Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

154. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Geneva, March 14, 1962, 10:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Foster
  • Ambassador Dean
  • Mr. Stelle
  • Mr. Spiers
  • Mr. Akalovsky
• United Kingdom
  • Lord Home
  • Mr. Godber
  • Mr. Shattuck
  • Sir Michael Wright
  • Mr. Samuel¹
  • Mr. Lambert
  • Maj. Gen. Riddell
  • Mr. Russell
• USSR
  • Mr. Gromyko
  • Mr. Zorin
  • Mr. Tsarapkin
  • Lt. Gen. Gryzlov
  • Mr. Sukhodrev

SUBJECT

• Disarmament

Lord Home opened the meeting stating he believed it would be useful for the three delegations to exchange views on how the conference should proceed and on disarmament matters in general. He invited Sir Michael Wright to report on the results of the consultations among the representatives of the three delegations on conference procedures.

Sir Michael Wright stated that the group had had several meetings to discuss procedure and that he was happy to say that agreement had been found upon proposals to be put before the other delegations.

After some discussion of the arrangements for the opening meeting, as well as the subsequent meetings of the conference the three principals agreed that limitation on publicity as agreed among the US, the UK and USSR delegations would apply only to the conference as a whole and that each delegation would be free to act at its discretion as far as making its views known through its own media. The UK also stressed the importance of the role the Co-chairmen would play, particularly as a steering committee.

Lord Home observed he was encouraged that this conference would open under the conditions of US-USSR agreement on principles. He noted that the disarmament principles developed earlier by the Commonwealth Conference² were very similar to those agreed by the US and USSR. Thus, he thought, the conference had a good start.

Referring to the question of verification, Lord Home particularly emphasized the problem of verifying unidentified events in the nuclear test context and the question of verifying the levels of armaments remaining during the process of general disarmament. He said it would be helpful for the conference if the US and USSR stated their views on these two matters, which were likely to be the central difficulties in the conference work. He observed that his opening speech would deal primarily with these two problems, noting that it would not contain any propaganda but merely the suggestion that these problems be studied objectively.³

Mr. Gromyko responded by saying that he would not object even if Lord Home’s speech contained some propaganda, provided that there were different kinds of propaganda.

Mr. Gromyko then made a prolonged exposition of USSR views, stressing that the US, the UK and the USSR carried the main burden of responsibility for the solution of the disarmament problem. The reasons for this were obvious and certain conclusions from this should be drawn as far as the committee’s work was concerned. He noted that this conference was to take place in a city where representatives of the three countries had made many speeches as far back as during the days of the League of Nations, although the US had not been a formal member of the League of Nations. No practical solution had been found at that time and he wondered whether the three powers could not now use their authority and prestige in order to further the cause of disarmament and peace. As far as the USSR was concerned, its representatives had come to Geneva to contribute to the solution of disarmament. In this connection, Mr. Gromyko recalled Mr. Khrushchev’s proposal that the conference be opened at the heads-of-government level and regretted that no agreement had been reached on that proposal.⁴ Mr. Gromyko went on to say that the main requirement for the solution of the problem was the desire on the part of all participants to reach agreement; negotiations were only a means of reconciling differences.

Mr. Gromyko continued that the USSR believed that the solution of the disarmament problem should be sought on the basis of general and complete disarmament, i.e., on the basis of decisions already adopted by the UN General Assembly. He contended that such an approach would eliminate many difficulties presented by partial approach. He observed, however, that the solution of general and complete disarmament could not be implemented by simply pressing a button. This was why the Soviet proposals provided for sufficient time and several stages. He stressed the need for an agreed over-all time limit, time limits for the implementation of each measure and stage, as well as on the allocation of disarmament measures among the different stages, and contended the USSR was aroused by proposals not providing for specific obligations in this respect.

