270. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Taylor) to the
Secretary of State1
Washington, August 23,
1963.
SUBJECT
- Attached Cable from General Harkins
At the direction of the President, I have queried General Harkins as to his evaluation of the
present relationship between the Diem government and the Armed Forces of South Vietnam.
Specifically, I
[Page 607]
inquired
whether the declaration of martial law indicated that Diem had confidence in his armed
forces or that he had become a hostage to them. Also what was General
Harkins’ estimate of the
effect of recent events on our common programs in Vietnam?
Attached herewith is his reply. The informal tone results from the fact
that this is a private exchange between two old friends.
[Attachment]
Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
(Harkins) to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)2
Saigon, August 22, 1963, 8:33
a.m.
MAC 1495. Eyes Only for Gen. Taylor and exclusive for Adm. Felt. Reference your
JCS 3284.3
- 1.
- It’s a bit premature to crystal ball the hidden machanisms
[mechinisms?] and internal machinations of this mixed-up
country. However, my first thought is that Diem still has confidence in
the armed forces otherwise he would not have put them in charge
at such a critical time, the Buddhist situation such as it was
and he, himself, rapidly losing station in the eyes of the
world, as indicated by press reports. As you know, Gen Don, now acting chief of the
JGS in the absence of Ty,
has been one of the most vociferous in saying Diem and the Nhus must go
before this country can make any headway. He has made these
remarks so outward I feel certain the President is cognizant of
how Don feels.
- 2.
- Last week I told Diem
someone must be appointed in Ty’s place so that we can get on
with the war. Don was
appointed Tuesday and at midnight martial law was declared. My
first thought was that he really was a fast worker. However,
when he called me early Tuesday morning,4 he told me
the President wanted me to know that he, the President, has
declared martial law in order to secure the rear areas.
- 3.
- Gen Dinh (III Corps)
another coup slinger, has been named Commander of the
Saigon-Cholon area during the emergency. Big Minh, advisor to
the President, remains in place.
- 4.
- So you see the stage is set for an easy military
take-over.
- 5.
- However, in the midst of everything yesterday, Gen Don had the courtesy to come
over and explain the reasons for the “State of Siege.”5
- 6.
- He again assured me the President himself had made the
declaration. He did this because the Buddhist situation was
getting out of hand. It had gone from religious controversy to
political incitation of rebellion.
- 7.
- I asked Don how long he
thought martial law would stay in effect and he replied if
things remained quiet maybe only a short time because he
remarked, “you know how the President does not want the military
to be in control.” I asked if it would remain in effect until
after the elections on the 31st. He assured me it would not.
Otherwise the elections could not be considered free elections
(as if they ever were).
- 8.
- Don said he wanted my
assistance in carrying the war against the VC to a successful conclusion. I
said I was at his beck and call. He stated the war would
continue, the state of martial law should not affect operations
as he was only using the reserve forces to make a show of
military force in the cities. We’ll have to wait and see on
this—so far only one paratroop and one marine battalion, plus
some MP’s have been used in Saigon. In Hue, they moved two tens
from the training center to keep order in the city. However,
other battalions in the vicinity are on the alert. Armored
vehicles have been seen in both cities.
- 9.
- All corps senior advisors have reported that the operations
against the VC were continuing
apace in their areas. Again, it’s a bit early to say they’ll
continue in such magnitude as the VC were not prepared and have not yet reacted to
the military take-over. As to the effect of the new relationship
to our common programs—I hope there will be no change if I can
believe Don in saying the
war will continue against the VC.
- 10.
- As you know, our programs are completed. We have accomplished
our part of everything we set out to do after your visit in the
fall of ’61—all except ending the war, and that is not far off
if things continue at present pace.
- 11.
- The I Corps is quiescent. In the II Corps, Gen Khanh said yesterday things
were going so well he was looking for a place of more action.
Well, I agree it’s the best corps of all, but there is a bit
left to be done—not much, however.
- 12.
- The III Corps has its biggest headaches in the provinces
around Saigon, and in the past two weeks I have succeeded in
moving two additional regiments into the area from the I and II
Corps.
- 13.
- The IV Corps is where the war is being fought. 70 per cent of
the weekly incidents are there. Today I’m asking Thuan to move the 9th Div
intact from II Corps to the Delta area to clean up Long An, Dinh
Thuong, Kien Hoa and Vinh Binh provinces. The rest of the Delta
will be slow but easy if we can get these provinces settled.
They’re coming along—but it’s difficult terrain, particularly in
the rainy season. They have more VC than most of the provinces, and the people are
harder to convince. They just don’t like the government—just
want to be left alone with their rice and fish.
- 14.
- So as far as our programs are concerned, at least the
military, they are paying off, and all that is needed to end the
conflict is the will and determination of the Vietnamese to win.
This I believe is evidenced by the fact that they have averaged
about two or three thousand operations a week since July, and
last week they had over 4,000. This counts everything from
patrols and ambushes to the larger type. However, in my opinion,
I think we will see a drop in the number of operations against
the VC until things settle down a
bit.
- 15.
- I’m afraid I have rambled in answering your questions;
however, as it looks from here at this time the fact that
Diem placed the
military in command indicates he still has confidence in them.
Though Don is nominally
in command, it appears that the usual multiple channels still
exist and run to the Palace. I’m not able to answer what’s going
on between them. I’ll keep my ear to the ground and try to
determine. It could be they (the military) through threats or
persuasion told him he’d better do something or else. I can not
prove this with what information I have at this time, nor can I
state flatly he’s not a hostage of the military as I have not
seen him since the announcement of martial law.
- 16.
- The effect on the programs should be nil if they continue
carrying the war to the enemy.
- 17.
- In closing, the present situation might be a blessing in
disguise. There exists for all practical purposes a military
take-over with minimum violence. A few bones were bruised as the
police and military took over the main Pagodas yesterday. Not
that I’m for the military taking over—no indeed—but the state of
affairs as they were, it was becoming evident things were
getting out of control, and some measure of authority had to be
established. That it was done without
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firing a shot and thru the nominal chain
of command precluded a lot of bloodshed which would have spilled
if the rival factions tried to take over.
