Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

280. Memorandum from General Lansdale to the Special Group (Augmented), March 13¹

March 13, 1962

SUBJECT

• Institutional Planning, Operation Mongoose

As desired by General Taylor on 12 March, the planning for Operation Mongoose is now prepared on a format of separate planning for each Department and Agency involved. Revised planning along this line is submitted herewith.

Activities already approved are marked with an asterisk. Further planning must await determination of policy questions raised in my 12 March 1962 memorandum to the members of the Special Group (Augmented).

Planning transmitted to you by my memorandum of 10 March 1962 should be returned to me for destruction as a matter of security.

Attachment

[undated]

OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE I (State)
March–July 1962
ACTIVITY	PURPOSE	CONSIDERATIONS
Political and economic operations to isolate Castro regime and neutralize its influence in the Western Hemisphere.	Activities in consonance with U.S. policy established after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.	These activities will have some negative impact on the Cuban people, who are part of the target, but are consistent with an overt policy of isolating Castro and neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere. They are noted here, for the sake of completeness, as actions now being carried out by the Department of State under other existing programs and projects.
OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE I (Defense)
March–July 1962
1. Expand special intelligence and other sensitive intelligence coverage of Cuba as required.	To develop increased “hard” intelligence.	Use of cays near Cuba entail unacceptable security risks when vulnerable to Cuban landing parties. (Defense, in collaboration with CIA.)
March–July 1962
(cont.)
ACTIVITY	PURPOSE	CONSIDERATIONS
2. Develop the means of the Inter-American Defense Board to provide substantive intelligence on Cuban activities.	To add to the U.S. intelligence coverage on Cuba and possibly to strengthen the concern of Latin American states for security.	Sensitivity of using this multi-national organization clearly restricts potential use by USA. Visibility of operational interest is an acceptable risk here.
3. Provide logistic and personnel support for CIA intelligence operations into Cuba.	To ensure optimum implementation of the intelligence plan.	The intelligence plan requires support by U.S. military manpower and equipment.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure a decisive U.S. military capability for intervention.	To overthrow the Communist government of Cuba.	The U.S. military intervention must be conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Bloc’s ability to take effective counter-measures is reduced to a minimum.
OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE I (USIA)
March–July 1962
ACTIVITY	PURPOSE	CONSIDERATIONS
Propaganda programs to isolate Castro regime and neutralize its influence in the Western Hemisphere.	Activities in consonance with U.S. policy established after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.	These activities will have some general impact upon Castro support and influence in the Western Hemisphere. There will be some new material for use as the Phase I intelligence operations produce but essentially the program is a continuation of that already in effect.
OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE II (State)
1. Make political decision to intervene with U.S. military forces in Cuba.	To overtly engage the U.S. prestige in support of a Cuban revolt to an extent that would require the U.S. to become involved in assuring the ultimate victory of a Cuban revolution; this involvement must include the commitment of U.S. military forces as necessary to achieve such victory.	This political decision will require consideration of the legal and moral factors, assessed in the perspective of world opinion and U.S. security interests.
ACTIVITY	PURPOSE	CONSIDERATIONS
2. U.S. officials and news releases on policy decision.	Indicate policy and commit prestige of U.S. government to appropriate support of the Cuban people vs. Communist dictatorship.	Top officials of Executive and Legislative branches to make timely statements. This should encourage similar attitude by leaders of other nations and help spirit of Cubans. Development of sympathy leading to favorable opinion about outside support for Cuban people is a goal.
3. Latin American leaders, government and public, in support.	Commit national prestige and power of Latin political, intellectual, labor, youth, religious, military leaders to cause of Cuban people against Communist regime. For local public impact, international support, and morale of resistance within Cuba.	Timely and strong public statements will be encouraged. Maximum publicity at country of origin, other key countries and into Cuba by CIA assets. Support of State action by CIA and USIA is involved.
OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE II (Defense)
ACTIVITY	PURPOSE	CONSIDERATIONS
1. After political decision, provide maximum U.S. support to resistance fighters in Cuba who have been spotted in Phase I.	To assure that Cuban “freedom-fighters” are fully equipped to attack the Communist regime’s military and police forces; as part of the assurance, the U.S. support must include the immediate commitment of U.S. leadership personnel in combat operations.	DOD support planning, stock piling, readying of equipment and personnel for commitment must be developed with maximum lead time. Close coordination with CIA is required to insure maximum readiness to meet the immediate needs of the revolutionary forces. The hazard of visibility in preparing for these support activities makes security a paramount consideration.
