Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

226. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Saigon, July 17, 1963.

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Ngo Dinh Nhu, Political Counselor to the President of the Republic of Vietnam
• The Honorable Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
• Mr. John M. Mecklin, Counselor of Embassy for Public Affairs
• Mr. Truong Buu Khanh, Vietnam Press
• Mr. Marshall Wright, Special Assistant to Mr. Manning

Mr. Manning expressed his appreciation for this chance to talk with Mr. Nhu and said he had wanted for some time to come to Southeast Asia, an area he had never visited. Mr. Manning said that he was responsible in the Department of State for dealing with matters bearing upon public and political opinion, and hoped to be able to return to Washington with more complete information and a better understanding of this area of US/Vietnamese relations.

Mr. Nhu said he was very glad to see Mr. Manning, particularly because the area of Mr. Manning’s responsibility, public and political opinion, is the area in which the Government of Vietnam is weakest. Mr. Nhu said that Vietnam is a very underdeveloped country insofar as public relations are concerned and in its sensitivity to U.S. and world public opinion. Mr. Nhu said the two fields in which GVN development was most laggard were: 1) the collection and use of security intelligence; 2) dealing with public opinion and public relations.

Mr. Manning said that as a former journalist and a political appointee of the Kennedy Administration, he was deeply interested in the practical aspects of government public relations work. Sometimes the practical solution to Government public opinion problems lies in simplicity, rather than a massive and formal government public relations program.

Mr. Nhu agreed but said that there were certain principles which are traditional and which have not been respected and which must be observed.

Mr. Manning said that there are two kinds of principles, both very important. The first has to do with reporting itself, and is the justification for the resentment which the victims feel when they are subjected to unfair and unobjective reporting. Secondly, there is also the important operating principle for the United States in the kind of involvement in which it finds itself in Vietnam. The realities of American politics make it essential that there be some kind of scrutiny in reporting of U.S. involvement. The American political system is such that U.S. Government involvement in a situation such as obtains in Vietnam requires, as air requires oxygen, that U.S. correspondents be present to observe and to formulate and transmit reports back to the American people.

Mr. Nhu said that in theory he agreed with Mr. Manning and he thought it would all work well if we could cap our efforts with success, but, Mr. Nhu asked, is it possible to reach success if the U.S. correspondents do not stick to the principles of fair and objective reporting? Mr. Nhu said that the GVN feeling of irritability at the American correspondents was due not so much to unjustified as to unfair reporting. He understood how the American reporters had arrived at their views and even recognized that there is some justification for their point of view, for the following three reasons.

First, the many “bad rumors” both in the United States and in Vietnam, start with high GVN officials in authoritative positions close to the President. This is an old phenomenon, and there have been fewer bad rumors from Vietnamese Government officials in the past year. However, the U.S. press, Congressional figures, and even many U.S. executive officials, have received their “inside information” not from opposition sources but from GVN officials themselves. Mr. Nhu said he could not blame the Americans for attaching credence to antigovernment information received from such sources.

Mr. Nhu digressed to observe that he was speaking to Mr. Manning very frankly about this matter, for without candor there could be no useful results from their talk.

Mr. Manning expressed his appreciation and agreed that candor was needed.

Mr. Nhu said he was not simply imagining that GVN officials were the source of many of the bad rumors. He knew of many specific cases. For example, he knew who had given Senator Mansfield misleading and inaccurate information. How, Mr. Nhu asked, can you expect U.S. reporters not to believe these close friends of President Diem? However wrong, therefore, the views of the American correspondents, Mr. Nhu did not blame them and, in fact, understood them and their point of view.

Rhetorically, Mr. Nhu asked why the high-ranking GVN officials disseminated these untruths, and more importantly, the half truths? He said such behavior was characteristic of underdeveloped countries where information is imperfect and public relations policies were ineffective. The Government officials themselves know most imperfectly the true situation and in their own confusion and ignorance lead them to confuse and to pass on inaccurate impressions to newsmen on subjects in which they had no real competence. From his own experience, Mr. Nhu thought that the study system which the Government of Vietnam has been holding for the past year had obtained great results in giving to high GVN officials a more complete and more accurate understanding of the national situation and of the activities of the Vietnamese Government.

Mr. Nhu said it had been American friends who had advised of this system and that American money had been made available in some cases to help finance the activity. Mr. Nhu said that a wide range of people from university professors to village leaders have personally told him that these study sessions have afforded them their first real opportunity to make a proper assessment of the situation in Vietnam.

Mr. Nhu said that there had been a number of innovations since the creation of the Committee for Strategic Hamlets: 1) institutional reform; 2) study sessions and a more active public information program; 3) the Montagnard program; 4) (translated incomprehensively not understood in French). These innovations plus the Strategic Hamlet program, had created a sense of momentum as well as a better understanding among the people of Vietnam’s just cause.

