232. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
117. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 103.2 I am very much disappointed in reftel. It gives us nothing to work with, on either side of equation. A wait-and-see attitude on our part at this juncture will lead only, in my judgment, to further undermining of stability here and to further jeopardizing U.S. vital interests. It will encourage more agitation and demand on part of Buddhists; it will discourage further conciliatory action on part of government; it will increase prospects of a coup.
For two years (and longer), the U.S. has had to make hard choices here. We have made them pretty forthrightly, and the more forthrightly we have made them, the better they have panned out. On these hard choices, clearly taken, we have helped build what is admittedly a much stronger defense against Communist takeover than was thought possible. This has been done despite inefficiencies and goofs on part GVN (and on our part too). Experience has shown that GVN can be counted on to be slow, sticky, and uncoordinated in adopting and implementing any policy. There are many cross-currents of opinion and many free-wheelers. Nevertheless, our best bet still lies in encouraging and prodding and helping them to accept and follow through on [Page 522] policies that look reasonably good, as was done successfully in military strategy and tactics, in clear-and-hold operations, in rural development, in Strategic Hamlet concept and execution, in financing, and in many other fields.
GVN has badly underestimated and mishandled Buddhist problem. It may—although I do not think so—have gotten out of hand, but at last Diem has come out with something that looks good (and has already taken certain concrete actions to back it up), publicly committing his government to a conciliatory course. We should by all available means encourage the GVN in this.
Diem’s statement, and the response to it, may offer the last opportunity to surmount this difficulty and to get this effort back on the tracks. The Buddhist response depends in great degree on U.S. official and press reaction. (Their agitation and appeals are now directed apparently as much toward Americans as toward Vietnamese.) I think the government’s offer is sincere and that we can help them carry it out successfully. The government’s position promises satisfaction on religious grievances. It would be a pity if the scepticism reflected in reftel were to increase Buddhist scepticism and/or intransigence, and thus lose the opportunity to move this problem towards solution.
I again recommend statement along lines previously suggested, which certainly does not go overboard but would be effective, and possibly decisive here.