Referring to the problem of control, Mr. Gromyko observed that much had been said on this issue, both in the League of Nations and in later disarmament negotiations. Perhaps many aspects of this problem were still unclear, but much of what had been said attested to a lack of desire on the part of certain states to resolve the problem. He contended that the Soviet Government was not against control; on the contrary, it was for strict and effective control. The other participants in the Committee would see during the negotiations that the USSR was indeed in favor of such control and was not merely paying lip service to it. However, the USSR was in favor of control over disarmament and not over armaments. The USSR was for control over disarmament measures up to and including all-embracing control after the completion of the process of general and complete disarmament. He contended that the USSR, taking into account past experience, could not rely on verbal pledges in the disarmament field; it believed that international control was important and therefore there was no need to convince it on that point.

Observing that the present discussion was only in general terms, Mr. Gromyko said, however, that he wished to touch upon a specific issue which had been raised in past negotiations. He recalled that in post-war disarmament negotiations, as well as during the US-USSR bilateral exchange of views, some participants, and particularly the United States, had mentioned the need for the establishment of the necessary arrangements and international institutions, both during and after the process of general and complete disarmament, to prevent aggression and ensure security of all states during as well as after the disarmament process. He said that the USSR would not object to such agreed arrangements and perhaps some international institutions to maintain peace and prevent aggression. He claimed that the Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament took this problem sufficiently into account and that Soviet statements in the committee would make that evident.

The Secretary stated that the U.S. Delegation had come to Geneva with every intention to work seriously and hard in order to make headway in the disarmament field. Observing that more than 30 active discussions of this problem had taken place in the past, the Secretary expressed the view that the time had come to make a breakthrough toward progress. He indicated he intended to stay in Geneva some ten days, but expressed readiness to return at any time when his participation was required to advance progress. In any event, the US would have a strong delegation in Geneva at all times. The Secretary stressed the President’s personal interest in the Conference and stated the President would follow it on a daily basis. In this connection, he referred to the President’s statement with regard to the possibility of a Heads-of-State meeting if the situation warranted such a meeting.⁵

The Secretary then said that the US was encouraged by the US-USSR Joint Statement of Agreed Principles and by the fact that that statement had been welcomed warmly throughout the world. He expressed the view that our task was now to give reality and life to those principles.

Referring to the question of verification, the Secretary expressed the hope that the USSR would give careful thought with regard to what the US meant and what it did not mean in the field of verification. He stressed that it was important to give assurance to all parties that agreed measures were indeed carried out, and observed that confidence and trust were based on knowledge, whereas ignorance bred suspicion and fears. He emphasized that the US had no desire to intrude in the life of other countries or interfere with their activities any more than it was necessary only to verify compliance with the obligations assumed under a disarmament agreement. The US was prepared to sit down and discuss, within the context of specific disarmament measures, methods of verification which would involve minimum intrusion. He expressed the view that this problem should not affect over-riding strategic considerations in the first stages, since the US and USSR knew enough about each other to inflict great damage even today. He also thought that there was no need to worry about minor tactical problems or espionage. The main problem before us was to stop the armaments race.

Referring to the problem of nuclear tests, the Secretary recalled the distinction drawn by the Soviet Union between “inspection of disarmament” and “inspection of armaments”. He wondered whether the Soviet Union could accept cessation of nuclear weapon tests as disarmament and noted that a test ban would involve not a partial but a total elimination of tests. He expressed the view that nobody should say his final word now on the various problems we faced; rather, a thorough examination of those problems should be undertaken to see what could be done to resolve them, so that general and complete disarmament should become a reality instead of remaining merely an aspiration.

Lord Home inquired whether Mr. Gromyko’s reference to special international institutions to maintain the peace also covered the organization to verify the implementation of obligations during the disarmament process.

Mr. Gromyko replied that this meeting had not been convened for the purpose of detailed discussion. However, he said he would be prepared to engage in such a discussion at any time. He went on to say that certain measures to keep the peace were needed. The Soviet Union believed that establishment of an international force was one of the possible ways of resolving the problem.

