Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

9. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

JCSM–182–61

Washington, March 23, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Nuclear Arms Control Measures (U)

1. Current international and domestic interest in arms control matters indicates a probable need for early policy decisions on issues which confront the United States in this field. US arms control policy decisions probably will require coordination with at least major NATO Allies in order to gain Western support for policies which are compatible with US national security requirements. Anticipating these needs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have re-examined the issues which, in their view, warrant priority consideration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that certain extremely important arms control issues arise in connection with those proposals which would affect the nuclear capabilities of the United States. This memorandum sets forth the policy decisions which the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend be made concerning these issues.

2. In their re-examination of pressing arms control issues, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken the following factors into consideration:

a. “The basic threat to US security is the determination and ability of the hostile Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes to direct their political and ideological influence and their rapidly growing military and economic strength toward shifting the power balance away from the West and, ultimately, toward achieving world domination.

b. “The chief elements of this threat lie in (a) the Soviets’ possession of rapidly growing nuclear capabilities (which have made the Soviet leaders feel freer to adopt an aggressive posture in peripheral areas) as well as large conventional forces; (b) the Soviet regime’s ability and willingness to identify itself with various forms of political and social discontent and popular opposition to the status quo; to support subversive elements, including legal political parties, within free societies; to apply substantial resources for the purpose of fostering and exploiting various kinds of weakness and instability in all parts of the Free World; and, particularly in the neutralist and less developed societies, to take advantage of pressures for economic and social change; (c) the extent to which the totalitarian Communist leadership is able to act ruthlessly and rapidly and to repudiate agreements without being subject to moral restraints.”

c. The United States is in fact engaged in a life-or-death struggle with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Leaders of the Bloc recognize this by repeatedly stressing their objective of securing domination of the world and emphasizing that their ultimate task is the subjugation of the US. Sino-Soviet techniques for attaining their objective include subversion; the creation and exploitation of chaos; economic warfare; blackmail through threats to employ their military power; the outright use of their military power when risks to their own security are not great; the development, maintenance and improvement of their military strength and capabilities far in excess of any apparent requirements for internal security; a constant campaign to degrade the US position as leader of the Free World; and a constant campaign to reduce and eliminate US nuclear warfare capabilities which constitute the primary Free World obstacle to the Bloc use of major aggression to achieve world domination. Employment of the foregoing techniques has proven successful in many cases: Since World War II, the USSR base of the world Communist movement has been expanded to encompass Eastern Europe, mainland China, Tibet and parts of Korea and Indo-China; significant political and economic influence by the Bloc has been achieved in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America; there is a broad base of support for the Soviet campaign to stigmatize and inhibit possible US use of its nuclear weapons capabilities even for self-defense; many Free World spokesmen have joined the chorus in support of Soviet efforts to disarm all nations, especially the United States, and thus to eliminate the obstacle to Sino-Soviet ambitions which is posed by US military capabilities.

d. The US military posture is determined by the need to protect the security of the United States and to carry out our collective security responsibilities; it is not designed for aggression. However, the Soviet leaders probably realize that there is a serious risk of self-destruction if they attempt to destroy US military capabilities. They probably recognize also that they would risk the initiation of general nuclear war, and their own destruction, if they were to expand significantly the area under their domination. They would consider the risks to be very great if areas considered vital by the United States to its own security arrangements were involved. Thus, programs to attain their objective of world domination without incurring the risk of self-destruction are supported by their efforts to disarm the West through their campaign for “general and complete disarmament”.

e. Basic to the security of the United States and to its collective security arrangements is a capability to deter a nuclear attack on the United States. This requires sufficient numbers of strategic nuclear weapons and means for their delivery which are sufficiently invulnerable to be able at least to absorb an initial nuclear attack and still retain the capability to inflict unacceptable damage on the attacker. The active defense of the North American continent against manned aircraft and missile attack requires the use of nuclear weapons. A similar defense requirement exists for US forces on the seas and overseas. Also, US forces overseas must possess at least sufficient stocks of nuclear weapons and means for their delivery to operate effectively if Sino-Soviet forces initiate nuclear attack or in case the use of nuclear weapons is authorized by the President for other reasons.

