107. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to All Posts0

CA-590. Background.

Since the resumption of the Geneva test ban talks on November 28, the Soviet Union has been pressing publicly its four point proposal to end nuclear testing. In brief, the Soviets proposed:

a)
A ban on atmospheric, underwater and space tests.
b)
Above ban to be policed by “national detection” systems.
c)
A ban on underground tests pending agreement on a system to control such tests as a composite part of an international control system over the realization of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.
d)
The treaty to become effective on signature by the US, UK, USSR and France and then to be open to adherence by all other states.

During the next few weeks we anticipate Soviet propaganda output will stress the following themes in an attempt to justify the new proposal:

1.
Control of nuclear testing can only be solved under conditions of general and complete disarmament.
2.
National detection systems are capable of detecting atmospheric, outer space and underwater detonations. Reliance upon this “control” technique, already proposed by the West for atmospheric tests, coupled with an agreement to ban underground tests can serve as an interim solution to the problem of nuclear testing.
3.
Present tense international situation, which is radically different from 1958-59, makes any control system impossible. Controls today can only serve espionage purposes.
4.
The recent moratorium was not a joint agreement such as the USSR now proposes. It was a unilateral declaration which the US abrogated in 1959 when President Eisenhower announced that the US no longer regarded itself as bound by it.1
5.
Negotiations must be expanded to include France inasmuch as France is now a nuclear power and has been conducting tests on behalf of the Western bloc.

Guidance.

To counter these Soviet propaganda themes and to develop support for the US-UK position, you may wish to draw on the points noted below: [Page 258]

1.
Unlike the Soviet Union which now repudiates it, the US continues to hold to the purpose of the Conference, i.e., the conclusion of a test ban treaty under effective international safeguards.
2.
Latest Soviet proposal is not a treaty proposal. Rather, it is an invitation to sign an unverifiable paper declaration which could be violated at will.
3.
In effect, the Soviet proposal calls for junking all agreements reached in the past three years and starting all over again. The US wants disarmament progress now and continues to believe that the conclusion of a test ban treaty, such as the US-UK have proposed, represents an immediate, practical step toward the goal of general and complete disarmament.
4.
The proposal asks the US to place reliance solely upon Soviet promises which recent history has already shown inadequate to halt nuclear testing. In contrast, US-UK draft treaty provides for impartial control commission to administer test ban agreement and does not rely on good faith of either party.
5.
The US September 3 proposal (Kennedy-Macmillan atmospheric ban proposal), which the Soviets cite as precedent for national detection system, was an effort to spare the world from fallout danger of impending series of Soviet tests—US would have taken the risk, at that time, of an unpoliced moratorium on atmospheric tests to prevent potential hazards to world population from fallout. The offer expired September 9 by its own terms and has not been reaffirmed in the present altered situation. It is obvious Soviet test series of approximately 50 detonations places the US in a position where it must give greater weight to military considerations than was the case four months ago.
6.
Although it would appear that the Soviet proposals offer little hope of genuine progress, the US will remain at the Conference table in an effort to determine full implications of these proposals and whether the Soviets have any intention of reversing their present position. At the same time, the US will continue to strive for the conclusion of an effective treaty banning all nuclear tests along the lines of the US-UK draft treaty tabled April 18, 1961.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/12-561. Official Use Only. Drafted in the Public Affairs area of ACDA and approved by James E. Goodby.
  2. For President Eisenhower’s statement of December 29, 1959, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, vol. II, pp. 1590-1591.