356. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
PRESIDENT BOSCH AND INTERNAL SECURITY IN THEDOMINICAN REPUBLIC
President Juan Bosch of the Dominican Republic rightly considers that he has a popular mandate to bring about a radical transformation of political, economic, and social conditions in the Dominican Republic. He hopes to accomplish this purpose by such measures as agrarian and tax reform, economic development primarily through private foreign investment, and a more equitable distribution of earnings than has been the case hitherto.
There is currently under way a concerted campaign to discredit Bosch by charging that he is himself a crypto-Communist engaged in establishing a Communist dictatorship, or else that his ineptitude will lead to a Communist take over in the Dominican Republic. Manifestly, this campaign represents the reaction of vested interests who see their privileged position threatened by Bosch’s revolutionary purposes. It also reflects genuine concern regarding Bosch’s remarkably tolerant attitude toward Communist activities.
With reason, Bosch believes that the principal immediate threat to the accomplishment of his mission is the possibility of a reactionary coup. In this context, he has not hindered Communist organizational and agitational activities, so long as the Communists have avoided direct interference with him. He argues that to crack down on these activities would only precipitate a campaign of urban terrorism and guerrilla resistance like that in Venezuela, which would hinder the accomplishment of his constructive purposes.
Bosch understands that the security of his regime depends ultimately upon continued US support, particularly as a restraint upon the Dominican military. At the same time, he is nationalistic, egotistic, and aware of the political inexpediency of appearing to be a US puppet. Consequently, he is not readily amenable to US advice regarding his policy with respect to Communist activities.
The Communist danger in the Dominican Republic is not immediate, but potential. It is none the less serious. Given present freedom to organize and agitate, the Communists will become better prepared to exploit some future opportunity. If Bosch should fail to satisfy the expectations of the Dominican masses, or if he should be overthrown by [Page 733] a reactionary coup, the Communists would have an opportunity to seize the leadership of the popular revolutionary movement. This does not mean that they would directly come to power—the Dominican military have the will and ability to prevent that for the foreseeable future. It does mean that the Communists would have gained the advantage of identification with the popular side in a continuing class struggle.
[Here follows a table of basic facts on the Dominican Republic.]
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Dominican Republic, June 14-July 31, 1963. Secret.↩