Mr. Nhu then said there were two other reasons why high government officials gave misleading and inaccurate information to correspondents, and both of these reasons were also related to the fact that Vietnam is an underdeveloped country. First, it is characteristic of officials in underdeveloped countries to think themselves capable of holding higher positions. Mr. Nhu emphasized he was speaking not of the opposition but of GVN officials. This dissatisfaction with their position led them sometimes into captious and critical remarks concerning government programs. Second, a lack of candor and honesty is a requisite among the subject peoples under a colonial government. People therefore learn never to speak with complete honesty and candor but to color their remarks according to their auditors. Many of the Vietnamese people and officials have yet to grow out of this colonial mentality. On every issue they have three or four attitudes to express, depending upon their interlocutor. It therefore becomes very difficult for Americans (both reporters and other Americans) to know what is objective and what is not.

Mr. Nhu said he had made a special study of this matter and had to confess that despite his study and despite the fact that he was a Vietnamese himself, he found it extremely difficult to know the real opinion of the Vietnamese who came to see him.

For the reasons stated above, Mr. Nhu said, Americans of all kinds (professors, intellectuals, government officials) cannot be blamed if their talks with Vietnamese leave the Americans confused as to where the truth stands. Mr. Nhu said he knew that his government’s efforts could not succeed unless a favorable climate for the free discussion of all problems was created. However, a great effort had been made in this direction in the past year and there had been progress. The U.S. public opinion at the present time is founded on the total sum of the rumors built up over the last seven or eight years. It is this foundation which makes American public opinion so hostile to the Government of Vietnam. Mr. Nhu said he was trying to dissipate the rumors and untruths through frank talks with Americans, particularly American officials. He stated that he would continue to try to sit down and talk with Americans as brothers and comrades. Mr. Nhu said it was not his job to defend the present regime. Rather, it was his ambition to solve the very problem of underdevelopment and the effects of underdevelopment on public opinion.

Mr. Nhu said he recognized fully the importance of Mr. Manning’s second principle. He understood that the United States cannot change its institutions to please the Vietnamese Government, but the situation is a very delicate one. He recognized that U.S. opinion is impatient with the fact that, despite the massive infusion of U.S. aid to Vietnam, the political, economic and social situation in Vietnam still does not correspond perfectly to the U.S. pattern.

Mr. Nhu stated he realized there was a kind of “bad U.S. conscience about this war, but one cannot win a war with a bad conscience.” What is needed, Mr. Nhu said, is not perfection-but improvement.

The problem is not merely a Vietnamese problem but a worldwide one. The starting point here and in Thailand, and in all other underdeveloped countries, is the serious difficulty of trying to create a democracy in an underdeveloped land. The critical and almost insoluble problem is how to build democratic institutions upon an underdeveloped foundation. In Vietnam the Strategic Hamlet program aims at solving this contradiction between the state of development and yearnings for democracy.

Mr. Nhu observed wryly that he had now done his mea culpa and would like to speak about the American correspondents. Their attitude is a systematic refusal to listen to, to understand or to report the attitude of the Vietnamese Government. The American correspondents deliberately reflect in their reporting only one point of view and that is the point of view of those hostile to the GVN. This applies not only to Vietnamese officials but also to sympathetic American officials. For example, the American correspondents were not interested in Admiral Felt’s ideas. They refused to attend a press conference of Admiral Felt’s last week. In fact, they consistently refused even to approach anyone who had a view or a vision different than their own. This attitude does not accord with a true journalistic attitude. The U.S. public needs to be informed of the whole picture. Mr. Nhu said he did not ask that the American correspondents tell lies, but was offended by their refusal of invitations to see or to hear anything not in accord with their own views.

Mr. Nhu said that these young reporters want nothing less than to make a government. This was, indeed, an exalting ambition. It was a stimulating pastime indeed for three or four of them to get together on a concerted effort to overthrow and to create governments. They find in the United States an atmosphere receptive to their efforts because U.S. Congressional and executive officials have, for years, been influenced by GVN officials to adopt attitudes inimical to the Diem regime. Everything is set for a fundamental reassessment by the United States of the situation in Vietnam. All conditions are favorable for a complete U.S. change of policy in Vietnam. It is a great opportunity and it would be tremendous sacrifice for those hostile to the Diem regime to give up this opportunity.

Mr. Nhu said that these were the realities and it was necessary for a Vietnamese patriot to face them squarely. He said that a change of government now would be of benefit only to the Communists. Yet he realized how difficult it was for the Americans, and for this reason he had been thinking of a different kind of aid, a kind of aid which would not involve any moral commitment on the part of the United States to the Vietnamese Government, but would, nonetheless, continue to be effective in content.

