208. Editorial Note
On July 6, 1962, the intelligence community issued National Intelligence Estimate 11-8-62, “Soviet Capabilities for Long Range Attack,” which sought “to estimate probable trends in the strength and deployment of Soviet weapon systems suitable for long range attack” over the next 5 years. The estimate concluded, among other things, that the Soviets were placing greater emphasis “on forces for intercontinental attacks, especially ICBMs” and were “attempting to improve their capabilities for both preemptive and retaliatory action, by measures designed to shorten reaction times and increase survivability.” The estimate noted further that, given the quickening tempo of the ICBM program, “the present relatively modest force level of about 50 operational launchers will probably grow substantially, reaching some 125-175 launchers in mid-1963 and 200-300 in mid-1964.” The estimate also concluded that “with the long range striking forces we estimate it will have in the mid-1960ʼs, however, the USSR could not expect to destroy the hardened, airborne, seaborne, and fast reaction nuclear delivery capabilities of the US.” For text of the estimate and the report of the Special Inter-Departmental Committee on Implications of NIE 11-8-62 and Related Intelligence, forwarded to President Kennedy on August 23, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume VIII, pages 332–342 and 359–378.