotiations. I pointed out this resulted in extremely serious and dangerous situation.

Gromyko said he agreed with this. I concluded by saying I would inform my govt of his remarks.

My preliminary conclusion is that Soviets consider they have good issue and will be prepared use force.⁵

Thompson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-2761. Secret; Niact. Received at 1:42 p.m. Repeated to London, Bonn, Paris, and Berlin.
2. See footnote 3, Document 192.
3. Transmitted in telegram 1379 from Moscow, October 27. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-2761)
4. Telegram 1146 to Moscow, October 26, transmitted various administrative solutions to the problem of identity documents which might be proposed if the Soviet Union reacted “in any way positively” to Thompson’s initial proposals. (Ibid., 762.0221/10-2661)
5. In a subsequent telegram Thompson suggested that, in view of Gromyko’s position, the United States had four possible alternatives: 1) use force to ensure entry, 2) tell the Soviet Union there would be no negotiations until the situation was restored, 3) prohibit Americans in civilian clothing from traveling in military vehicles, and 4) agree to show identity cards to the East Germans, but state that this did not imply recognition of the German Democratic Republic. (Telegram 1386 from Moscow, October 27, 7 p.m.; ibid., 762.0221/10-2761)