f. To meet US requirements for nuclear weapons, and those required in support of US collective security arrangements, it is anticipated that allocation of the bulk of planned US special nuclear materials production will be needed at least through the 1960’s.

g. In accordance with national policy, the US military posture over a period of years has been based on progressive modernization of all military forces, with emphasis on nuclear capability, and on the assumption that nuclear weapons would be used “when required to meet the nation’s war objectives” and when authorized by the President. If directed, the time between a decision to change the US military posture and the availability in operational units of the weapons systems required both qualitatively and quantitatively to support the new posture may in many cases be as long as eight to ten years. Such a change would necessarily have to consider many factors not the least of which would be substantial increases in US defense expenditures in making the change-over.

3. In light of the situation which confronts the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend that US national policy be established as follows relative to nuclear arms control measures currently under consideration for possible negotiation independently of each other and independently of other disarmament measures:

a. Cessation of Nuclear Weapons Testing:¹

(1) The United States should seek to conclude the Conference on Cessation of Nuclear Weapons Tests not later than 1 June 1961 with an agreement which will prohibit those tests which the agreed control system is capable of detecting and identifying.

(2) Following 1 June 1961, and pending an enforceable international agreement to cease the testing of nuclear weapons, the United States should resume the testing as soon as possible of nuclear weapons in environments in which the release of radioactive material to the atmosphere can be controlled, i.e., outer space, underground and underwater.

(3) The United States should agree to cease only those nuclear weapons tests for which an effective international detection and identification system is feasible. In this case, the United States should reserve the right to resume such tests in the event of violation of any part of the agreement, including that part which prescribes the installation and continued effective operation of the detection and identification system on a world-wide basis.

b. Cessation of Production of Fissionable Materials for Use in Weapons:²

(1) The United States should not implement an agreement to halt its production of fissionable materials for use in weapons until:

(a) Its requirements for nuclear weapons indicated in paragraph 2 e above have been met;

(b) All States within the Sino-Soviet bloc have implemented an agreement to limit numerically their armed forces personnel and armaments to levels which would not reduce, and preferably would improve, the relative military capabilities of the US and its Allies vis-à-vis the USSR, Red China and the remainder of the Sino-Soviet bloc;

(c) The implementation of these limitations on armed forces personnel and armaments by the Sino-Soviet bloc has been and continues to be verified and inspected to the satisfaction of the United States and its Allies throughout the Sino-Soviet bloc;

(d) A system by which the US and its Allies can verify and inspect compliance by the Sino-Soviet bloc with an agreement to halt the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons is installed and operating effectively throughout the Sino-Soviet bloc; and

(e) The Sino-Soviet bloc simultaneously ceases production of fissionable materials for use in weapons.

(2) The United States should not agree to halt the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons on a reciprocal plant-by-plant basis with the Sino-Soviet bloc unless the conditions listed in paragraphs 3 b (1) (a), (b), (c) and (d) above, have been met.

(3) The United States should not agree to halt the production of non-fissionable materials, such as tritium, which are essential to the effectiveness of US stocks of nuclear weapons, nor to halt the production of fissionable materials for non-weapons uses, including nuclear propulsion.

(4) The United States should not agree to halt the fabrication of nuclear weapons from stocks of nuclear materials available when a cessation of the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons becomes effective, nor to halt the refabrication and maintenance of its nuclear weapons.

c. Transfer of Fissionable Materials from Past Production to Non-Weapons Uses:³ The United States should not agree to transfer fissionable materials from past production to non-weapons uses unless:

(1) The quantity to be transferred by the United States is matched by the USSR, there is effective international control of the quantities transferred, and the quantity transferred by the United States does not reduce US stocks of nuclear weapons; or until

(2) The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons has been halted under the conditions specified in paragraph 3 b above and its subparagraphs, the quantities transferred by the United States are matched by the USSR, and there is effective international control of the quantities transferred.

d. Declaratory Prohibition of Nuclear Sharing:⁴

(1) The United States should continue to abstain from commitment to the provisions of UN Resolution 1576 (XV), 20 December 1960. This resolution calls upon nuclear powers to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons or information necessary for their manufacture to non-nuclear powers, and calls upon non-nuclear powers to refrain from manufacturing or attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. Although the United States abstained when this resolution (commonly called “the Irish Resolution”) was voted upon, it was approved by the General Assembly.

