There is enclosed herewith a memorandum summarizing developments during
the first three weeks of the new Peralta regime in Guate
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mala. This summary has been
prepared in reply to a verbal request made to the Department by Mr.
Bromley Smith.
Enclosure
THE NEW GUATEMALAN REGIME: ITS FIRST THREE WEEKS
Summary
The Guatemalan regime, headed by Col. Enrique Peralta, which took
power through a coup d’état near midnight on March 30 completed
three weeks in office on April 21. In that time it has accomplished
its basic administrative organization, has announced and begun to
implement its program of government, has received the recognition of
a majority of the American Republics, and has continued to enjoy a
wide base of political support within the country. There has been no
challenge to the authority of the new government and no violence
except for small-scale action taken at the initiative of the
government itself against small guerrilla groups already in
existence prior to the coup. While active opposition will
undoubtedly soon emerge, the new Peralta regime has enjoyed a period
of political calm enabling it to consolidate its position. The
future success of the new regime will depend in large measure on the
wisdom with which it wields its absolute power and its success in
instilling a sense of urgency for social and economic improvement
and the reestablishment of a constitutional democracy through free
elections.
Consolidation of New Regime. Within
twenty-four hours after the coup, most of the major political
parties, including the center and moderate left, had approved the
coup and indicated their support of the Peralta regime, at least for
the emergency. This wide support was motivated as much by
anti-Ydigoras sentiment
as it was by anti-Arevalo feelings. Wide sectors were simply
“fed-up” with the mal-administration, corruption, political anarchy,
and lack of positive leadership by Ydigoras. The new regime’s first decree-law
continued the Labor Code in effect and thus confirmed the rights of
labor. The new cabinet named on April 1 contrasted with that of
Ydigoras in that it was
largely composed of civilians and its members had a much higher
decree of professional and technical competence. Though it had not
yet been recognized by any of the participating countries, Guatemala
sent dele
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gates to the Managua security and Alianza conferences, in order
not to break the continuity of purpose achieved so recently at San
Jose.
Recognition. From information now available,
some eleven Latin American and some sixteen or more other countries
(including nearly all major Western powers) have thus far recognized
the Peralta Government. At the time the United States extended
recognition on April 17, eight Latin American and eight other
countries had done so. Eventual
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recognition by all the Latin
American republics seems assured except for Venezuela, the Dominican
Republic, and possibly Costa Rica. Costa Rican leaders (including
ex-President Figueres) have expressed approval of Peralta to United
States officials and Costa Rica may seek some formula to extend
recognition without offending their understanding with Betancourt on
non-recognition of military coup governments.
Before recognizing the Peralta regime, the United States consulted
closely with other Hemisphere governments and determined that there
was a consensus favoring eventual recognition. Special note was
taken that Mexico and three of the four Central American countries
had by then extended recognition. Also, it was fully evident that
there was wide support in Guatemala for the new regime in spite of
its unconstitutional inception. Despite strenuous efforts we were
not able to extract an official public statement fixing a specific
timetable for elections. However, Peralta did give Ambassador
Bell verbal assurances
that hopefully elections would be held within a period of not more
than two years. Also, on April 4 Peralta had been quoted in a Miami Herald story as stating: “It will take
Guatemala about two years to get ready for free elections.” He
claimed that this was a public statement. In delivering our note of
recognition on April 17, Ambassador Bell reminded the Foreign
Minister of our acceptance of these assurances and our hope that
elections would be held within the shortest possible time. We intend
to keep reminding the regime of this point.
Program of the New Government. To date the
Peralta Government has issued some fourteen decree laws. Among the
more important were the Fundamental Charter of Government (No. 8 of
April 10) and the Law for the Defense of Democracy (No. 9 of April
10). The Charter stated that public power would reside in the Army
and be exercised by the Minister of Defense (i.e. Peralta) as the
Chief of Government. It provided that the Chief of Government would
exercise all executive and legislative functions acting with the
assistance of the Council of Ministers (the cabinet) and the advice
of an appointive Council of State. The courts were to function in an
independent and exclusive manner. With the sole exception of the
University of San Carlos, appointments of all officials in the
country would be made by the Chief of Government. Rigid control and
drastic penalties for communist and other
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subversive action was
established by the “Law for the Defense of Democracy” and in a
companion decree-law (No. 10) to protect public order and prevent
crimes of violence. A significant aspect of Decree Laws 9 and 10 is
that violations of these decrees on subversion and crimes of
violence will be tried in military and not civilian courts. This
seems to contradict the “independent and exclusive” jurisdiction
supposedly given the civil courts.
An important pronouncement was issued by the new government on April
19 which outlined its program. Besides pledging special attention to
the poorer classes, its intention to honor its international
obligations, and its support for the Declaration of Central America
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signed at San Jose on March 19, the government specifically
announced an eight point program to implement its “full and
enthusiastic support” of the Alliance for Progress. These eight
points were: (1) reorganization of the public administration as an
instrument to promote social and economic development, (2)
institutional reorganization to provide more social benefits, (3)
agrarian development, including rational land distribution,
supervised credit and marketing services, (4) accelerated Central
American economic integration, (5) industrial development using both
public and private resources, (6) fiscal reform and effective
administration, (7) coordination of government fiscal and monetary
policy with public investment policy designed to secure an equitable
redistribution of the national income, and (8) reinforcement of the
National Planning Council in developing rational development
plans.
U.S. Assistance to the New Government. No
basic changes will be required in our AID assistance strategy in order to assist the
implementation of the above program. Our programmed assistance was
designed specifically for such purposes but was unable to work
effectively with the previous Ydigoras administration. It is not anticipated that
large additional amounts of aid will be needed or could be
effectively used at this time. At the moment there is some $30
million in unexpended funds, mostly loans from U.S. sources, which
have not been used due to the inability of the Ydigoras Government to provide
matching funds or otherwise take effective action. Should the
present government prove effective in devising and implementing
development plans then it can be anticipated that our assistance
could be much accelerated and with only minimum requirements for
grant assistance. This prediction is based on the present
satisfactory economic situation in Guatemala and the prospects of
greatly accelerated progress, provided the economic community can
look forward to a more stable political atmosphere and the support
of an efficient and effective public administration. The unwholesome
domestic climate, administrative disarray and fiscal mismanagement
have constituted more of a deterent to the Guatemalan economy in the
past three years than have low coffee prices.