Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

168. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, April 5, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Meeting of Committee of Principals

PARTICIPANTS

• See attached list¹

The Secretary noted that the tabling of a draft “treaty” by the Soviet Union had confronted us with a tactical problem and that although the fundamental barrier to negotiations was the negative Soviet attitude toward inspection, we should try to put in the hands of our delegation the materials they need for negotiating purposes. A treaty outline was being prepared for this purpose, and a number of questions needed to be answered.

Mr. McNamara said that he had wondered how soon this needed to be done, but the Secretary’s statement that materials were needed for the present negotiations had answered that question. He also wished to ask what degree of detail was needed. He hoped that certain matters could be dealt with in general language.

Mr. Foster replied that we had to be more specific than heretofore and that although the complete details of our proposals could be unfolded gradually, we needed to give a sense of direction to the negotiations.

The Committee then turned to discussion of the specific issues posed in Mr. Foster’s memorandum of April 4, 1962,² for the Members of the Committee of Principals.

1. Criteria for determining the dividing line between long- and medium-range strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

Mr. Foster recalled that Mr. McNamara had previously suggested that a distinction be drawn between vehicles of inter-continental and less than inter-continental range. He noted that a major problem was whether to consider the B-47 and Badger as falling in the inter-continental category. ACDA recommended that they should be treated as inter-continental. Treating them as less than inter-continental gave the United States such an advantage as to be non-negotiable. Admiral Parker reviewed the alternatives which had been considered calling attention to the fact that under the alternative recommended by ACDA, the numbers of vehicles in the inter-continental categories for the United States and Soviet Union were roughly equivalent.

Mr. McNamara questioned whether this was an accurate reflection of the true situation. He stated that for the Badger to achieve inter-continental range, part of the Badger force had to be utilized as tankers. Accordingly, although the Soviet Union did not now have an inter-continental force equivalent to that of the United States, it could achieve such a force under the proposed categorization by, in effect, trading tankers for missiles. He believed that the recommended categories would be disadvantageous unless tankers for the B-47 were also included. For similar reasons, he expressed his opposition to considering all strategic delivery vehicles in a single category. General LeMay agreed that the question of categories had to be looked at from the operational standpoint.

Dr. Wiesner commented that if both we and the Soviet Union try to maximize advantage through “juggling” categories, we would never get an agreement. He suggested that reductions should be by types across the board but that production should be by categories. Reductions should be by numbers alone, but destructive capability might have to be considered in connection with production limitations. Proposed reduction of a given type might be traded-off against allowed production. Mr. McNamara thought that this approach would meet Defense’s problems.

Mr. Fisher asked whether this did not mean that we were not really reducing by types since, in view of continuing production, the effect of this approach would actually be an increase in certain types supposedly subject to reduction. He also asked how this approach would affect determination of retained levels. The Secretary requested further clarification of the proposal.

Mr. Foster reserved his position on the proposal and suggested that Dr. Wiesner work it out mathematically to show what was involved.

2. Criterion for Determining Destruction Capability.

Mr. Foster noted that ACDA recommended that destructive capability be measured by the gross loaded weight of the vehicle involved but that he understood there was some difference of opinion as to the appropriateness of this criterion. General LeMay said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were examining the matter. Mr. McNamara said that this was one matter which he hoped could be dealt with in general language. Mr. Beam stated that he thought it might be possible for a time to deal with the matter in general language.

3. Reduction Criteria for Non-Strategic Armaments.

Mr. Foster said that ACDA recommended that reductions in the non-strategic area should be by numbers only. He noted that weight might be of some importance in some categories but that reduction by numbers represented a simpler approach.

Dr. Wiesner suggested that reductions should be by numbers but that types rather than categories should be used in the non-strategic as well as the strategic area. He suggested a continuous list of armaments to be reduced in both areas.

4. Categories for Non-Strategic Armaments.

Mr. Foster recalled that with one exception the categories suggested for non-strategic armaments had been under consideration for some time, the exception being ACDA’s proposal to add a new category for surface-to-air missiles other than anti-missile missile systems.

In response to a question by the Secretary, Mr. McNamara said that he was inclined to the belief that the larger the number of categories the better in the non-strategic as well as the strategic area. General LeMay believed that a larger number of categories would be needed in the non-strategic area than had been proposed. Mr. McNamara thought in particular that ships should be divided into more than a single category.

Dr. Wiesner renewed his suggestion that reductions in the non-strategic as well as the strategic area be by types and that production be by categories. He believed this approach would solve the problem pre-sented by the fact that the Soviet Union has so much to draw on. Mr. Nitze pointed out that there would be a problem in defining types.

Mr. Foster noted again that the issue had been under discussion for some time. However, Mr. McNamara stated that he was not prepared to give a final answer and that it would take some time to work the matter out. He was inclined to agree with Dr. Wiesner and wondered whether, if the suggested categories were to be used, they could not be described as “illustrative”. The Secretary thought this approach might be possible.

