Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

390. Circular telegram 743 to all diplomatic and consular posts, October 24¹

October 24, 1962, 10:41 p.m.

Inform Consuls.

There is urgent need for clarity and consistency in our statements explaining our action against Soviet bases in Cuba. What follows is intended as guidance for US officials at home and abroad in their public and private discussions of this matter.

We should have clearly in mind what the problem is and what it is not. We can expect a massive effort at distortion from Moscow and it must be countered at every opportunity. Moreover, we should be using actively every opportunity to explain our position rather than waiting to react to Communist or Cuban accusations.

Our present course of action is directed against the following:

1. the sudden and secret introduction into the Western hemisphere of aggressive weapons by Soviet Union;

2. the expansion of aggressive military power by a state whose avowed aim is imposition of an alien doctrine on free men;

3. abrupt alteration of already delicate balance of military forces in world, imperiling countries and peoples heretofore free from threat of attack by nuclear weapons;

4. creation of a new and obvious threat to peace of hemisphere and of world.

Our response is:

1. that of free men and free governments in interests of their own defense and security;

2. that of Western Hemisphere against introduction of Soviet power;

3. that of a region replying collectively to a new and serious threat;

4. a restrained and limited reaction against a specific danger.

Measures now launched are not:

1. effort to impose our political system on Cuban people;

2. attempt to control or restrict Cuba’s right to arrange for its legitimate defense requirements;

3. confrontation between US and Cuba;

4. act of war or attempt to force Cuba to her knees.

It should be clear that we deplore the fact of foreign domination over Cuban people, abandonment of Cuba’s national interests for those of alien power, imposition of an ideology and a system opposed by vast majority of Cuban people. But we are confident that Cuban people, with wisdom and courage, will correct this situation in their own way and in their own time.

We should not permit confusion between objectives of our present course of action and our long-range hopes for restoration of freedom and independence in Cuba. We must hammer home this message to every audience, most particularly to Cubans themselves.

Historical Base

Our present course is firmly rooted in history. We must try to clarify for our friends unique relationship that has developed inside this hemisphere over years. Essence of Monroe Doctrine is well known, at least among sophisticated audiences. We should point out, however, that opposition to intrusion of outside power into hemisphere has been as much an element of Latin American political thought and tradition as it is of our own. The great Latin American liberator, Simon Bolivar, expressed himself often and forcibly on this matter.

This tradition—of unified opposition to foreign tyranny and foreign power—is at root of special relationship that binds American states. It has been formalized in Organization of American States and in many declarations of policy and attitude subscribed to over years by all governments in hemisphere, including Cuban Govt before it placed itself under foreign masters.

Special ties of tradition, history, culture, religion, language, and the like are not unique to Western Hemisphere though they are more firmly established here in terms of political organization. We can reasonably ask our friends around world to relate sentiment that prevails in our hemisphere on this matter with their own special feelings of affinity with their neighbors or others. Even Russian audience might get a better appreciation of our position if they contrast it with their own feeling of special interest and attachment to Central Europe.

Exposition of our case on basis of history, tradition or special ties should be carefully tailored to audience at hand, drawing on parallels that are meaningful and convincing.

Legal Base

Quarantine against shipments of offensive military equipment to Cuba is being carried out in accordance with a recommendation of OAS. It is an action clearly authorized by Rio Treaty (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance). Moreover, it is consistent with provisions of UN Charter.

Rio Treaty has as its fundamental purpose “to assure peace, through adequate means, to provide for effective reciprocal assistance to meet armed attacks against any American State, and . . . to deal with threats of aggression against any of them.” Emplacement of Soviet missiles in Cuba is regarded by all other American States as such a threat.

Treaty provides for collective action not only against armed attack but also against “any other fact or situation that might endanger peace of America.” Measures which may be taken under treaty specifically include “use of armed force.”

Present course adopted by American family of nations against Soviet threat in Cuba is consistent with earlier statements of policy adopted by OAS. In 1960, at meeting of American foreign ministers, Organization “condemned intervention or threat of intervention of extra-continental communist powers in hemisphere.” At Punta del Este, in 1962, foreign ministers went further. They declared that “continental unity and democratic institutions of hemisphere are now in danger.” Source of danger was specified: “the subversive offensive of communist govts.”

Organization agreed to prohibit all trade in arms with Cuba. It excluded the Castro regime from participation in organs of Inter-American system.

On Oct. 2–3 of this year, foreign ministers of American States met informally in Washington and reiterated that “Soviet Union’s intervention in Cuba threatens unity of Americas and its democratic institutions.” Foreign Ministers agreed that developments called for “adoption of special measures, both individual and collective.”

It was against this background of repeated warnings and statements of policy toward Soviet intervention in Cuba that OAS acted on Oct. 23. Without a dissenting vote, OAS recommended that its members “take all measures, individually and collectively including use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that Govt. of Cuba cannot continue to receive from Sino-Soviet powers military matériel and related supplies which may threaten peace and security of continent and to prevent missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to peace and security of the Continent.”

Quarantine of Cuba is being carried out in accordance with this clear statement of policy on part of Inter-American family of nations.

Question may be raised whether this kind of action by a regional grouping of states is in accordance with UN Charter. Answer is: yes.

UN Charter recognizes and approves existence of regional organizations of states provided their actions are consistent with purposes and principles of UN. Measures being undertaken against secret and dangerous stationing of aggressive Soviet force in Cuba represent, in words of UN Charter, “effective collective measures for prevention and removal of threats to peace.”

Importance of regional groupings in maintenance of peace was recognized in earliest conceptions of UN. Draft prepared at first conference at Dumbarton Oaks is virtually same as Chapter VIII of UN Charter.