(2) The resolution, if now subscribed to by the United States, would constitute a moral commitment which could impose limitations on the Free World in efforts by its members to provide for their individual and collective self-defense; moreover, because it is not enforceable, it would not bar nuclear sharing by the USSR with other Communist countries. Furthermore, the declaratory approach of the resolution would establish a precedent which could undermine the position of the United States and its Allies that arms control agreements must be accompanied by effective verification and inspection.

e. Application of IAEA Inspection Machinery to Restrictions of Fissionable Materials to Peaceful Uses:⁵

(1) Implementation of the arms control measures in paragraph 3 b and c could result in relatively large quantities of fissionable material becoming available for non-weapons purposes. The United States could agree that use be made of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to insure that fissionable material made available to the IAEA for peaceful uses is not diverted to military uses providing the following are met:

(a) The Statute of the IAEA is revised and strengthened to ensure against inspection veto by possible evaders.

(b) An effective inspection system is developed.

(c) The IAEA’s inspection and safeguards staff is appropriately expanded and includes adequate US representation.

(d) All fissionable material becoming available for peaceful purposes as the result of arms control measures is placed under the IAEA’s control.

(2) Inspection and verification systems for monitoring arms control measures, such as the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, should be separate and distinct from the IAEA. Experience gained by the IAEA with respect to inspection and safeguards, however, could be useful in the development of arms control verification and inspection systems.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to stress that they are concerned about and recommend strongly against any reduction of our nuclear warfare capabilities, unless the conditions specified in paragraph 3 above have been met. They consider that it would be premature in the foreseeable future to initiate any negotiations or undertake a commitment to adhere to any of the measures listed in paragraph 3 above, with the exception of an effectively safeguarded cessation of nuclear weapons tests, in isolation or related only to other nuclear measures.

5. In making the foregoing recommendations concerning nuclear arms control measures, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the requirement to balance nuclear and non-nuclear measures and reaffirm their previously stated views that:

a. “The US negotiations effort must ensure that in the post-arms control agreement era, the United States will be able to maintain at any stage an adequate response to the entire spectrum of the remaining Sino-Soviet bloc threat; namely, an evident, secure nuclear retaliatory capability and an evident, flexible capability for military operations short of general nuclear war.

b. “The United States must always be able to back up its Allies with forces to a degree which will make our willingness to fight with or without nuclear weapons, credible both to our Allies and our enemies.”

6. There are other important issues in the arms control field which may require national policy decisions on which the military advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be furnished as the need arises. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the policies set forth in paragraph 3 above involve arms control issues of immediate importance to the security of the United States. Decisions on these policies will have major effects on the national strategy of the United States and on US military capabilities and long-range programs. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the foregoing views be transmitted to the Adviser to the President on Disarmament Affairs and that decisions at the national level be reached on these policies.⁶

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112, 23 Mar 61. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A stamped notation on the source text reads: “SecDef has seen.”
1. See Appendix A hereto. [Footnote in the source text. This 5-page appendix is not printed.]
2. See Appendix B hereto. [Footnote in the source text. This 15-page appendix is not printed.]
3. See Appendix C hereto. [Footnote in the source text. This 5-page appendix is not printed.]
4. See Appendix D hereto. [Footnote in the source text. This 3-page appendix is not printed.]
5. See Appendix E hereto. [Footnote in the source text. This 5-page appendix is not printed.]
6. In a memorandum to Bundy dated April 10, Komer described this paper “as an example of how the Chiefs still sign off on such disarmament comments as made the last general in the White House almost come to ignore their views.” Komer believed that the paper failed to take into account the effect on the Soviet Union of U.S. actions regarding atomic weapons, and pointed out that the Soviets were currently in the process of reducing conventional forces to 2.5 million, “where we are,” by 1962. “True, this still somehow gives them a lot more divisions than we have, but the disparity will no longer be so great as to be an absolute bar.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies, ACDA Disarmament General, April 1961)