194. Editorial Note
On May 12, 1962, Walt Rostow, Chairman of the Department of Stateʼs Policy Planning Council, recommended in a memorandum to Secretary of State Rusk that the United States “inform Moscow that we are counting on continued Soviet support for the Laos solution agreed between us at the highest level; i.e., a neutral, independent Laos. We have moved the politics of the RLG in this direction and are prepared to move [Page 437] them further. But the role of North Vietnam in Laos, in the context of the Nam Tha engagement, is unacceptable to us, as is the North Vietnam role in South Vietnam.” Rostow wrote further that “Soviet behavior suggests that they have agreed to let Hanoi and Peiping experiment with extended aggression in Laos; but there is no indication that they [the Soviets] are prepared to let their prestige become involved or their freedom of action be determined by others in a U.S.-Hanoi or U.S.-Peiping military engagement.” For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume II, pages 393–395.
In a second memorandum to Rusk, May 31, Rostow urged that, in addition to issuing firm statements of policy and making public the “crucial role of North Vietnamese forces in Laos, as well as in South Viet-Nam,” the United States “propose to inflict selective damage on North Viet-Nam for its aggression beyond its borders until that aggression ceases. I do not have in mind here massive bombing of Hanoi. I do have in mind highly selective attack on transport and power facilities, by precision methods, which are now within our capability, plus some mining of Haiphong harbor.” Rostow acknowledged that there were risks involved but contended that “the internal situation in both North Viet-Nam and Communist China, plus the relatively favorable balance of nuclear strength between the US and the Soviet Union, and the Sino-Soviet split, make this as good a time to face this risk as any we are likely to confront in this decade.” For text, see ibid., pages 432–433.