Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

15. Nusup 1257 to Geneva, June 8¹

June 8, 1961, 9:39 p.m.

For Dean from McCloy. As per our telecon today there follows text of a draft letter I have prepared for the President outlining course of action re test ban talks and forthcoming disarmament negotiations. As I indicated in telecon, President’s statement of today somewhat alters the practical timing of the program. Hope to consult with President first of week and then I will communicate with you. We are considering advisability of renewal of proposal re banning atmospheric tests in accordance with Thompson’s suggestion and are preparing treaty language. We would appreciate having you transmit language which you feel embodies the cautions contained in your SUPNU 1640.

BEGIN VERBATIM TEXT:

(Verbatim text attached)

QUOTE. The conversations with Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna have made it clear that there is at the present time no prospect of any change in the Soviet position regarding either a nuclear test ban or general disarmament. These conversations have now affirmed at the highest level the determination of the Soviet Union to press the concept of a veto on inspection as well as on all aspects of any international peace-keeping machinery, including the functioning of the United Nations. This fact poses some very important decisions which must be made promptly if we are to avoid a substantial erosion of the U.S. position in all of these areas.

The first field in which decisions must be made is the Geneva test ban negotiations. In these negotiations I feel that we have gone the limit of what would be either possible or appropriate in the way of concessions to the Soviet position. Any further concessions at this time, I feel, would not advance the conclusion of a satisfactory agreement. In fact, I feel they would prejudice it.

The Soviet position in the negotiations raises for decision now the question of whether the United States should resume nuclear tests when tests of material importance to the national security can be prepared and programmed.

I am well aware of the arguments which can be made against a decision to resume testing. In spite of any efforts to prepare world public opinion, the nation which first announces the resumption of nuclear tests will incur a certain onus. The resumption of nuclear tests will make it increasingly difficult to prevent the proliferation of nuclear capabilities to other powers which do not now possess such a capability. There is even the possibility that the resumption of tests by the United States will give the U.S.S.R. a chance to overtake the United States in fields of technology in which we now lead, by giving the U.S.S.R. the opportunity to test free from the trouble and risk which would attend a clandestine test and from the political onus of being the first to resume.

Notwithstanding these considerations, however, I recommend that you do make the decision to resume testing with tests of material importance to the national security. Under the present condition the United States is at a dangerous disadvantage. Because of the closed nature of Soviet society we have no assurance that they are living up to their announced moratorium; while they can be sure that we are living up to ours. The United States cannot permit itself to be kept indefinitely in a situation in which it denies itself the possibility of tests which might result in a major improvement in its military position without any assurance that the U.S.S.R. is under a similar inhibition.

The consequences which might ensue if the U.S.S.R. is engaging in clandestine testing while the United States refrains from testing over a period of time are serious. In my judgment they outweigh the danger to the position of the United States, if the U.S.S.R. is not engaging in clandestine testing, from a resumption of testing by both sides which might permit the U.S.S.R. to catch up to the United States in fields of technology in which we now lead. As long as the present condition exists of a moratorium which is enforceable against the United States but not against the U.S.S.R., the U.S.S.R. is under no pressure to come to an agreement involving any inspection. By permitting this condition to exist, the United States jeopardizes before the world the credibility of its long-held position that it will not restrict its freedom of action in the field of weapons without effectively verified agreements.

For these reasons, I recommend that the United States prepare for a series of tests of the maximum military and scientific value. In this connection, my suggestion would be that we should undertake no prior announcement of our tests. We have, heretofore, given prior announcement but this was a carry-over from the period of concern over “fall-out.”

If you agree with these conclusions, I recommend that Ambassador Dean be recalled from Geneva. This is the clearest way of indicating to the U.S.S.R. and to the world that we regard the present Soviet position as non-negotiable. The United States should not move to recess the negotiations but the American delegation and the negotiating schedule should be substantially reduced.

At the time Ambassador Dean returns, the United States should issue a declaration, with the concurrence of the United Kingdom and, if possible, of France, which declares our intention to desist from testing anywhere in the sensible atmosphere, on the earth’s surface, on the ocean or under the ocean and which invites all nations to join in this declaration. This declaration would be conditioned upon no other country’s engaging in testing in these environments in a manner or to a degree which might prejudice the security of any declaring country.

At the time of this declaration, the United States should state that, as for testing elsewhere, we consider ourselves entirely free to take any steps which the security of the free world and the United States demanded. We should also state that such testing as this involves would be undertaken on our own soil and in such a manner as to remove any general hazards to health. We would be prepared at any time to cease testing if the Soviet Union would be willing to execute the treaty along the general lines that we have tabled at Geneva.

Until we had actually tested, or our determination to test was well understood, we should not agree to shift the test ban negotiations into the comprehensive negotiations now scheduled for July 31 of this year. The Soviets undoubtedly wish to merge the talks and to have the United States go into the July 31 talks with the present uncontrolled moratorium still in effect for the purpose of making it increasingly difficult for the United States to resume its freedom of action with respect to testing and we should resist this effort.

With regard to the comprehensive disarmament talks, I recommend that we enter into the bilateral exchanges as planned on June 19. We should there state our proposals for the composition of the Commission to deal with the comprehensives, avoiding any agreement which would compromise our objection to the concept of the troika either in those negotiations or in any other disarmament or peace-keeping measures.

We should press for the inclusion in the principles to be adopted for the July 31 negotiations an acceptance of the concept of the rule of law in international disputes which involves a true acceptance of the principle of international arbitration, the extension of the jurisdiction of the International Court, the application of international sanctions by impartial tribunals not subject to veto. Corresponding principles would be applied to the control and inspection of disarmament obligations.

We would state in these negotiations and publicize throughout the world that we repudiate the thought, inbedded in the troika concept, of two-power rule. We should expose the fallacy of the introduction of the neutral bloc veto, as it is an empty facade to hide a two-power rule of the world. The veto in the hands of a group of neutral countries is meaningless.

We should be prepared to present a plan that would envisage a full disarmament program which was combined with the development and use of international institutions designed to verify and enforce a compliance of the obligations assumed.

It would also embody our concept of how peace and order would be maintained in a disarmed world through international peace-keeping machinery. The plan would condition progress from one stage to another on the basis of the results achieved and the confidence generated in earlier steps.

The comprehensive negotiations could also include, if the Soviets were prepared to discuss them, steps calculated to reduce the chances of war by accident, surprise or miscalculation. They might also include certain steps of a somewhat limited but perhaps significant nature that could be verified by reciprocal inspection without the intervention of international authority.

These recommendations require that the United States engage in a program of public opinion preparation and diplomatic presuasion on a scale different from what has hitherto been attempted. This activity will begin with a response to the Soviet Aide-Mémoire, drafting of the declarations with respect to testing and with a White Paper on the Geneva talks. END VERBATIM TEXT. UNQUOTE.

Rusk

1. Draft presidential letter outlining course of action in test ban talks and disarmament negotiations. Secret. 9 pp. Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611–GE/6–761.