Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

648. Memorandum from Thompson to Rusk, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy, April 6¹

April 6, 1963

SUBJECT

• Memorandum of Conversation Between Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR and Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, Department of State, Saturday, 10:00 a.m., April 6, 1963.

I explained to the Ambassador that the postponement of the talks on Berlin was entirely due to the Secretary’s heavy schedule and said the Secretary thought that in view of the very short time he would have, it would be better to wait until they could have a more thorough discussion. When I started to describe what the Secretary’s schedule had been in the last few days, the Ambassador interrupted to say he was well aware of this and completely understood the reason for postponement.

I then went on to say that he had occasionally asked for personal advice from me on various questions, and that today I would like to consult him on the same personal basis. I said I had been informed of the conversation he had had a few days ago and that it seemed clear from this and from other indications that misunderstanding between our two countries was increasing and seemed to me to be quite serious. I had been considering recommending to the Secretary and the President that the President send some high-level official in whom he had complete confidence and who was privy to his thinking to see the Chairman for an informal talk with the objective of clearing away as much of this misunderstanding as possible. I said this, of course, did not indicate any lack of confidence in Ambassador Kohler, but that this sort of thing could only be done by someone who was in close contact with the President. I did not wish to make such a recommendation if it would not be helpful, and I found it difficult to make up my own mind. I said that I realized that on both sides there were difficult problems just now and that I could understand that the timing might be awkward for both of us.

Dobrynin said, without hesitation, that he thought it would be a very good idea. He pressed very hard to know what specific person I had in mind. I tried to put him off by saying simply that it should be a high-level official who was in a position to know what was in the President’s mind on various problems. He continued to press for a name by way of illustration and I finally mentioned the Secretary, the Attorney General, and Mr. Harriman. I had previously mentioned the Laos problem and said that it could be that developments would be such that a visit by Mr. Harriman, ostensibly on this problem, would be easiest to explain. I said I thought that if the Secretary should go, there would have to be some problem that could be dealt with successfully. I said that if it were the Attorney General, there would have to be some excuse, and I mentioned the possibility of visiting the Leningrad and Moscow Universities where we had students, and pointed out that the Attorney General had made previous trips abroad particularly in connection with universities and youth problems. I inquired if he knew of any event coming up in the Soviet Union which might be used in this connection. Dobrynin inquired about timing, and I said I thought this would depend upon developments, but I should have thought some time within a month. He repeated he thought it would be an excellent idea for someone to go and would think about the matter and let me know if he had any further thoughts.

I also told the Ambassador that I understood the President would probably send Mr. Khrushchev a personal letter, probably some time next week.

I then asked the Ambassador what his guess was as to what particular issues were bothering the Chairman. He mentioned first the Cuban affair and said that he was sure, from his own experience in Moscow, that they would interpret the emigre raids as having been condoned if not actually run, by the United States Government. He did not mean necessarily the President but perhaps one of the other agencies. He [illegible in the original] thought this had been interpreted as a deliberate effort to embarrass the Soviet Union. He also said that outside the Government, particularly in the Foreign Office, people in Moscow did not distinguish between statements made by prominent Senators, for example, and responsible members of the Executive Branch.

Dobrynin referred to the Soviet troop withdrawals and the statements by Senator Keating and others which made it look as though the Soviets were withdrawing under pressure. He said that from having attended meetings in Moscow, he knew that they were particularly sensitive to any thought that they were being pushed around or yielding to pressure, and said that while our Government might react the same way, he thought they were particularly prone to this in Moscow. I said I could assure him that while I could not speak for every individual, I knew that no agency of the Government condoned these raids, much less connived at them, and referred to the vigorous action we were taking to stop them. The Ambassador indicated he understood this.

The Ambassador then referred to the disarmament discussions and particularly the negotiations on a test ban. He said he had actually seen the telegram which Kuznetsov had sent reporting his conversation with Dean, who referred to two to four inspections, but stressed the importance of an acceptance in principle. He said he was sure that the Soviet Government and he himself had been convinced that the Chairman’s letter accepting two or three inspections had solved the matter, and that when we had come back with a proposal of eight, the Soviet Government considered it had been led into a trap, and that this had been a deliberate effort to play games with them. I pointed out that Mr. Dean had categorically denied having made the statement attributed to him and, quite apart from this, I could assure him that there had never been any thought of our agreement to any such number. The Ambassador replied he was not discussing this but simply trying to explain the reaction in Moscow. He added that when he had delivered the Chairman’s letter to the Attorney General, the latter remarked that this was fine, and the Ambassador had been convinced himself that the matter was settled.

In this connection, the Ambassador referred to the readiness with which the Chairman had agreed to receive Norman Cousins, who had told the Ambassador that he had seen the President, that he had no mandate whatever from him, but would like to talk to Khrushchev about testing in order to explain the thinking of the American people, as well as what he understood was in the mind of the President and other officials. I said I hoped he understood that Norman Cousins was not particularly close to the President nor the Secretary and probably not in a position to give any authoritative account of their thinking, although he was a man of good will. The Ambassador said he thoroughly understood this and had explained it to the Chairman. He merely cited it as indicative of the Chairman’s interest in trying to understand our thinking and reach agreement on this problem.

The Ambassador asked me what subject would be covered in the President’s letter, and I said I did not know, but imagined it would cover more than one subject as there were a number of serious issues between us.

1. Memorandum of conversation between Dobrynin and Thompson, April 6. Top Secret. 4 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 77 D 163, Pen Pal Series, Special US–USSR Files, 1963.