Attached are two background papers—one dealing with Haiti and one with
Guatemala. They were prepared for your 4 o’clock meeting today.
As you will note from reading them, the situation in both countries has
one similarity—both regimes are discredited, there is no suitable
alternative on the horizon, and we have relatively few assets.
Attachment
SUBJECT
1. The term of President Ydígoras ends in March 1964, with the
election of his successor scheduled to take place late this
year.
2. The prospect that former President (1945 to 51) Juan José Arévalo
may successfully mobilize his considerable popularity to win
re-election to office has spread fear and confusion among
middle-of-the-road and other anti-Communist elements in Guatemala.
Arévalo is not a Communist, but his confused, ill-balanced,
political philosophy of “spiritual socialism”, fed by deep prejudice
against the United States, served the Communist purpose well during
his administration, precursor to the Communist dominated Arbenz
administration of 1951 to 54. Should he regain power, he would
likely serve the Communist purpose well again, turning his country
away from friendly relations with the United States, and away from a
constructive role in the Alliance for Progress for which he has no
apparent understanding or sympathy.
3. The moderate forces opposing Arevalism within Guatemala persist in
their traditional inability to unify for victory. They have been
unable thus far to produce a leader of significant political
stature.
4. Ydígoras, through his mastery of internal Guatemalan politics, has
maintained himself in power, but he is not leading his country
anywhere. He suppressed a brief Air Force revolt on November 25, and
has managed to overcome the most immediate severities of his
administration’s chronic budget problem and to meet Government
payrolls quickly enough to avert disorder which threatened to come
from arrears in payments.
(Guatemala recently succeeded in floating $7 million in bond sales to
private United States banks, removing the apparent need for an
emergency budgetary support loan of the same amount which we had
been prepared to make to the Government. While the basic condition
of the Guatemalan economy is reasonably good and will probably
improve, assuming political stability, Government finances are in
need of drastic reform and the administration will operate on a
hand-to-mouth basis for the foreseeable future.)
5. It is no secret that there is wide-spread feeling in Guatemala
favoring a military coup to oust Ydígoras, and arrange for elections
which would exclude the participation of Arévalo. Under Guatemalan
electoral law, Arévalo would be ineligible to assume office for a
term beginning before March 1963, i.e., before the end of a 12-year
interval since he last held the office of President. The key element
in this respect is the military; its intent is still uncertain.
[Typeset Page 325]
6. Ydígoras is withholding endorsement from any of the current
candidates, hoping to maximize his influence on the ultimate choice.
While he has been an outspoken opponent of Arévalo, there has
allegedly been some contact between them, and the possibility is not
to be excluded that Ydígoras could accommodate himself to an Arévalo
victory in return for assurance of being left in peace in Guatemala
after retiring from office.
7. The Latin American Policy Committee with the participation of
Ambassador Bell in November
1962 examined the problem of the presidential succession in
[Facsimile Page 3]
Guatemala
and decided on the course of action set forth in the Secretary’s
Memorandum for the President of December 7, relating to the Special
Letter Attached to the Byroade Report on Guatemala.
[text not declassified]
