94. National Intelligence Estimate1

NIE 53-63

PROSPECTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The Problem

To assess the situation and prospects in South Vietnam, with special emphasis upon the military and political factors most likely to affect the counterinsurgency effort.

[Page 233]

Conclusions

A.
We believe that Communist progress has been blunted and that the situation is improving. Strengthened South Vietnamese capabilities and effectiveness, and particularly US involvement, are causing the Viet Cong increased difficulty, although there are as yet no persuasive indications that the Communists have been grievously hurt. (Paras. 27-28)
B.
We believe the Communists will continue to wage a war of attrition, hoping for some break in the situation which will lead to victory. They evidently hope that a combination of military pressure and political deterioration will in time create favorable circumstances either for delivering a coup de grace or for a political settlement which will enable them to continue the struggle on more favorable terms. We believe it unlikely, especially in view of the open US commitment, that the North Vietnamese regime will either resort to overt military attack or introduce acknowledged North Vietnamese military units into the south in an effort to win a quick victory. (Paras. 29-31)
C.
Assuming no great increase in external support to the Viet Cong, changes and improvements which have occurred during the past year now indicate that the Viet Cong can be contained militarily and that further progress can be made in expanding the area of government control and in creating greater security in the countryside. However, we do not believe that it is possible at this time to project the future course of the war with any [Page 234] confidence. Decisive campaigns have yet to be fought and no quick and easy end to the war is in sight. Despite South Vietnamese progress, the situation remains fragile. (Para. 32)
D.
Developments during the last year or two also show some promise of resolving the political weaknesses, particularly that of insecurity in the countryside, upon which the insurgency has fed. However, the government’s capacity to embark upon the broader measures required to translate military success into lasting political stability is questionable. (Paras. 33-35)

[Here follow 11 pages of discussion of the conclusions outlined above.]

32.
The Outlook. Whether the Communists are correct in their appraisal will, of course, depend in some measure upon the extent and nature of US involvement, but primarily upon the South Vietnamese response to the developing situation. We do not believe that it is possible at this time to project the future course of the war with any confidence. Despite GVN progress, the situation remains fragile. A series of major Viet Cong successes, should they occur, might have a shattering psychological effect. Nevertheless, the heavy US involvement and close working relationships between US and Vietnamese personnel have fundamentally altered the outlook. Changes and improvements have occurred during the past year which for the first time indicate that the Viet Cong can be contained militarily and that further progress can be made in expanding the area of government control and in creating security in the countryside. However, some areas of Viet Cong control, such as the Mekong delta, will be very difficult to pacify, decisive campaigns have yet to be fought, and no quick and easy end to the war is in sight.
33.
Developments in the last year or two have also gone some distance in establishing a basis for winning over the peasantry and in improving the efficiency of the military establishment and the civilian bureaucracy. It can, of course, be argued that only a highly centralized regime, single-mindedly dedicated to independence, and placing a heavy emphasis on personal loyalty can cope with the problems of guerrilla warfare. However, we believe that a greater willingness on the part of the regime to enlist the active support of those who have become disaffected or discouraged in the face of Diem’s techniques of government would considerably speed the reduction of the Viet Cong insurgency.
34.
Substantial reduction of Viet Cong military power, however, would probably intensify rather than reduce the need for changes in the philosophy and practice of the Diem regime, if revived insurgency were to be precluded and military victory translated into political consolidation. The achievement of physical security in the countryside would in itself satisfy a major political requirement in convincing the peasants of the government’s ability to protect them. But the government must be both willing and able to expand its efforts to bring social, political, and economic improvements to the countryside if the peasant is to recognize a stake in the survival of the government and to be fortified against Communist blandishments. Effective action in this and other fields, particularly with the removal of a substantial US presence at all levels of the government, would almost certainly require a wider participation in the development and implementation of policy and a considerable reduction in the tight, personal control of the bureaucracy.
35.
On the basis of its past performance, the ability of the Diem regime to move willingly and effectively in these directions is questionable, and may become even more so should military victory come within sight. With the removal of the inhibiting effects of an immediate and overwhelming military danger, political stability would be [Page 235] greatly threatened if disappointment with the regime’s performance mounted among important sectors of the population and the conviction deepened that legal avenues to change remained blocked.

[Here follows a map of South Vietnam highlighting principal. areas of insurgency and counterinsurgency activity.]

  1. Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on April 17, except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. The statement of the problem and the conclusions are also printed in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 12, pp. 522-524.