5. Limitations on Production of Armaments.

Mr. Foster expressed the view that the issue of limitations would have to be resolved in connection with the determination of categories.

6. Limits on Testing of Strategic Delivery Vehicles.

Mr. Foster stated that the ACDA recommendation was based on relating past testing experience to new levels of production. He believed this would not present problems. Mr. McNamara agreed to this approach.

7. Anti-Missile Missile Systems.

Dr. Wiesner thought problems would arise from treating anti-missile missile systems differently from other types of armaments and that calling for prohibition of such systems might be interpreted as reflecting fear on our part. Mr. Wilson agreed that there might be a propaganda problem.

General LeMay expressed the view that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was doing well in this field but that we could beat them if we wished to do so. He thought we should not give up our chance of doing so.

The Secretary asked whether it was assumed that we would continue developments. Mr. McNamara affirmed that we could proceed with developments in every category in which we were allowed to produce. Dr. Wiesner believed that until the second stage of disarmament was reached, we had to be able to turn around.

Mr. McNamara suggested that one way to handle the matter would be to treat anti-missile missile systems as a separate category of non-strategic armaments. If any such systems had been produced, they would be reduced thirty percent. If none had been produced, no production would be allowed.

It was agreed to handle the matter in this manner.

8. Elimination of Armaments Intended for Reserve Forces.

Mr. Fisher noted that the Soviet Union had proposed the elimination of armaments for reserve forces and that ACDA believed that it would be advantageous to the United States to take the Soviet Union up on its offer. Mr. McNamara said that he had not had an opportunity to think the proposal through, that he did not know how armaments for reserve forces would be defined, but that the offer seemed advantageous. General LeMay stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted another look at the proposal. Mr. Foster urged that it be given serious consideration since it was hard to think the proposal was not to our advantage. Mr. McNamara was inclined to agree with Mr. Foster but was not certain how to ensure that it would be to our advantage.

9. Destruction of Nuclear Delivery Vehicles During Negotiations

Mr. Foster noted that the proposal that the United States and the Soviet Union destroy on a mutual basis between 10 and 30 B-47’s and Badgers each month for a limited period during the negotiations had been discussed many times. He called attention to the proposal’s value in reassuring others of our sincerity. Mr. McNamara stated that he could agree to the proposal but that he believed the number destroyed should not be above 15 vehicles a month.

The Secretary asked whether the proposal would jeopardize our position in the present confrontation with the Soviet Union. Mr. McNamara said that it would not. General LeMay, however, doubted that a Badger was worth a B-47.

Mr. Wilson commented that Mr. Murrow doubted that the proposal would have lasting psychological impact since we were phasing B-47’s out anyway. Mr. Foster pointed out that we had decided to retain the B-47 longer than previously planned and that it remained a significant instrument of war.

Mr. Rostow feared that the proposal would prevent the neutrals from facing up to the problem of inspection and that trading bombers might offer the neutrals a soft way out. He wished to study the matter further and believed that every device should be used to make the neutrals confront the inspection issue. Mr. Bundy was concerned that the proposal would open a Pandora’s box of bonfires.

No conclusion was reached respecting the proposal.

The Secretary asked that ACDA and Defense prepare a joint statement of issues for the President.³

Upon completion of the review of issues posed in Mr. Foster’s memorandum of April 4, Dr. Wiesner raised the following questions regarding the Treaty outline that had been circulated: whether destruction of missile launching sites should not be subject to the thirty percent reduction; whether the proposed definition of “control” in connection with transfer of nuclear weapons might not be disadvantageous; whether the verification annex should not be placed in the body of the Treaty outline; whether the Treaty outline should not specify the Parties to the Treaty; and whether the Treaty outline did not give undue weight to experts commissions. It was agreed that these questions could be examined in connection with redrafting the Treaty outline. Dr. Wiesner also suggested that the thirty percent reduction factor might be applied to armed forces as well as armaments, but Mr. Foster and Mr. McNamara thought it wiser to leave the United States proposal in its present form.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/4-562. Secret. Drafted by William E. Gathright (ACDA/IR) and approved by Foster for ACDA on April 9 and by the Secretary on April 10.
1. This 2-page list of the 34 participants at the meeting is not printed.
2. Foster’s 7-page memorandum to the Committee of Principals, April 4, which summarizes the issues for discussion at the April 5 meeting, is reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, vol. 3, pp. 369-369F.
3. Reference presumably is to Foster’s April 6 memorandum to the President, summarizing the issues for imminent discussion at the meeting that day with the President. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Basic Memoranda, 2/62-4/62) The issues still to be resolved after this Principals’ meeting were also summarized in a memorandum from Kaysen to the President, April 5. (Ibid., Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, 18-Nation Conference, Geneva, 4/1/62-4/11/62) Both memoranda are in the Supplement.