Office of the Historian

23. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson) to the Director (Murrow)1

Washington, January 30, 1963.

At the January 17 CI meeting2 there was a long discussion about U.S. press coverage of Viet-Nam. The feeling of the group was that, although our policies were correct in Viet-Nam you would never know it from the press coverage of Viet-Nam in this country. I was charged by the CI group to ask Pierre to hold a meeting on the problem and see [Page 66] what solutions might be devised. A meeting was held on January 21 with Bob Manning, Secretary Sylvester, Ralph Dungan and myself in Salinger’s office.

We agreed that there are two layers to the problem:

1.
Past U.S. policy of laying back and letting the Vietnamese take the lead in dealing with the press must be reviewed. John Mecklin’s memorandum3 was read and discussed at some length. It was the opinion of all of us that Mecklin’s memorandum goes in the right direction. Salinger said that he would give the memorandum to the President and send it back to us with the President’s reactions. Unfortunately, the President still has the memorandum and he has not reacted, although I have jogged Pierre a couple of times. Apparently there isn’t much Pierre can do about it, since he knows the President has the memorandum and has asked him about it at least once since the meeting.
2.
Devise means whereby favorable accounts of the situation in Viet-Nam can be given to the right press men under the right circumstances. Under this approach, two things have happened:
a.
Admiral Felt will hold an on-the-record press conference this week.
b.
General Wheeler will issue a statement next Tuesday, upon his return, and then hold an on-the-record press conference. It is also hoped that he can be teed up for a subsequent National Press Club luncheon but early optimism on this has faded somewhat.

Meanwhile, Governor Harriman reacted so favorably to the Mecklin memorandum that he sent a letter4 to Ambassador Nolting in which he suggested three areas of improvement which Nolting should explore:

1)
The handling of foreign journalists by the Vietnamese Government-leaving it to the Ambassador to decide whether we ourselves should simply take the initiative to increase our briefings and contacts or should try to explain the facts of life to the Vietnamese. However, the governor feels that the American public has a right to the best possible information even if this offends Vietnamese sensibilities.
2)
Critical statements by the military advisers in the heat of battle—and here Governor Harriman notes that the new PIO will be able to help considerably. The Governor is also urging an indoctrination of U.S. personnel on the importance of not criticizing the Vietnamese publicly.
3)
Finally, Ambassador Nolting, General Harkins and other responsible members of the Country Team are urged to increase their official and informal contacts with the American press, making sure [Page 67] that the press promptly gets the facts and the perspective involved. But the Country Team has also been cautioned against optimistic statements to the press and public officials.

Donald M. Wilson
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 306, USIA/TAP Files: FRC 68 A 1415, CI-Vietnam. Eyes Only.↩
  2. See Document 14.↩
  3. For text of Mecklin’s November 27,1962, memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. II, Document 322.↩
  4. Document 24.↩