Here is a report from Bob Murphy about his visit to
Trujillo with Igor Cassini.2
Murphy’s conclusion is that our hostility to the Dominican Republic is
unwise; he thinks we should “walk back the cat and initiate a policy of
guidance.” He thinks that the groups at Ciudad
Trujillo are willing and eager “to be taken by
the hand and to institute democratic reforms.”
I know nothing of the Dominican Republic except by hearsay, but I think
there can be little doubt that the whole concept of the Alliance for
Progress would be gravely shadowed in the eyes of Latin Americans if we
were to move to anything like a policy of “friendly guidance” toward
Trujillo.
At the risk of misunderstanding, I think I ought to add that if the
public were to know that Igor Cassini is providing public relations help
to Trujillo, your own personal position as a
liberal leader might be compromised. I cannot help thinking that your
own position should be fully disengaged from any venture of this
sort.
Attachment
Accompanied by Igor Cassini, I had private and informal talks at the
Palacio Nacionale, Ciudad Trujillo, April 15 and 16, 1961, with Dr.
Joaquin Balaguer,
President of the Dominican Republic, Foreign Minister Porfirio Herrera Baez, Personal
Assistant to President Balaguer, Otto Vega,
[Page 626]
and Generalissimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina.
Protocol was carefully observed at both meetings to mark the status
of the Generalissimo as a private citizen; we were first received
for a few minutes by the President and the Foreign Minister for
perfunctory conversation. Then we were joined by the Generalissimo
who acted as Dominican spokesman.
It developed from the conversations that conditions on the Island are
stable and calm; that there is no suffering or actual inconvenience
resulting from the OAS embargo. The
effect of it is disturbing in the psychological and political sense
and of course it is deeply resented.
My approach was that of asking questions in order to explore the
situation, seeking a solution, with emphasis on the traditional
friendship between our two countries. I suggested that while it is
perhaps true that the vast majority of North Americans are
uninformed about and little interested in the affairs of the
Dominican Republic, a minority are highly critical of the
“Trujillo dictatorship”. They, I suggested,
were better judges than I of sentiment in Latin America.
During the course of the conversations there were frank references to
the 6th OAS meeting at San Jose; to
the feud between Betancourt
and Trujillo;3 to the
necessity of free elections in the Dominican Republic with some form
of OAS supervision; to the question
of the Dominican future should the Generalissimo disappear from the
scene, for example, as a result of illness or accident; and to the
urgent need for better communication between the D.R. and other
American Republics, including the U.S. as well as the U.N. I
referred to a certain preoccupation in Washington and elsewhere of
stories regarding alleged tortures, brutalities and suppression by
the regime. I stressed the hostility in certain quarters and among
sectors of the press against what they believed to be a cruel
dictatorship which did not disdain corrupt methods in its dealings.
I referred also to the concern that the D.R. not become another Cuba
as a result of a vacuum created by the eventual disappearance of
Trujillo, and the possible entrance of
elements antagonistic to the U.S.
I found an alertness regarding all these problems. The following
emerged from our talks:
The Generalissimo not only does not intend to leave the D.R. as
Batista left Cuba but he and his associates see no reason to do so.
He is certainly no Batista. Trujillo in his seventieth year seems in
excellent health and spirits. He manifests what appears to be
genuine confidence in the stability of the position. He pointed to
the fact that the Republic’s
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constitution requires Presidential elections in May, 1961. He and
his associates said that it would be most difficult to amend the
constitution to require earlier elections. However,
Trujillo declared that he is prepared to
accept OAS observers and the full
publicity. He seemed persuaded that the situation required freer
contact with the press. Mr. Cassini provided a helpful and convincing account of
President Kennedy’s handling
of this important problem, especially the feature of open
conferences, and the acceptance of the fact that there would be
inevitably critical and even hostile elements attending. The
Dominicans seemed to agree that there was wisdom in meeting these
openly in the hope that as they feel their case is sound,
sympathetic support would be forthcoming from many sectors of the
press who are not prejudiced a priori.
