Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

244. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report¹

TDCS-3/655,859

Washington, August 2, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Assessment of the Progress of the War Against the Viet Cong in South Vietnam During the First Half of 1963

The following assessment was prepared by the source in response to a request and also reflects the opinions of Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting, Jr. and other Embassy officers.

1. Summary. Although the progress made in the complex counterinsurgency program in the last six months failed to produce a turning point in the war against the Viet Cong (VC), nothing occurred to change our basic belief that the VC will eventually be defeated, provided that the Buddhist crisis is resolved satisfactorily and the security of South Vietnam is not endangered by the deterioration of the situation in Laos. The war with the VC is being brought under control through the successful implementation of:

a. The isolation of the VC from the people by means of the Province Rehabilitation Program and the Strategic Hamlet Program, which have as yet not completed the task, but which have made solid progress as evidenced by the increasing VC harassment and attacks on strategic hamlets and the initially encouraging results of the Chieu Hoi (Surrender) program.

b. Military operations designed to keep the VC off balance, harass their base areas, and ultimately to destroy the regular VC formations are difficult to assess. However, the VC have been hurt in I and II Corps areas, to a lesser extent in III Corps area, but, whether they have been significantly hurt in IV Corps area is problematical.

c. Interdiction of reinforcements from North Vietnam through an effective border program is most difficult to implement, but the training and emplacement of border control teams have accelerated during the period. The problem of patrolling the long borders between South Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia is a staggering one and perhaps the ultimate answer to the problem of infiltration is to deny the infiltrators, along with the VC already in South Vietnam, any theater of operations within the country.

2. The Buddhist crisis has placed an increased strain on the Diem regime and raises the possibility of jeopardy to future progress in counterinsurgency operations. Much will depend on the manner in which the crisis is resolved, most particularly with respect to the degree to which the Diem regime has been weakened or to the viability of any successor regime should Diem fall. At the moment, Diem seems to have an at least temporary advantage over his Buddhist antagonists.

For the first six months of 1963, there is little evidence that the counterinsurgency campaign is materially affected by the Government of Vietnam (GVN) difficulties with the Buddhists. In any event, a recapitulation of the developments over the past six months is valid at this time if only to show how much we have to lose in terms of momentum in the anti-VC operations if the current crisis persists and becomes more serious.

3. Although the past six months failed to produce a turning point in the war against the VC, a slow but steady progress was recorded in the many facets of the complex counterinsurgency program. The period under review saw the essential completion of the joint GVN/US buildup of the necessary manpower and resources to do the job; the refinement of the National Campaign Plan guiding the war against the VC was worked out jointly by the USMACV and the GVN Joint General Staff; and, in an accelerated implementation of these programs in the field, marked especially by the stepped-up infusion of American fiscal and material aid into the Province Rehabilitation/Strategic Hamlet Programs. The progress made perhaps failed to live up to the expectations held at the beginning of the year and was of course more discernible in some areas than in others, but nothing occurred to change our basic belief that the GVN/US partnership is on the right track and that the VC will eventually be defeated, provided that the Buddhist crisis is resolved shortly in a reasonably satisfactory manner, and provided that the deterioration in Laos does not further endanger the security of South Vietnam.

4. In order to provide a more detailed analysis of the counterinsurgency effort during the past six months, the balance of this report is divided into three parts according to what we consider the broad areas of endeavor which must be successfully carried out if the war is to be brought under control.

A. The isolation of the VC from the people with the progressive constriction of the enemy into mountain, piedmont and delta wastelands, and the channelling of the peoples’ energies into political, economic and social development of their hamlets;

B. The military operations designed to keep the VC off balance, harass their base areas and ultimately to destroy the regular VC formations; and,

C. The interdiction of reinforcements from North Vietnam through an effective border program.

[Here follows a 16-page detailed analysis of parts A, B, and C.]

1. Source: U.S. Army Military Historical Institute, Kraemer Papers, Vietnam. Secret; Routine; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only.