Turning to the question of control, Mr. Gromyko expressed the view that there must be an organization to deal with control on a daily basis. Such an organization must be agreed in advance and must encompass an agreed system. He said the Soviet Union would set forth its detailed views on this subject at a later date, perhaps also in written form. He expressed the hope that the West would do the same, provided its efforts were aimed at disarmament. He went on to say that the most decisive factor in determining the state of peace was disarmament as such. In fact, he was inclined to believe that disarmament accounted for some 99 per cent. As to whether there would be aggression if general and complete disarmament was implemented, Mr. Gromyko expressed the view that it would be difficult to provide a complete guarantee against such a possibility; after all, wars had taken place even in the ancient times, and Hanibal had waged war against Rome. Nevertheless, the Soviet proposal provided for guarantees in that respect too.

The Secretary stated he did not believe that disarmament was a hopeless problem and expressed the view that we should be able to find a solution to it. However, any solution should be based on Aristide Briand’s precept that disarmament should be such as would leave no one a dupe or victim. He said he understood the nervousness some people might have with regard to the possibility of strangers wandering in their country during the disarmament process. Our task was to find a solution to this problem and to define the job of verification personnel in such a way as to limit it only to actual verification functions.

Lord Home expressed the view that it should be possible to combine the provision for an international disarmament organization in the US program with the idea of creating an international institution for maintaining peace as mentioned by Mr. Gromyko. He also observed that it should not be beyond our imagination to develop a method of verifying that the arms reduced are not being replaced. He suggested that all the participants should think about these problems and perhaps meet again at a later date.

Mr. Gromyko said he wanted to make one additional point. He stated that he understood that all the participants in the conference would work on general and complete disarmament in accordance with U.N. decisions and that the Committee’s task should be to translate those decisions into specific obligations of states.

Outlining his general conception of the Committee’s work, he said that the following should be done: (1) spell out obligations for general and complete disarmament as a whole; (2) allocate specific measures to appropriate stages; and (3) spell out commitments with regard to time limits both for the over-all program and the individual measures and stages. Finally, he contended that U.S. proposals thus far had not included some of these very important problems.

The Secretary expressed the belief that the Committee should deal with general and complete disarmament on a comprehensive basis and that it should stay in session until agreement on a total program was reached. He agreed that stages were necessary but noted that some immediate steps could be found which could be implemented as soon as agreed and which would help us move forward in the broader disarmament field. He expressed the view that as the work of the Conference proceeded, it might be necessary to establish subcommittees, particularly when specific obligations were spelled out.

Lord Home stated he was in basic agreement with the method of work as outlined by Mr. Gromyko, i.e., general and complete disarmament should be attained at the earliest possible time and concluded by stages, with each stage containing measures of physical disarmament and an appropriate control machinery to verify compliance with obligations. During each stage, the operation of the next stage would be planned in great detail. He stressed the need of starting with actual physical destruction of weapons, since this was what mankind desired. Reverting to the question of verification, he stressed the importance of having assurances of compliance during the disarmament process so that the ultimate outcome of that process be not prejudiced. In this connection, he reiterated the need for the creation of an appropriate organization.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-1462. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on June 14. The meeting was held at the British Mission, Villa la Fenetre.
1. Ian Samuel, Principal Private Secretary to Lord Home.
2. At the conclusion of the tenth conference of British Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London March 8-17, the Prime Ministers issued a nine-point statement outlining the principles to be followed in bringing about general and complete disarmament, with effective inspection and control.
3. The text of Lord Home’s speech is in U.N. doc. ENDC/1.
4. Khrushchev first formally advanced this proposal in his February 10 message to President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan; for text, see vol. VI, Document 31, or Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 32-36.
5. In his March 2 address, President Kennedy had stated that if the Soviet Union would accept a treaty in the opening month of talks, he and Prime Minister Macmillan would meet Khrushchev at Geneva to sign the treaty. See ibid., p. 74.