Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

71. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harkins) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)¹

Saigon, March 30, 1963, 2:05 p.m.

MACJ00 1870. 1. My comments on State to Saigon 22 March² follow. Before making specific comments I want to set the stage first. There are no hard facts here to support general theme that aerial interdiction is an indiscriminate killer. Second, recognize fully that the war in Vietnam is political as well as military. In fact, this point was one of the essential elements in the National Campaign Plan. How ever at this stage of the game the 30,000 VC casualties on the one hand and 13,000 RVN on the other for 1962 would indicate it has a distinct military flavor. Third, political attacks by the VC are possible only because of the active participation of their military forces. For this reason, destruction of the VC political organization, which is essential to GVN efforts to regain control and support of the people, requires application of force against the VC military capability which enables it to flourish. In many cases air delivered munitions are the only type of force which can presently reach some of the VC strongholds. Fourth, to consider the VC as merely a political adversary in spite of the vicious manner and means that he employs to subvert the populace is inviting disaster and accepting a degree of procrastination which puts time on his side.

2. Specific comments in the area of statement of the problem follow:

a. U.S. supported offensive sorties though increasing have not reached the tempo cited. Actual statistics for U.S. fixed wing aircraft for the past 6 months reveal a total of 2450 offensive sorties for an average of 480 per month of which an average of 100 were interdiction. 183 (Farmgate) interdiction missions have been flown thus far in March 1963 which is indicative of the increase in this area.

b. The first paragraph should state that these air strikes are based upon confirmed intelligence. Additionally, Vietnamese military personnel are on board U.S. aircraft when ordnance delivery missions are flown.

c. In regard to the 2nd paragraph, VC bases and installations identified by intelligence have existed for a considerable period-if not hard core, the population in these areas are considered active sympathizers in the enemy camp. We realize that 2 or 3 hard core VC can make a village VC using their terrorist methods. We are particularly mindful of this and never put strikes on such villages if we feel this the case.

d. Third paragraph is basically sound although the quality and quantity of intelligence are improving. Unfortunately shooting wars have always produced civilian casualties. A most regrettable fact. This must be weighed in light of the malicious killing done by the VC purposeful terrorization.

e. The concern expressed in paragraph 4 of the problem is shared here. The RVN accepts the probability of occasional incidents philosophically. The most probable adverse effect has been VC exploitation and exaggeration for propaganda purposes. It must be pointed out that air is only one of many means to achieve interdiction; however, it attracts more attention though not necessarily inflicting more innocent casualties in RVN than artillery, surface action, etc. Further, there is no basis to assume relaxation of thorough planning and forewarning measures to avoid civil casualties even at the expense of reduced results.

f. The approach expressed in paragraph 5 of the problem has been unavoidably compromised numerous times. The presence of U.S. press representatives free to report anything other than classified information makes secretiveness in this area more difficult. It is quite possible that a reevaluation of the U.S. role is in order as pertains to open acknowledgment of our disdain for international Communism.

3. Following comment pertains to the Pros of the problem:

a. Although this may be called a political war it is an established fact that the VC have maintained and operated four war zones for as long as 17 years. Support by the population concentrically surrounding these zones varies inversely with the distance from the heart of each war zone area; from passive support, such as providing rice, to active participation in guerrilla actions. These war zones are the safe havens inside the country from which the direction of the VC effort comes.

b. The former successes in recruiting have not been continued as evidenced by increased tempo of kidnapping and impressing of males to support the VC cause. The “dramatic growth” in VC strength is more attributable to our own improved intelligence reporting, which has confirmed that the VC hard core was already there.

c. Parts of RVN are enemy held as stated in paragraph 2 (War Zones). The aircraft presently used in SVN are adapted to the type of interdiction missions that the enemy disposition and the nature of the terrain dictate. The optimum roles of air operations in this type of conflict are the support roles. However, this does not obviate offensive operations as a major contribution to the C.I. effort.

d. Target lists are approved by JGS after intensive screening. In the present organization of the districts and provinces either the chief or his deputy is a military man. The conditions that existed in June of last year no longer apply to the tempo and method of current operations.

e. Propaganda is not restricted to the Communist bloc. Our role in RVN should be placed before the world by our own agencies to allow both sides to be analyzed. The current propaganda is an excellent barometer of the effectiveness of our air operations. It does not appear that we have suffered a loss of prestige in any friendly nation in S.E. Asia.

f. U.S. forces are presently in South Vietnam at the request of the RVN in an advisory role. RVN is not a signatory of the Geneva Accords.

g. RVNAF pilots unaccompanied by U.S. advisors fly the majority of interdiction missions. No interdiction missions are executed by USAF pilots exclusively.

4. Conclusions:

a. It is essential in a counter-insurgency effort that all types of means and method of delivery of munitions be employed. Increasing intelligence capabilities, proper selection of targets, better accuracy on control of delivery, all of which we are working daily to improve, should do much to eliminate the political opposition to interdiction.

b. As long as the U.S. supports the RVN in this effort propaganda wise it appears to make little difference as to whether interdiction is made by U.S. or VN piloted aircraft. If air attacks were not hurting the VC the propaganda effort would not be directed at this capability. The VC is directing a strong propaganda and terrorist campaign against the strategic hamlet too and we know this program is hurting them badly.

c. Aerial interdiction cannot be related to recruiting ability of VC, as long as the VC have access to people they will get recruits. As the VNAF improves in capability direct U.S. participation (Farmgate) will be reduced accordingly.

5. This responds to ADMINOCINCPAC 242350Z³ which requested my personal comments. My response has been prepared in order to reach you while you are still in Washington. Country Team position this regard has not been determined, however Amb Nolting has seen this message.⁴

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, Interdiction, SGN (63)19 GVN. Top Secret; Priority. Sent to CNO exclusive for Admiral Felt who was in Washington and for General Barnes. A copy was sent by courier to Ambassador Nolting.
2. Document 66.
3. Not found.
4. Numbered paragraph 5 was handwritten. On March 30, General Anthis, U.S. Air Force Commander in Vietnam, sent a memorandum to General Harkins commenting on airgram CA-10362, Document 66, along lines similar to those outlined in Harkins’ telegram:

   “In summary, I can think of no greater advantage to be gained by the VC than to have the role of air curtailed at this time. If we wish to serve the interests of the Communists, this is the step to take. The last attack from Hanoi was on defoliation. Apparently the latest is interdiction. If interdiction is curtailed or stopped then I would say we are well on our way to a ‘gut-less’ war in SVN.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, Interdiction, SGN (63)19 GVN)