161. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and Acting Secretary of State Ball0
Ball: … to know that.
President: We don’t have historically the argument that well, we could have gotten an agreement but the United States stopped it. Why don’t they let the British go ahead and ask Tsarapkin if he would agree to—even with their proposal, just informally, of national inspection rather … I don’t … I think even the British plan provides for inspection, if there is an event, doesn’t it?
Ball: That’s right.
President: We don’t want to have just for the record that an agreement could have been reached, but we bitched it up, because I think that [Page 402] everybody there is going to be against us. I don’t think there is anybody that takes our position. They’re all going to be with the British. You see, you got the neutrals; you got the pro-Communists; you got us and the British. I just hate to let the thing go and look like they could have gotten a deal, the British could have, but we stopped it because I think that would really be a … and I don’t think they can get a deal.
Ball: Well, he seemed to feel pretty confident that they were going to be able to get all the other delegations to understand the implications of this thing; that they are doing a big educational job.
President: Well, it may be if the British don’t put forward a formal proposal to them, they ought to ask if they would agree to a part of any program in inspection after the event. It ought to be possible to get that question put by the British and just have it on the record, because we keep getting the scientists say it could be done. I don’t want to be like Eisenhower was in ‘59 when he cranked up the deal, but didn’t. I don’t want them to be able to always say “Well …”
Ball: Course this meeting of the scientists over the weekend really undercut the Macmillan position a lot on that.
President: Yes, but, George, I think there must be some way without making it a formal proposal to put it on the record and maybe it is already on the record, that he would not agree to inspection following an event, even after there was a suspicious one.
Ball: Let me see if we can’t get that point made.
President: And then at least Macmillan is not able to say “Well, the British …” We got to get the deal there. You know Adlai will be up in arms, and we will have a lot of heat that we could have gotten a deal, but we didn’t. They don’t want to break up that way.
Ball: Sure.
President: Because I don’t think they will give them a deal, even on the British plan.
Ball: No, I don’t think they will either. The problem I know the Secretary is worrying about is that we don’t want to get ourselves in a position where we are beginning to bargain from the starting point of the British plan.
President: I agree with you.
Ball: I am going to talk to him a little later on the secure line, and I will see what we can do along that line.
President: Yes, just take a look at the British plan. Somebody over there is an expert. Put the toughest part of it. Somewhere I would like to find out when this portion of discussion seems to be impossible by saying “Would you even accept this?” Then if Tsarapkin says “No”, then say to the British “Even your plan doesn’t go”. Otherwise, I am sure Macmillan [Page 403] will have a lot of political problems at home and if then he blamed it on us, we will look like we have lost a great moment.
Ball: All right. Let me try that with him and see what he can do there.
President: What else do you have?
Ball: Oh, I don’t think much. This Argentine business is nasty, of course.1
President: Here is Mac now. He has something. Oh, did you get any place on Berlin?
Ball: No, I don’t know whether you saw the cable that came in late last night.2
President: Yes, he is giving it to me.
Ball: It is pretty discouraging. They are meeting again tonight.
President: That is why I don’t think they will take anything of the British plan, either. And I think just for the record we’ve got to get it made.
Ball: Okay.
- Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Disarmament. No classification marking. Transcribed in Ball’s office.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- Reference presumably is to Secto 65 or Secto 67, both messages on the Berlin question which Secretary Rusk transmitted from Geneva on the night of March 19-20 to the President and Acting Secretary Ball. See vol. XV, pp. 48–50.↩