Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

164. Letter From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

Washington, March 22, 1962.

Dear Mr. Secretary: As you know, a series of meetings during the week preceding the departure of the U.S. Delegation to the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference resolved a number of questions related to the initial U.S. proposals to be presented to the Conference, but left other questions undecided. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has been reviewing those issues not fully resolved within the U.S. Government in order to arrive at recommendations which could form the basis of a U.S position.

The purpose of this letter is to transmit to you for your comments the tentative views and recommendations of ACDA on several of the unresolved issues. As ACDA prepares its views on other issues these will also be submitted to you for comment and clearance.

Categorization of Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles. It has been tentatively agreed that we should divide strategic nuclear delivery vehicles into two categories. We believe these two categories should be termed long-range and medium-range. In considering the criteria to be used to distinguish between these two categories, it is recognized that it is possible to arrange the limiting criteria in a U.S. proposal so as to provide us certain advantages by virtue of the characteristics of weapons peculiar to our current inventory and theoretically to prevent the Soviets from having the same advantage. However, as a practical matter, we cannot expect that the Russians will be taken in by such tactics. Therefore we should decide whether it is more advantageous to us to have a plan which permits a conversion between medium weight bombers and long-range systems within the framework of a total reduction, the Russians having the same option, or whether it will be better to preclude such a conversion on both sides. In view of the decision to continue some modernization of our forces, we believe it would be best to distinguish between the two categories of strategic missiles on a basis that would permit conversion between medium weight bombers and long-range systems.

Therefore, we believe that long-range delivery vehicles should be defined as including all armed combat aircraft over 30,000 kg empty weight, all missiles over 5,000 km in maximum range, and all submarine-launched missiles and air-to-surface missiles with ranges over 300 km. This would place the following delivery vehicles in the long-range category:

1. Long Range

• U.S.: B-52, B-58,¹ B-47, Titan, Atlas, Minuteman, Polaris, Regulus, Hound Dog, Skybolt.
• U.S.S.R.: Bison, Bear, Badger, Blinder, SS-6, SS-7, SSN-4, SSN-5, AS-3, AS-4.

2. Medium Range

• U.S.: B/RB-66, A3J, A3D, P3V, P2V, P5M, Mace, Matador, Pershing, Redstone.
• U.S.S.R.: Madge, SS-5, SS-4, SS-3, SS-2.

All missiles between 300 km and 5,000 km maximum range and all aircraft between 15,000 kg and 30,000 kg empty weight would fall in the medium range strategic delivery vehicle category except as noted above.

Criteria for Determining Destructive Capability. It has been agreed that in reducing strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, a dual criteria will be used: numbers plus some measurement related to destructive capability. We believe that total gross loaded weight (maximum designed take-off weight for aircraft) is probably the most reasonable measurement to use for total destructive capability. Such a limitation would, we believe, inhibit the Soviets from trading smaller delivery vehicles for larger delivery vehicles or from building considerable numbers of larger missiles to carry 100 megaton warheads. Such an additional limitation is obviously advantageous for the long-range category of missiles since otherwise there would be no limit on the size of vehicles that the Soviets might build. Although in the medium-range category there will be weight and range limits on individual aircraft and even probably on individual missiles as a result of engineering criteria, the medium-range category still confronts Western Europe with a potential threat of vast destructive capability. While the requirement for a dual criteria may be considered less necessary in the medium-range category, we believe it is still desirable for political as well as technical reasons to limit this category by total gross loaded weight as well as numbers.

Reduction Criteria for Armaments Other Than Strategic. The question remains open whether a criterion in addition to numbers should be applied in determining reductions of tactical nuclear and conventional armaments. We are inclined to believe that, with the possible exception of the 5-300 km missile category, an additional criterion such as total weight would simply complicate the verification process without achieving any additional meaningful limitation. There may be some advantage in placing an additional weight limitation on the 5-300 km missile category. However, the range limitation of 300 kilometers itself may provide all the limits we would need. To summarize, we believe it advisable to reduce the above categories solely on the basis of numbers.

Categories of Non-Strategic Weapons. We believe the categories of non-strategic armaments which were listed on page 13 of the March 3 memorandum for the President² are appropriate with two exceptions:

a. We would suggest that category (4) might be changed to read:

“Surface-to-surface and air-to-surface ballistic and air-breathing missiles and free rockets with range capabilities from 5 to 300 kilometers.”

This change is intended to permit the exclusion of such missiles as the Bullpup, which are in reality ordnance for fighter bombers.

b. We suggest that a new category encompassing surface-to-air missiles, but excluding AICBM’s be added as Category (7). The inherent short-range characteristics of this category distinguishes it from the anti-missile missile category. Reductions in armaments in this category, and limitations on production and testing, should be treated in a similar manner to that adopted for other non-strategic weapons.