2. After political decision, commit U.S. military forces in accordance with contingency plans.	To intervene as required to achieve victory for the revolutionary forces.	Consistent with security aspect, U.S. military forces are placed in a state of readiness to accomplish the assigned mission. The military forces must be prepared to assist in the maintenance of order until the revolutionary government is in control.
OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE II (CIA)
ACTIVITY	PURPOSE	CONSIDERATIONS
1. Support U.S. military actions in Cuba.	To provide intelligence, guerrilla action, and Cuban political-psychological support of U.S. military operations.	CIA capabilities must be continuously assessed and considered in the development of military planning. Executive responsibility for directing the use of covert assets must be clearly understood as resting in the U.S. military commander of the U.S. intervention, as in agreed-upon wartime operations.
OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE II (USIA)
1. Increase news emphasis on Cuban revolt and intervention from the outside to help the Cuban movement.	To neutralize opposition to U.S. policy and, if possible, gain support for U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere.	Optimum exploitation of news material available to CIA and Defense is essential.
OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE I (CIA)
1–15 March 1962
ACTIVITY	PURPOSE	CONSIDERATIONS
Intelligence Operations
1. *2 Dispatch one intelligence agent operation to key area selected by CIA.	Collect and report intelligence on anti-regime attitudes, on potential resistance, and on vulnerabilities and strengths of Communist security system.	There is a risk that this action will disclose this U.S. intelligence activity within Cuba. Selected personnel are being intensively trained. This first team has 2 agents. An area in which resistance has been reported has been selected. Agent operations must stay alive, make useful contacts, and report securely to CIA. Physical risk to personnel is substantial, due to lack of intelligence. First reports from first team are expected by the end of March, while reports from the second and third teams, dispatched in March, are expected to start in April. Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence collection, with the thought that
1–15 March 1962 (cont.)
ACTIVITY	PURPOSE	CONSIDERATIONS
		they will be in place inside Cuba and ready to act whenever paramilitary operations are decided upon. However, CIA has noted that, once the agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort will be made to attempt such control.
2. 3 third-country intelligence staff officers in place in Havana.	To collect intelligence.	These staff intelligence officers may also be used in the future for communications or agent handling, if future developments warrant.
3. 2 third-country trained intelligence officers, readied to travel in Cuba for temporary periods.	To collect intelligence.
1–15 March 1962 (cont.)
ACTIVITY	PURPOSE	CONSIDERATIONS
4. * Caribbean Admission Center, Opa-Locka, Florida, fully activated by 15 March 1962.	To collect intelligence required for the operations, to identify and earmark intelligence assets as refugees arrive, and to provide security against Communist agent operations.	This operation, in response to early recommendation as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with a new building completed and occupied, and with a staff of 43 at work. Operations commenced 15 February and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center. (CIA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice, State, USIA.)
5. * Periodic intelligence estimates, as required by progress of operations.	To up-date NIE 85–62, so that current estimates can be considered at national policy levels.	As the operations develop, there will be both increased intelligence collection and a need for as current an Intelligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully. It is likely that a more informal method of producing an Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than now governing the issuance of NIE’s) may have to be followed. CIA is now publishing daily intelligence summaries on Cuba and is planning a bi-monthly or weekly report summing up intelligence for this purpose. (CIA responsibility, with support of others as required.)
1–15 March 1962 (cont.)
ACTIVITY	PURPOSE	CONSIDERATIONS
Other Operations
6. [text not declassified]	[text not declassified]	[text not declassified]
16–31 March 1962
Intelligence Operations
7. * Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	One team of 4 and one team of 3 agents. Both teams include personnel who have had resistance training and some past experience.
8. Establish 2 additional third-country resident agents in Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	Possible future use in communications and support.
9. By 31 March, have 105 agents selected and 50 agents trained.	To ready agent operations.	Effectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions controlling these factors. If the recruitment and training are for resistance activities, the task of recruitment and training will be much less difficult than if they are limited to intelligence-collection purposes only.
