131. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy0
SUBJECT
- Atmospheric Nuclear Testing
You have asked for my recommendation as to whether the United States should, in the near future, resume the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. This question is one of extreme gravity and of exceptional complexity. The views and recommendation which follow can reflect this in only a small way. I hope that the long and searching discussions we have held on this subject have done more justice to the multitude of issues involved.
In my judgment the most important argument against resuming nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere is the possibility of prejudicing formal or tactic steps toward arms control arrangements by making it more certain that the USSR would again test and thereby further escalate the nuclear arms race. Any step we can take to damp down this race is obviously in the national interest if consistent with our national security. Furthermore, to the extent that our nuclear weapons capability is superior to the Soviet capability, a freeze on nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere would be to our military advantage.
[Page 320]This said, I think the problem for decision can thus be formulated. If there is no reason to believe that the Soviets will agree to a test ban of a type we deem necessary to safeguard our national security over the long term, can we risk our national security by gambling that the Soviets will parallel restraints we could unilaterally impose on ourselves? I do not personally believe we can accept this risk in view of the Soviets’ declared objectives and their recent resumption of testing.
There is no reason to believe that the Soviet Union now regards an agreement to ban tests under appropriate safeguards as a serious matter for negotiation. Their influence in inhibiting the Chinese Communists has diminished. We know that they are engaged in a massive drive toward an AICBM capability. Their recent test series has doubtless whetted, rather than damped, their determination to surpass us in the state of the art. I think the conclusion to be drawn is that the Soviets will again test in the atmosphere to achieve what they believe may be significant military advances, regardless of whether or not we resume atmospheric tests. Our failure to resume atmospheric tests might indeed encourage the Soviets to capitalize on their recent advances by launching another massive test series which could in fact seriously jeopardize our national security.
This situation might change in the future, and for this reason I believe we should continue to support a comprehensive test ban treaty with adequate international control.
Other reasons which are commonly advanced to support the argument that the United States should not test in the atmosphere do not seem to me very convincing when our national security is at stake. One argument is that world public reaction would be adverse and inimical to our interests.
We may certainly expect losses to our international position as a result of a decision to proceed with a test program. For example, the decision would be viewed as having a damaging effect on the forthcoming disarmament conference, even though we do not believe that the Soviets would use this as a pretext for breaking off the negotiations. However, such losses may be balanced to a certain extent by the fact that much of foreign public opinion is already conditioned to a U.S. resumption of atmospheric tests. Moreover, our international posture may be strengthened by the evidence of our will to do what is necessary to protect our national security interests, and those of that part of the free world which depend upon us for protection from Soviet aggression.
The problem of radioactive fallout is another argument against testing in the atmosphere, and I share the concern you once expressed at having even one individual affected by radioactive fallout. Nevertheless, I believe that the hazards from fallout produced by such testing as we may [Page 321] carry out are minimal as compared with the hazards which might be caused by misunderstandings about our nuclear strength.
In any event, our security must be the primary consideration, and I am convinced that we can do much to minimize psychological and propaganda losses by careful explanation of our policy, including taking advantage of our improved disarmament program. If, in addition, we are scrupulous in the exercise of responsibility in the conduct of our program, limiting our tests to the kind and number which are essential for military and scientific purposes and conducting them with careful regard to health and safety factors, we should be able to hold our political losses to manageable size.
I have noted the Secretary of Defense’s statement that immediate military requirements now exist for resumption of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, particularly with respect to effects data to assure a continued capability for our offensive and defensive weapons systems. These requirements are particularly persuasive in the light of the major advances in weapons technology, including weapons effects information in the AICBM field, which I understand the Soviets made in their recent test series. If, as seems to be the case, atmospheric tests are necessary to maintain the effectiveness and credibility of the nuclear deterrent, then I believe we now have no satisfactory alternative but to proceed with our test series.
The atmospheric test program of about twenty-four shots proposed by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission seems generally satisfactory and appears to conform to the criteria you have established.
While I believe our best approach in general would be an obviously sober and businesslike approach which would confine the tests to the fewest possible events in the shortest possible period of time in the least inhabited area of the Pacific, I believe there are political and psychological advantages in scheduling cratering or balloon shots in Nevada prior to the commencement of the main series. Specifically, this would permit the briefest possible time lag between your announcement and the first test in the series, and, although it would lengthen the period of tests, it would serve to alleviate criticism that the United States is callous about the safety of inhabitants of the Pacific area but does not use its own territory for tests.
In sum, the reasons for resuming testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere appear to me to be more compelling than the reasons for refraining. My recommendation, therefore, is that you decide to order such atmospheric nuclear weapons tests as you may deem militarily necessary along the lines of the program proposed for the period March-July 1962.
[Page 322]I should like to emphasize the importance of preparing our allies and friends in other parts of the world to assist us in facing up to the criticism which a test series will produce. Diplomatic consultations, including those at the United Nations in New York, will be an essential element in this process. I recommend that we provide our ambassadors in selected countries and at the United Nations with a summary of the reasons which you will advance in your statement of a decision to test, and authorize them to communicate it to the governments to which they are accredited and to the U.N. Secretary General preferably twenty-four hours in advance of its release here. We have developed, and are coordinating with your staff, arrangements for carrying out such diplomatic consultations, including a contingency plan involving a possible initiative with respect to the Security Council. In addition, of course, we will presumably need to take in advance of this some more formal step to consult with the British.
We plan to use the United Nations to bulwark a decision, if taken, to resume atmospheric testing. We would hope for Ambassador Stevenson on the day following the announcement to circulate to the United Nations a document for the information of the entire membership explaining fully our rationale for testing in the atmosphere. At the same time Ambassador Stevenson might hold a press conference which would give him an opportunity to play a full public role in support of your decision. In Washington the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense would play similar roles.
In addition, we have developed plans to take this question to the Security Council in the event it appears likely that the USSR or a third power will seek to convene a special session of the General Assembly. If there is no such move, we would prefer to avoid formal United Nations actions since we will be confronted with difficult proposals calling for an uninspected ban on atmospheric tests. Moreover, the USSR can be expected to use the United Nations in order to build up the pressure for a summit meeting. If the indications are that a special General Assembly is likely, we believe there is relative political advantage for the United States to preempt the situation and convene the Security Council to consider this matter. The Security Council is a much more manageable organ than is the Assembly. In the Security Council our objective would be to remand this question to the Geneva conferees.
The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Director of the United States Information Agency concur in the views expressed above.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests 2/17/62-4/4/62. Secret. Attached to a February 21 memorandum from Battle to McGeorge Bundy stating that the memorandum had been approved at a meeting in the Secretary’s office on February 20.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