Production Limitations. It has been previously agreed that production of strategic delivery vehicles and other armaments would be limited in Stage I to some percentage of the numbers of vehicles and armaments in the inventories of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. at the beginning date of Stage I. However, upon re-examination, we believe there are some serious difficulties which would result from applying limits on production based upon an agreed percentage of existing inventories of each category of weapons. As far as strategic nuclear delivery vehicles are concerned, this method would affect the U.S. and U.S.S.R. about the same since inventories on both sides will be roughly equal. The problem of basing production quotas on inventory of agreed categories becomes more serious in the non-strategic category. In some of the non-strategic categories of armaments, particularly land weapons, the vastly superior Soviet inventories would permit them to produce at far greater rates than the United States.

In each category, this apparent asymmetry can be adjusted by basing the annual production limitation for both sides on a percentage of that national inventory which is the smaller. Thus, in those categories where the USSR is numerically superior, e.g., tanks, the U.S. inventory would be the basis for limiting production for both sides, and vice-versa. For the strategic categories, inventory would be determined by the product of the numbers of units and their respective gross load weight. For armaments other than strategic, numbers of units in each category would constitute the inventory. Further, we believe that consistency with an overall disarmament program indicates the desirability of establishing permitted production rates for Stage I below past production rates in those cases in which there has been substantial production (e.g., strategic delivery vehicles). However, we recognize that in certain categories, such as armaments for ground forces, past production in the U.S. has been so low, as compared to that in the U.S.S.R., that, in these cases, establishment of production limitations on the basis of past production may present serious problems. There are the bases of ACDA’s recommendations on the question of production. ACDA is not at this time recommending the specific percentages that should be proposed.

It is our present thinking that permitted production rates should be required to absorb any replacements required as a result of accidental loss of any type of armament as well as production for testing and training. However, production for peaceful purposes, e.g., space vehicle boosters, would have to be declared and verified but would be permitted within specified limits and safeguards. ACDA is also studying the problem of how production limitations would affect sales or grants of armaments from the major powers to smaller powers.

Testing of Weapons Systems in Categories Proposed for Reduction or Control. The U.S. is committed by the September 25 Plan³ to proposing that testing of agreed categories of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles should be limited or halted in Stage I. The U.S. is not committed to halting or limiting the testing of other armaments.

We believe the U.S. should take the following position in elaboration of the September 25 proposals on testing in Stage I:

a. As general principles:

(1) As long as some production is permitted some testing should be permitted.

(2) In Stage I, testing would be allowed only for those armaments for which production of operational units was planned prior to the end of Stage I. However, this restriction should be subject to abrogation if the period of transition from Stage I to Stage II is delayed excessively.

b. Limitations on testing should apply to strategic missiles, but not to other strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Strategic missiles, defined as those having a maximum range of 300 kilometers or more, would thus be the agreed category referred to in the September 25 Plan. For each stage concerned, an annual quota of strategic missile tests should be established. For the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. the quota should be fixed at a figure which bears the same proportion to the permitted annual production of strategic missiles that the number of tests of such missiles now considered necessary bears to current production of such missiles.

c. Within the quota, either new types of vehicles or newly-produced units of older types could be tested.

d. Delivery vehicles produced for peaceful purposes could be tested outside the quota figure, but within specified limits and safeguards and subject to inspection to insure that the vehicles were in fact being utilized for peaceful space exploration purposes rather than for military tests.

e. The testing of anti-missile systems is covered in the succeeding paragraph.

AICBM: Concerning AICBM’s, the memorandum to the President stated that “restrictions be placed in Stage I on production, deployment and testing of anti-missile missiles by the U.S. and U.S.S.R.” ACDA believes that these restrictions should be such as to reduce to zero any existing AICBM’s and to prohibit any production or testing of such weapons. This recommendation is premised on the assumption that agreement would be reached prior to any Nike-Zeus systems becoming operational in the U.S. Once these systems become operational in the U.S., we, of course, would have to re-examine our position. Our recommendation is based on our strong belief that the destabilizing effects of technological breakthrough in this area pose such a potential threat that we should prohibit these weapons as far as practical, i.e., destruction of existing weapons and prohibitions on all production and testing.

We will make available draft staff studies which were taken into account in formulating this letter.

I believe that after you have had an opportunity to review these subjects it would be appropriate to form a joint task force of DOD and ACDA representatives to discuss and consider the above views and recommendations, and any others which the Department of Defense may wish to advance. If this idea meets with your approval, I would appreciate your designating Defense representatives to meet with me with a view to early establishment of an agreed U.S. position on these matters for use of the U.S. Delegation in Geneva.

Sincerely yours,

Adrian S. Fisher⁴

0. Source: Department of State, Special Group (CI) Files: Lot 68 D 451, 1/1/62-7/31/62. Confidential.
1. Though not within the weight range, it is recommended that the B-58 be included in the long-range category to retain consistency with regard to mission. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. See footnote 3, Document 146.
3. For text of the U.S. program for general and complete disarmament submitted to the U.N. General Assembly on September 25, 1961, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 475-482.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.