Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

158. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, March 15, 1962, 10 p.m.

Disto 30. Dean and Godber (UK) called on Tsarapkin 5:00 pm for informal discussion test ban treaty.

Dean said US prepared grant one point to which Sovs had apparently attached importance, namely, to drop 4.75 threshold and make treaty comprehensive on banning all tests in atmosphere, outer space, underground and in oceans. Noted this change would do away with need for US proposals in August for scientific review of threshold after research program or for re-examination treaty to lower threshold by increasing number of control posts or inspections. We would retain sliding scale of 12 to 20 inspections, retain same number of control posts (19), retain our offer to remove administrator by vote of 7 to 11 in commission, and retain offer to place neutrals on inspection teams. We would be prepared to sign April 18 treaty as fully comprehensive with only two additions:

(a) Would want to see if in some way we could have the head of state certify there were no preparations for tests and work out agreed rights for preparatory commission to inspect, certain number of times per year, declared test sites.

(b) Would want to shorten time for control installation to something like six months and would be prepared contribute mobile control posts toward this end. We would in addition be willing to allocate agreed limited number of inspections within inspection quota to zones which had normally little seismic activity. A large seismic zone covering heartland of Soviet Union might thus be allocated only very small number inspections; possibly three.

Dean handed Tsarapkin informal aide-mémoire (text separate tel) covering these points.¹

Following indication by Godber of concurrence in proposal, Tsarapkin said could tell us even without careful study of proposal that it does not coincide completely with Soviet position which has been submitted to US and explained to us November 28² and on subsequent occasions. Under now existing situation, idea international control is completely unacceptable to USSR. Only basis for agreement possible is national control. Dean proposal is quite different approach. This document based on previous positions now out of date. It is impossible come to agreement now on any proposal based on this approach.

Dean stated that without trying be argumentative, seemed should be some way work out agreement on basis international control. Asked Tsarapkin his reaction to US proposal for comprehensive treaty contained aide-mémoire. Tsarapkin said if US desired comprehensive treaty it could have comprehensive treaty on basis Sov Nov 28 proposal. USSR could not accept US proposal contained in aide-mémoire even if first two paras (inspection for preparation and speeding up installation control) were dropped.

Godber asked whether there was any way to combine approaches of national and international control. Even if tests could be detected by national systems some control posts and some inspections would be necessary to locate and verify violation. Tsarapkin said if we would sign agreement there would be no violators; could not understand approach of signing treaty and then violating it. USSR not against control but under very difficult situation between East and West it is impossible admit agents other side under whatever color of international inspectorate. We should know that. But if West wanted control, Sov November 28 proposal would give it. Scientific advances are such as to make national control adequate; international control might have been required five years ago but not now.

Dean said our scientists do not agree national control adequate. Asked if USSR nevertheless wished stand on Nov 28 proposal; Tsarapkin said Sov position is readiness come to agreement now on tests on basis Nov 28 proposal. Without waiting for GCDUSSR also willing accept any reasonable way settling matter within GCD framework.

Godber said even if we could or might in future be able to detect tests, Tsarapkin had given us no way clear up dispute on whether events detected were natural phenomenon or test. Gromyko this morning had expressed, in conference, Sov willingness accept control.³ Even relying upon national detection as provided Sov Nov 28 proposal it would seem essential, if not to accept control posts, at least to accept inspection teams. UK has no position to put toward on this; was merely looking far ahead. Moreover Godber would have thought that since Sovs were prepared accept controls up until they began tests in September, they might surely find it advantageous to their country to do so at this point in time after test series. Frankly could not understand reason for change Sov position. Tsarapkin replied that speaking equally frankly, he thought we knew very well what had happened to cause change. International situation changed sharply and USSR now had to concern itself with problem of military reconnaissance so could not accept international control which permitted such reconnaissance. If we three sign treaty in bona fides there would be no need for inspection. Godber said there could be need in case of dispute over event. Tsarapkin said if such need should arise we could perhaps exchange data and conduct consultations. He deeply convinced such consultations would resolve any misunderstanding. Agreement could be found on basis Nov 28 proposal. Godber inquired meaning of the term “basis”. Tsarapkin said no hidden meanings should be read into that phrasing—by November 28 basis he meant national systems and no international control. Inspectors could be espionage agents. Godber reminded TsarapkinUK ready accept inspectors.

Dean said Tsarapkin should sleep on it and perhaps we could have further talks. Tsarapkin said he ready. Would be happy if we could come to agreement on basis November 28 proposal or to settle in connection GCD. Dean said we wanted agreement now. Tsarapkin replied agreement now would be acceptable without waiting for GCD.⁴

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/3-1562. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London and Moscow.
1. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, p. 150.
2. Reference is to the Soviet draft agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear and thermonuclear tests (U.N. doc. GEN/DNT/122, December 11, 1961), November 28, 1961; for text, see ibid., 1961, p. 664.
3. In his statement to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on March 15, Gromyko said, “the Soviet Union is ready to accept any proposals on control over disarmament put forward by the Western Powers if they will accept Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament.” For text of his statement, see ibid., 1962, pp. 94-103.
4. Dean supplemented his report of this meeting as follows: “I should like to add that in course our discussion of comprehensive treaty, I specifically asked Tsarapkin whether he would accept April 18 treaty if threshold were dropped to zero and additional safeguards proposed paras 1 and 2 of informal aide-mémoire were dropped. He replied categorically that he would not and would only negotiate on their November 28, 1961 proposal.” (Disto 35 from Geneva, March 16; Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/3-1662)