The Generalissimo expressed vigorous confidence in the stability of
the Dominican situation, believing that the population stands
whole-heartedly behind the present program and approved what has
been achieved in the past to improve the living conditions of the
mass and to provide better opportunities for the average man. He
stated his belief that if he should disappear, constitutional
processes are adequate to maintain the position. He emphasized that
he has no plans to perpetuate a Trujillo
dynasty, confirming what his son had recently said on the
subject.
According to the Generalissimo he intends to stand on the side of the
U.S. regardless of the present difficulties.
Trujillo authorized Mr. Cassini to work out a plan of
improved communications including the selection of a professional
public relations expert from the U.S. to work in the D.R. for a
better public image of the D.R. abroad. An attack would be made on
baseless and distorted stories regarding the regime and the light of
day thrown on the allegations frequently of obscure origin
concerning brutalities and suppression. The intention would be to
open the D.R. to a truly free press recognizing that a controlled
press is a liability.
The Foreign Minister read to us a draft of an informal and personal
letter he planned to send to Secretary Rusk and fifteen other L.A. Foreign Secretaries. In
essence it was an historical account of the D.R.’s foreign policy
and an expression of regret over the OAS resolution and attitude. He asked for my reaction.
I replied that my personal reaction was unfavorable because if I
were an addressee of such a letter I would not know what to do with
it. I might interpret it wrongly as an expression of anxiety whereas
I had gained the impression that they did not so intend it. They all
agreed that it would be more effective to institute a series of
informal representations by qualified persons in the various
capitals. They said they would be grateful if I would discuss it at
a convenient moment with Secretary Rusk.
[Page 628]
Comment:
It might be useful to compare American policy vis-à-vis other
countries in different areas—countries which are similar in size and
presenting various interpretations of democratic government. Three
analogies occur to me: Tunisia, Guinea and the Republic of the Congo
(French).
In the case of the Dominican Republic, the U.S. has broken diplomatic
relations for hemispheric reasons no doubt which are arguable, but
certainly having some relationship to the Betancourt-Trujillo feud,
and specifically for the consideration of the pallid OAS resolution at San Jose on Cuba. Yet
there is no question that the D.R. has provided consistent support
of U.S. policies especially in the field of E-W relations, than any
of the three countries mentioned. Also as distinguished from the
D.R., the U.S. has extended substantial material aid to the other
countries mentioned.
The U.S. maintains friendly diplomatic relations with the
“democracies” of Bourguiba, of Sekou Toure, and of Abbe Youlou.
Tunisia has approximately the same size population and is if
anything poorer than the D.R. Surely no one would suggest that when
it comes to strong arm methods, Bourguiba would yield any ground to
Trujillo. Sekou Toure’s approach to
democracy is of course several degrees less liberal than either
Bourguiba or Trujillo. Sekou Toure of course
has to deal with a more primitive population whose ideas of
democracy are hazier than Tunisian or Dominican, and whose economy
is also more primitive.
The case of Abbe Youlou at Brazzaville is that of a classic approach
of a tribal leader coming to power by the massacre of opposing
tribal leaders. He is now in apparently absolute control as a result
of brutal methods for which there is a tradition in the area. By no
stretch of the imagination is Brazzaville the capital of a democracy
in our sense of the word, and yet quite properly we maintain
diplomatic relations with that country, as we do with Guinea and
Tunisia. Yet we have broken with the D.R. which is close to our
shores and very close to Cuba. I am frankly puzzled as to the wisdom
of our position. Should we not walk back the cat and initiate a
policy of guidance. The moment would seem ripe for it. The present
situation does not seem to call for harshness and public
condemnation but rather a process of friendly leadership. It seems
to me that the group at Ciudad Trujillo are
eager and willing to be taken by the hand and to institute
democratic reforms.