Subject was discussed in detail at founding conference at San Francisco in 1945. And in course of discussion, Inter-American system was examined and approved as precisely kind of regional grouping anticipated in Charter.

In summary, (1) quarantine of Cuba is an action within competence of OAS and is consistent with objectives specified in Rio Treaty; (2) action under Rio Treaty accords with provisions of UN Charter.

It may be argued that Cuba has been excluded from Inter-American family and is, therefore, not bound by decisions of OAS. It may be argued, too, that under the Rio Treaty no American state is bound to carry out action without its own approval.

First, it should be noted that Cuba itself has not been expelled from OAS but only present puppet govt of that unhappy state. Second, Castro regime has not to date repudiated its membership in Inter-American Organization. In any event, Cuba remains in Western Hemisphere. Like it or not, a citizen with smallpox becomes a legitimate concern for community as a whole and must be subject to certain limitations and controls. Introduction of aggressive and dangerous weapons in hands of alien authorities and located within hemisphere is a source of rightful concern—and reaction—for neighboring states.

Disagreement is not between Cuban people and their neighbors. It is between an extra-hemispheric power with expansionist aims and members of Inter-American family. If there were not aggressive Soviet weapons at Soviet bases in Cuba, there would be no quarantine directed at their removal.

Meaning for non-Communist world

Other nations, allied with US or unallied, have an interest in Cuban developments that may not be apparent to them. Some may be inclined to see no immediate threat to their own interests or to argue that surely the powerful US can take care of any danger from Cuba.

First, it should be noted that the presence of a Soviet nuclear missile capability could, if allowed to continue, represent a significant change in already delicately balanced forces in world. Unless this danger is eliminated before it is allowed to grow, it would mean diversion of significant resources—in manpower, matériel, and weapons—to counter this new threat to free world’s security.

Our resources, great as they are, are not inexhaustible. Money, men and missiles that might have to go into effort to counter Soviet presence in Cuba would then not be available for other areas and other friends.

In addition, introduction of Soviet missile power into Western hemisphere would significantly increase Moscow’s potential for nuclear blackmail against country that is bulwark of defense for its 40-plus allies and for all free men.

In terms of Soviet effort, one medium range missile in Cuba is equivalent of one intercontinental missile in Soviet Union at a fraction of cost. Heightened threat to US, to Panama Canal and to all countries in Caribbean region should be obvious.

Question is not whether US can “take care of Cuba.” It can. But it could not counter Soviet threat from Cuba without either a significant new investment in resources or dimunition of its present efforts elsewhere. The implications for all free peoples should be apparent.

Case Against Symmetry

It is likely that in their propaganda—and in any possible future discussions—Soviets will try to draw a parallel between their missile bases in Cuba and our establishments in allied countries. A similar parallel may be drawn between Cuba and Berlin. This effort can draw on some of comment and speculation that has appeared in American press.

We might recall Winston Churchill’s observation that: Russians do something that they shouldn’t do in the first place, then they stop doing it under pressure, but only on payment of something else to which they are not entitled.

Analogy between Soviet bases in Cuba and ours elsewhere is a false one. We shall pay dearly if we permit ourselves to fall into this trap.

We should expose this approach wherever it appears as false and dangerous. We should contrast two along following lines:

1) Our bases abroad were established in cooperation with our allies in face of threat of Soviet expansion and aggression as exemplified in Eastern Europe, in Greece and Turkey, in Iran and in Korea. No such threat exists against Cuba from her neighbors.

2) Our missile bases in such countries as Italy and Turkey followed a series of open Soviet boasts and threats, beginning in 1957. Note these allied missile base agreements came only in 1959.

3) Our base arrangements have been made in open and announced agreements with sovereign govts under universally known alliance agreements. Soviet missiles have been placed in Cuba in secret, without any public statements and without any alliance.

4) Our bases on allied territory are manned and serviced jointly with allied personnel; Soviet bases were established without knowledge of Cuban people and are manned by Soviet personnel.

5) Our bases were established abroad to redress an imbalance created by Soviet aggressiveness and threatened expansion; Soviet bases in Cuba have created a new and serious imbalance in power situation, thus imperiling world peace.

6) American bases abroad are recognized by peoples concerned as being a vital element in defense of their independence and security; Soviet bases in Cuba have increased not lessened dangers to Cuban people and were set up without their approval or even knowledge.

7) US bases have served to strengthen the sovereignty and independence of those states where they are located; Soviet bases in Cuba are a symbol of that unhappy country’s subjection to alien control and domination.

8) US bases abroad were part of free world’s answer to threats of continued Soviet expansion; Soviet bases in Cuba mark a new effort at such expansion.

9) If allied missile bases suddenly appeared in Bulgaria or Byelorussia, there might be a rough parallel between them and Cuban bases in Cuba. To try to make such a parallel existing allied bases in allied countries under long-standing and open arrangements is absurd.

It should be noted, and underlined, that any indication on our part that we accept this suggested analogy or that we might be considering a “trade” on this basis could have disastrous political effects in the countries concerned.

Parallel between Cuba and Berlin is even more patently false than that between overseas bases. For example: (1) we are in Berlin under valid international agreements as well as by right of wartime conquest; (2) we have no missiles there; (3) we are there to defend the independence and freedom of the Berliners; (4) it has been demonstrated repeatedly and unmistakably that we are there with enthusiastic approval of people themselves. None of these is true of Soviets in Cuba—and Soviets and world know it.

Rusk

1. Guidance for U.S. officials at home and abroad for public and private discussions of Soviet bases in Cuba. Confidential. 13 pp. DOS, CF, 611.3722/10–2462.