16–31 March 1962 (cont.)
ACTIVITY	PURPOSE	CONSIDERATIONS
10. * Develop intelligence potential of Cuban “colonies” in U.S.	To exploit the intelligence possibilities of former residents of Cuba (including U.S. citizens) now in the United States.	There are “colonies” in Washington, D.C., and other U.S. cities which are “little Cubas.” Family, Church, and business interests provoke unusual personal ties inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise available. (FBI support and coordination is basic in this effort.)
11. * Develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962.	To collect intelligence in a Latin atmosphere, at different levels than now seem possible in the continental U.S., to spot additional intelligence assets and to provide security against Communist agent operations.	As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CIA will activate other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible. [text not declassified] Negotiations with local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers, if possible, in [text not declassified] are being surveyed for possible centers. (CIA responsibility with support by others as necessary.)
16–31 March 1962 (cont.)
ACTIVITY	PURPOSE	CONSIDERATIONS
Other Operations
None.
1–15 April 1962
Intelligence Operations
12. * Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	Number of agents undetermined as yet.
13. 5 third-country agents, temporarily travelling legally, in Cuba.	To collect intelligence.
Other Operations
None.
16–30 April 1962
Intelligence Operations
14. * Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances.
15. One third-country legal resident agent in Havana.	To collect intelligence.	Possible use for communications and support.
16–30 April 1962 (cont.)
ACTIVITY	PURPOSE	CONSIDERATIONS
Other Operations
None.
1–15 May 1962
Intelligence Operations
16. * Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances.
17. 3 legal resident agents in Cuba.	To collect intelligence.
18. One or possibly two trained staff intelligence officers (non-U.S.) resident in Havana.	To collect intelligence.
19. Ten legal travellers in Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	“Legal travel” means persons are in Cuba visiting, some for extended periods.
Other Operations
None.
16–31 May 1962
Intelligence Operations
20. * Four teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances. CIA will be attempting to cover as much of Cuba as it can.
16–31 May 1962 (cont.)
ACTIVITY	PURPOSE	CONSIDERATIONS
21. One possible singleton agent operation, Isle of Pines.	To collect intelligence.	Difficult
22. Four additional resident agents inside Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	CIA will be attempting to cover as much of Cuba as it can. The main factor of determining location of resident agents is to find a place where a trained agent can stay viable.
23. Five “legal travel” agents inside Cuba.	To collect intelligence.
24. By 31 May, selection of 50 additional agents and train 35 additional agents.	To ready agent operations.
Other Operations
25. [text not declassified]	To debase the economy of Cuba.	[text not declassified]
1 June—31 July 1962
Intelligence Operations
26. * 10 to 15 teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	Number of agents in each team and selection of areas will be determined by developments of the previous actions and by conditions.
1 June–31 July 1962 (cont.)
ACTIVITY	PURPOSE	CONSIDERATIONS
27. Reinforce and resupply agents and teams previously placed or activated inside Cuba.	To reinforce and resupply, as possible.	Numbers, areas, and supplies are completely dependent upon conditions at the time, and upon policy approval of methods to be used (that is, if air delivery can be used, or if this activity must depend upon maritime delivery).
28. By 31 July, select 100 additional agents and train 70 additional agents.	To ready agent operations.
29. * Collection of psychological material.	To provide documentary and photographic evidence of the tyranny of the Communist regime.	This evidence will be used by CIA and USIA to neutralize the influence of Castro and the Communists in the Western Hemisphere.
30. * Survey airfields, military installations, and communication centers.	To provide current intelligence on key security resources of the regime.	This is conceived of as ground surveys, and the possible recruitment of military and other official personnel as intelligence agents.
31. * By the end of July, have operations to penetrate the regime.	To provide current intelligence on the actions and intentions of the regime.	This requires attempts to place trained agents inside government organizations, or to defect officials “in place.”
Other Operations
None.
ACTIVITY	PURPOSE	CONSIDERATIONS
End of July 1962
32. * Comprehensive and definitive intelligence report on attitudes and abilities of the population inside Cuba.	To provide the Special Group (NSC 5412 augmented) with a hard estimate of the Cuban situation.	The intelligence estimate will provide a vital basis for a Special Group recommendation on whether or not the U.S. should undertake actions to make maximum use of Cuban resources as a justification for decisive U.S. military intervention.

2 Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

1. Institutional planning for Operation Mongoose. Top Secret. 15 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 482, Mongoose.