Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

179. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant Special Counsel (Goodwin) to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, April 26, 1961.

Here are few scattered thoughts on the “Cuba” problem.

Cuba is a threat to the security of the United States in two basic ways:

1. As a direct military menace in the Caribbean, a menace which will be intensified as communist arms shipments continue. However, even this increased danger will be minimal. Our treaty obligations commit us to the defense of any American nation which is attacked directly. Any military moves by Castro could be met immediately by our forces. Similarly we could intervene in case of Castro military aid to guerilla operations in the Americas.

2. As an exporter of revolution: There is no doubt that Cuba is being used as a base for export of the communist-fidelista revolution. This is done through the actual supply of funds and technical assistance to insurgent elements, through widespread and reasonably effective prop-aganda apparatus including a news service and radio network and through the use of Cuba as an example of the alliance between fidelismo and necessary social reform—identification with the welfare of the people.

This threat is significant—especially in the Caribbean area. However, even here, in the last six months there has been a significant decline in Cuban effectiveness. This has come because of the growing isolation of communist-fidelista elements from the Democratic left as Castroʼs pro-Soviet bent has become more apparent; and as Castro has become increasingly erratic in his personal behavior. There are signs, in fact, that, the communists are looking for another, more stable, hero—perhaps Cardenas of Mexico.

3. While this means a declining influence of fidelismo over popular movements; it does not necessarily lessen the importance of Cuban-Soviet-Chinese material and technical aid to revolutionary movements. It is important to remember that even if Castro were wiped out tomorrow we would not have solved the problem of communist influence in the Americas. In fact, most of the greatest danger spots (e.g. Northeast Brazil, Colombia back-country, communist dominated student movements, etc.) do not owe either their existence or strength to Castro, but to local and independent leadership. This danger has been steadily growing, and would continue to grow if our only anti-communist move were to knock out Castro. These movements will benefit from material assistance, even if they do not look to Cuba for leadership.

Suggested Course of Action:

Action Aimed at Cuba Directly

1. Before acting directly against Castro, in any fashion, we need a complete reassessment of the vulnerability of his regime—the degree of popular support, the probably declining position of the Cuban economy and its impact on the Cuban people, the efficiency of his police state, the possibilities of underground organization, etc. Without such an assessment it is impossible to realistically determine what alternative courses of action are open to us.

2. To meet the military threat we can work out defense agreements with Central American nations along the lines suggested by Professor Berle.

3. We should approach the government of Chile to call an Inter-American arms limitation conference. This conference should deal with methods of stopping external arms shipments in the context of the over-all limitations which are desperately needed in Latin America. We should decide, before this meeting, whether the risks in an OAS blockade of arms shipments to Cuba are outweighed by the dangers involved in halting and searching international shipping.

4. Immediately consult with heads of major nations in Latin America to see how far they are willing to go in terms of collective action. This should be done via a personal emissary. Although we should have a reasonably clear idea of what we want to do, this should be a genuine consultation among allies. All the myriad proposals for OAS action, etc., depend on the reaction of other Latin nations—a reaction as yet undetermined.

5. Underlying all these proposals is the feeling that we should not move quickly in direct action against Cuba. I do not believe that there is any course of direct action which we can wisely take on the basis of current knowledge and conditions.

Attempts to stop direct export of Castroism

1. We should provide Caribbean nations with the technical help (e.g. radar to spot incoming planes) and navy patrol assistance to meet the dangers of arms shipments from Cuba to insurgent elements in those nations.

2. There are two or three real danger spots (e.g. Dominican Republic and Haiti) where we should now be developing democratic alternatives to the present regime—organizing replacement governments. If we do not do this then the inevitable changes in governments may be followed by Castro-type regimes. When Democratic alternatives are organized we should consider means of precipitating the fall of Trujillo and Duvalier and possibly Somoza. In this way we can exert maximum control over the type of replacement government— the timing and initiative should be ours.

3. Help provide counter-propaganda assistance to Latin governments—e.g. radio transmitters. The more we can work through Democratic-liberal forces in Latin America, rather than through USIA alone, the more effective will be our propaganda.

General counter-communist operations

Our long-range strategy in the Americas should have two basic elements:

• First, the organization of a strong political counter-force. We have a ready instrument in the newly organized League of Democratic Parties. We should assist these parties—financially and technically—to develop progressive political movements (in some cases revolutionary movements, especially in the less progressive countries) through helping them in techniques of organization down to the village level, ideological warfare, etc. U.S. government help should be covert.
• Second, the Alianza para el progreso. This program with its emphasis on social and economic advance is the real hope of preventing a communist takeover. The Alianza is proceeding about as rapidly as possible given present organization of effort, and the magnitude of available funds. Both of these elements are unsatisfactory.

  A. Funds: Present plans provide for the allocation of 250-350 million dollars worth of economic assistance to Latin America in fiscal 1962. This is out of a total of 2.4. billion. (This sum does not include the social development fund.) One hundred million of this will go to Brazil to get them over their current financial crisis. I am not clear that any substantial re-allocation could be made given the enormous needs in Asia (especially in India and Pakistan)—although I believe there can be some increase. However, these funds are probably not sufficient to make a real and effective start in economic development.

  B. Organization: If communist takeover comes in Latin America it probably will not come through guerilla warfare, but through the capture of indigenous revolutionary movements. We cannot meet such a threat effectively—well-organized as it is—when our overseas operations are as diffuse and uncoordinated as they are today. The aid program, the political bureaus of State, the USIA, educational exchange, CIA activities all go, to too great an extent, their own way under separate heads and often in pursuit of separate goals. I believe that diffusion of effort results in great waste of resources and intelligence. We must organize our non-military overseas operation to reflect our basic objective in Latin America—the strengthening of democratic Western-oriented nations and governments so that they have the capacity to resist communist and neutralist attack in all its forms. Those who are charged with the responsiblity for achieving this objective must have control over the instruments which our government provides. Just as we have seen the need for some centralization of command in fighting hot wars—it is needed for effectively waging a cold war. This does not necessaily mean a “Chief of Hemisphere Operations”; but at the very least it means that, within each key country there must be a central operational capacity and authority with direct lines to the levels of action in Washington.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/61-4/61. Secret. The memorandum is a draft and is not initialed; it was not uncommon, however, for such papers to go forward in draft form.