Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

253. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State ¹

Saigon, August 14, 1963, 8 p.m.

226. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptels 178, 185, 193, Embtels 208, 220.² Delay and much hard negotiation on issuance of statement by Diem. I saw him early this morning and he had slipped back into postponement and vacillation, which he attributed to Buddhist attacks (banners, etc. in Saigon) against him and government and to attacks in US press, especially New York Times story by Szulc from Washington sources that Buddhist affair was affecting, or about to affect, war effort.

In face these factors, he said that Ministerial Council had advised him not to issue another conciliatory statement. I told him bluntly that for our part we could not accept this; I had given him before our reasons and he had promised to take positive action explaining clearly government’s position and, at least by implication, repudiating position set out so intemperately by Madame Nhu. This exchange occurred following ceremony this morning. I was supported by Chinese Ambassador Yuen and Australian Ambassador Hill.

At eleven o’clock appointment to say goodbye to President Diem, the exchange continued. We were absolutely frank with one another. I drew heavily on reftels (minus last para Deptel 193 re vacation). He maintained stoutly that neither the American press nor apparently the American government understood the real dimensions or all complexities of Buddhist problem, nor did we understand the true situation concerning the Ngo family and their individual contributions to the independence of Viet-Nam. He went into great detail on this, stressing particularly the absolute selflessness of Ngo Dinh Nhu’s contribution to the cause. I stuck to the position it would be impossible for the US Government to continue our present relationship to him and to his government if he did not promptly make a declaration which would show clearly who was running the country, would undo some of the damage done by Madame Nhu’s statements and would restore faith in GVN’s intention to carry out its announced policy of conciliation. Upshot finally was that he promised to make such a statement, if possible before I leave tomorrow. We are working hard on the follow up.³

At the close of this rather strenuous goodbye, President Diem was courteous enough to say that he considered my tenure here to have been one of the best souvenirs of his life, and that such frank exchanges as we had today would in no way mar our friendship. I said I heartily reciprocated his sentiments, and I felt that Ambassador Lodge would wish to deal with him on a similar basis of absolute frankness in the interests of our two countries. He asked me to thank President Kennedy for all he has done for Viet-Nam.⁴

“a. It took more pressure from Ambassador Nolting during their final meeting yesterday to get Diem to issue any statement at all reaffirming his government’s policy towards the Buddhists.

“b. The statement seems to do this well enough and, implicitly at least, to rebuke Mme. Nhu, but it takes the form of an answer to a question from Marguerite Higgins for publication in today’s Herald Tribune. Thus it could be disavowed if need be, and few Vietnamese are likely to be aware of it anyway.”

It was also noted that tension in Hue was mounting and more Buddhist monks and nuns were volunteering to sacrifice themselves. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files. Chester V. Clifton Series)

Nolting

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 S VIET. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC.
2. Telegrams 178 and 193 to Saigon and telegram 208 from Saigon are Documents 248, 252, and 251, respectively. Regarding telegrams 185 to Saigon and 220 from Saigon, see footnote 5, Document 250, and footnote 2, Document 252.
3. Diem’s statement was made to newspaper correspondent Marguerite Higgins. As quoted in The Herald Tribune, August 15, Diem stated “the policy of utmost reconciliation is irreversible” and “that neither any individual nor the government could change it at all.” In a veiled reference to Madame Nhu, Diem was quoted as saying, “It is only because some have contributed, either consciously or unconsciously, to raising doubts about this government policy that the solution of the Buddhist affair has been retarded.”
4. On August 15, President Kennedy received and read the President’s Intelligence Checklist, August 15, which contained an item entitled “South Vietnam”: