Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

29. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President¹

Washington, February 4, 1963.

SOUTH VIETNAM

The meeting with General Wheeler on Friday² was a complete waste of your time for which I apologize. It was intended to provide you an opportunity to initiate action on some of the problems in South Vietnam described in the Eyes Only Annex to Hilsman’s and my report.³ The rosy euphoria generated by General Wheeler’s report⁴ made this device unworkable.

The problems remain, however, and I would suggest another technique to solve them. If you approve, Governor Harriman and I will start a quiet campaign in the appropriate departments for the following objectives:

1. to get General Harkins a direct line of communication to the JCS, or, alternatively and less desirably, to persuade CinCPac to delegate more responsibility to Saigon;

2. to look for a replacement for Fritz Nolting when his 2-year term is up in April;

3. to encourage our civilian and military people in Saigon to put across more forcefully to the GVN U.S. views on fighting the war and on foreign policy;

4. to develop gradually a more independent posture for the U.S. in South Vietnam and very carefully to dissociate ourselves from those policies and practices of the GVN of which we disapprove with good reason;

5. to stimulate Defense to examine more carefully whether our Special Forces camps and the strategic hamlets are getting effective close air support when they are attacked;

6. to make a rapid and vigorous effort to improve press relations in Saigon, even at some cost to our relationship with the Diem Government;

7. to determine, before any slack occurs, whether the transfer of paramilitary training [less than 1 1ine not declassified] to the Army should be stretched out:

8. to get the field to consider whether we are supporting too many paramilitary organizations and overlooking some of the specific needs, such as a police force for movement control.

I don’t think we should start on such a campaign of persuasion without your knowledge and approval. You may prefer simply to tell me to go ahead, or perhaps you would prefer to speak with Averell on these subjects.

MV Forrestal⁵

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, 2/63-3/63. Secret.
2. An apparent reference to the meeting discussed in Document 27.
3. Document 19.
4. Document 26.
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.