Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

11. Memorandum of conversation, November 15, between Rusk and Andrade¹

November 15, 1962, 2:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Farewell call of Bolivian Ambassador Victor Andrade on Secretary of State

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Ambassador Andrade
• Mr. Duke
• Mr. Weise

During his farewell call on the Secretary, Ambassador Andrade stated that he had become increasingly concerned over the drift to the left within the MNR party in Bolivia and the failure of his government to act decisively on the Cuban issue. Andrade said that following the visit of the Bolivian Foreign Minister to the United States in early October, the Foreign Minister announced in La Paz that he had “fired” Andrade as Bolivian Ambassador to the United States. This announcement was untrue, Andrade said, since he had submitted his resignation on October 2, 1962 in protest to certain things he felt were wrong within his Government. He said he particularly deplored the vacillation of his government in confronting pro-Castro and communist elements both within Bolivia and their threat to the hemisphere.

Andrade said that for some time communist and pro-Castro elements had been making great headway in Bolivia and were extending their control over the MNR party organization, while at the same time subverting the true objectives of the Bolivian revolution. Since Fellman’s appointment as Foreign Minister in January 1962, Andrade said that he has had real differences with Fellman over the conduct of both internal affairs and foreign relations. Andrade said that when the Foreign Minister was in the United States last month he had had a show-down with the Foreign Minister over these differences. He remarked that the Secretary may have noticed that he, Andrade, had not participated in any of the meetings of the Latin American Foreign Ministers in New York or Washington and claimed that his abstention was the result of his break with Fellman over the Cuban issue and the attempt by the Government to assume a neutralist position at a time when the security of the hemisphere was being threatened by Communist aggression. He said that under these circumstances, Bolivia had no business flirting with extra-Hemispheric ideas and that he felt it was the duty of his Government to come out “clean and squarely” in support of the United States position in the OAS.

The Secretary remarked that we had appreciated the courageous stand of Emilio Sarmiento on October 23, 1962 when he voted with the overwhelming majority of the OAS membership in favor of the OAS resolution on the Cuban issue. To this Andrade replied that Ambassador Sarmiento had consulted him as to what action he should take in absence of instructions from his Foreign Office and that he, Andrade, had told Sarmiento that he should re-enter the OAS and vote in favor of the U.S. resolution.

Andrade then voiced further differences he had had with his Government. He said that he felt that President Paz was in an extremely weak and vulnerable position with respect to the left wing of the MNR party. He said that during his visit to La Paz in August 1961 he had expressed his objections to President Paz over the use of the Bolivian Government’s reserve fund (under the control of the Ministry of Government) for pay-offs to members of the Central Obrero Boliviano (COB). Andrade said that such use of Government funds was not only illegal, but was being used to buy-off the very elements which support Castroism and Communism in Bolivia and are subverting the Bolivian revolution and its economic objectives by creating chaos and anarchy within Bolivia. Andrade said the President dismissed his objection by saying that this was a matter of concern to Andrade’s imagination.

Andrade said that after he returns to Bolivia (around December 5) he would direct his efforts toward realigning the moderate forces within the MNR and channeling the Bolivian revolution into its true historic nationalist pattern. He said he intended to enter the political arena, and if it appeared that he could succeed he would play an active part in the presidential campaign in 1964. He emphasized that he had no intention of splitting the MNR party, such as Walter Guevarra had done in 1960, but would work from within toward the realignment of those forces which would be strong enough to confront the Left Sector and prevent a left-wing take-over of the party mechanism in the convention preceding the Presidential elections. He said that politics are played “rough and dirty” in Bolivia and that he had no illusions as to the difficulties which lay ahead of him. He felt, however, a real sense of duty in contributing to the elimination of “thugs and gangsters” who now threaten to control the MNR party.

The Secretary wished the Ambassador well and assured him that we would be pleased to see him should the Ambassador return to the United States for a visit on some future occasion.

1. Exchange of views during Andrade’s farewell call. Confidential. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 724.00/11–1562.