231. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy)
to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)0
Washington, December 6,
1962.
We agreed that I would send you a summary of the informal comments made on
the draft memorandum on “Future Policy toward Cuba”1 which was discussed
in the Executive Committee on Tuesday, December 4th.2
First, it was generally agreed that there should be a reorganization of our
machinery for Cuban action. In particular, there seemed to be general
support for the idea of an Office of Cuban Affairs which could be public and
above board, and which might do a more effective job with free Cubans and
others concerned with the hopes for post-Castro Cuba.
You and I agreed after the meeting that you would explore the availability
of a particularly well-qualified individual to head this office.
With respect to the draft memorandum itself, the following general comments
were made:
[Page 587]
- 1.
- The memorandum is correct in recommending that no general policy
be approved or set in motion until the current discussions with the
Soviets on Cuba have developed somewhat further.
- 2.
- The proposed action in the OAS
should not be framed sharply until we know more clearly what kind of
resolution is likely to obtain unanimous or nearly unanimous
support. Our current posture in the OAS is so strong that we should not weaken it for
marginal advantages.
- 3.
- Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the draft statement seemed
approximately correct; paragraph 7 needed further development in
order to distinguish desirable from undesirable travel to Cuba;
paragraph 8 should make it clearer that it is Cuban funds whose
transfer needs to be surveyed and controlled if possible; paragraphs
9 and 10 need to be spelled out carefully in cooperation with the
other agencies primarily concerned.
The covert annex was considered only very briefly, but the preliminary sense
of the meeting was that covert activities should be concentrated upon
improvement in the collection of intelligence for the immediate future, and
that we should not plan early sabotage activities.
Other items in the covert annex were not properly considered.
Attachment
3
Draft Memorandum for President Kennedy
SUBJECT
- Future Policy toward Cuba
Policy
Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow of the
Castro regime and its replacement by one sharing the aims of the Free
World. Our immediate objectives are to weaken the regime; frustrate its
subversive intentions; further reduce its influence in the Hemisphere;
and increase the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime (or split the
regime off from the Bloc).
A policy of containing, undermining, discrediting and isolating the
Castro regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic economic,
[Page 588]
psychological and other
pressures will achieve these immediate objectives and could create
propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate
objective.
Courses of Action
The following overt4 courses of action should be undertaken:
- 1.
- OAS action: condemning the
Castro regime for its duplicity; extending the trade embargo to
all items except foodstuffs, medicines and medical supplies;
further limiting air and sea communications between the
Hemisphere and Cuba; authorizing air and other surveillance; and
warning Cuba against continued promotion of subversive and
sabotage activities.
- 2.
- Establishment of Caribbean security arrangements through
ministerial level meetings of the Caribbean countries for the
purposes of reaching agreement on increasing the intensity of
surveillance of coastal and international waters; increased
surveillance and control of land boundaries; increased control
over subversive activities within national boundaries;
systematic exchange of intelligence information; and,
development of procedures for coordination of military
contingency planning for emergencies.
- 3.
- Application of the four-point shipping restrictions re Cuba.
- 4.
- Inclusion by NATO of Cuba on
the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is
prohibited.
- 5.
- Discussion of Free World industrial nations from shipping
crucial spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.
- 6.
- Persuasion of non-Bloc nations to limit their airlines service
to Cuba and to withhold transit rights to Soviet aircraft
serving Cuba.
- 7.
- Persuasion of Latin American nations to limit the travel of
their nationals to Cuba and to intensify measures to prevent
agents and groups of international communism from carrying on
their subversive activities.
- 8.
- Persuasion of appropriate OAS
organs to study urgently the transfer of funds to the other
American Republics for subversive purposes, the plan of
subversive propaganda and the utilization of Cuba as a base for
training in subversive techniques; and to make recommendations
to the member states regarding counter-measures.
- 9.
- Maintenance of currently enhanced VOA mediumwave facilities beamed to Cuba and
adoption by VOA of a more
aggressive line toward Cuba.
- 10.
- Facilitation of Cuban exiles’ entry into the United States
Armed Forces for training, and formation of reserve units
thereafter.
Timing
We should surface our program of isolating and weakening Cuba when it
becomes clear that our discussions on Cuba with the Soviets are unlikely
to be fruitful. Actions with respect to Cuba which may contribute
substantially to creating a situation calling for United States military
action should be withheld until the Soviet combat units have been
removed from Cuba or efforts to persuade the USSR to remove them have failed.
Annex A
5
Covert Courses of Action
- 1.
- Support fully the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are
associated with the original aims of the 26 July movement and who
believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within, in
order that they may: a) cause a split in the leadership of the
regime at the national or provincial levels; and, b) create a
political base of popular opposition to the regime.
- 2.
- Continue to support the Cuban Revolutionary Council in its efforts
to maintain a degree of order and unity in the Cuban exile
community.
- 3.
- Assist selected Cuban exile groups to encourage the Cuban people
to engage in minor acts of sabotage.
- 4.
- Utilize selected Cuban exiles to sabotage key Cuban installations
in such a manner that the action can plausibly be attributed to
Cubans in Cuba.
- 5.
- Sabotage Cuban cargo and shipping, and Bloc cargo and shipping to
Cuba.
- 6.
- Encourage the defection of Cuban diplomats, officials and
delegates abroad.
- 7.
- Continue to assist and guide Cuban exiles in their radio
broadcasts to Cuba.
- 8.
- Encourage and assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to
launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials
from international waters to Cuba.
- 9.
- Develop more fully a clandestine “Voice of Free Cuba” radio
capability either in Cuba or from a submarine in international
waters.
- 10.
- Develop more fully a capability for covertly intruding upon Cuban
television broadcasts.
- 11.
- Unless future developments warrant change, emphasize the following
themes in covert propaganda output: a) the need to return to the
original aims of the Cuban revolution; b) the Castro regime’s
betrayal of these aims; and, c)Castro, as a
pawn in the Soviet expansionist game, having subordinated Cuba’s
national interests to those of the USSR.
- 12.
- Assist, through subsidy if necessary, non-Bloc importers of Cuban
sugar to find alternative sources of supply.