Mr. Nhu said he was thinking along these lines because he realized that what is now going on in Vietnam, if presented in a certain way, cannot but affect the state of the Kennedy Administration. Mr. Nhu observed that President Kennedy is a Catholic and therefore is in a kind of minority. Mr. Nhu said that he, too, was a Catholic, but tended to mistrust other Catholics because he found that Catholics always have a guilt complex. Mr. Nhu said that if one is afflicted with a guilt complex there is a very great difficulty in following through on an effective program of action.

Mr. Nhu said that he was thinking of aid along the lines of the wartime Lend Lease program. Such a program would have the advantage of more flexibility and it would not commit the United States Government in the Vietnamese fight against communism. Mr. Nhu said he did not know very much about Lend Lease but believed that such a program presupposed the existence of a plan. In an underdeveloped country a perfect and complete plan was, by definition, impossible. Insisting upon one has only the effect of delaying the provision of aid.

Mr. Nhu said that he was attracted to the idea of changing the U.S. assistance to Vietnam to a Lend Lease type program because of the precedent of such a program in World War II. He said that American aid to Stalin in World War II obviously involved no moral commitment. The United States was fighting Hitler and was prepared to help anyone who was fighting Hitler. In that situation U.S. aid did not imply any approval of the aid recipient.

Mr. Nhu said that his idea on Lend Lease was a strictly personal thing. However, he observed, if we are to succeed in Vietnam-and if the United States’ worldwide strategy against communism is to succeed-the U.S. aid policy must be revised.

Mr. Mecklin asked if, under the type program envisioned by Mr. Nhu, the United States would continue to have an advisory role in Vietnam. Mr. Nhu responded that he supposed it would work as it had in Russia where he understood there were a number of American advisors. In fact, said Mr. Nhu, Vietnam would doubtless ask for more. Vietnam had a great need for advisors, particularly editors. The Vietnamese can write nothing effective publicizing their own cause because they are too scrupulous. People ask why President Diem does not talk more often to the Vietnamese people, as do the American presidents. A major reason is simply the lack of ghost writers.

As an example of the inability of the Vietnamese Government to present its own case, Mr. Nhu cited the GVN White Paper on Communist violations of the Geneva Convention.² He said the United States had to send Mr. Jorden to Vietnam in order to get an effective job done.

Mr. Nhu said the Vietnamese cannot understand Americans. Therefore they needed someone to help them interpret themselves for American consumption. Yet, when the GVN tried to hire an American Public Relations firm it was accused of trying to create a lobby. Mr Nhu said the GVN had neither the means nor the intention to create a lobby. He said the United States is new and strange and foreign to Vietnamese. He said that he himself had come to understand his American friends better in the last three weeks. It was this lack of understanding which led the GVN to try to use someone who would understand Americans and know how to convey to Americans the Vietnamese point of view. As of now, Mr. Nhu said, the American people do not know our point of view and cannot get to know it since the public has access only to the point of view of those opposed to the Vietnamese Government. Mr. Nhu said the GVN was the target of a campaign, whether deliberate or not, to convince the U.S. public that the GVN is not sincere. The United States now believes that. If Mr. Manning could somehow, during his short stay, reverse that belief it would be a large accomplishment indeed. That, of course, was too much to expect, Mr. Nhu said. However, he said he placed his trust in American fair play.

Mr. Manning said he would not attempt to speak to all of the points raised, but did wish to address himself to several matters. Mr. Nhu urged that Mr. Manning be frank and said that he considered himself a soldier fighting in a mortal war. Mr. Manning said that Mr. Nhu had expressed the belief that there was wide-spread disillusionment about the situation in Vietnam, both on the part of U.S. leaders and the U.S. public. Mr. Manning said that this belief was in no sense justified. The views of the United States Government and of the American public must be measured in terms of results. The results show that the American commitment to Vietnam, which was inherited by the Kennedy Administration from its predecessor, has been accepted and is being carried out by President Kennedy and by the American people. Moreover, contrary to the views expressed by Mr. Nhu, there is a conviction within the United States Government that we are involved in a winning program in Vietnam.

Mr. Manning said that the question of changing the nature of the American commitment will not be decided by journalists either in Vietnam or elsewhere. Such decisions will be made by the United States Government, and the position of the United States Government at the present time is clear as is the support of the American people for that commitment.

Mr. Manning said that his next point might appear to be contradictory, but that it was important that Mr. Nhu understand the point. Mr. Manning could understand the GVN’s resentment of the criticism to which it had been subjected. In similar circumstances, Mr. Manning said, he would be furious. Certainly, it would be better if the criticism of the GVN in the American press were less intense. However, the very existence of this criticism is one of the things that makes the U.S. commitment to Vietnam and the U.S. effort in Vietnam possible. Mr. Manning said he was not attempting to be glib. No one likes to be subjected to criticism and Mr. Manning was not suggesting that the GVN should be happy about criticism of it appearing in the American press. But President Kennedy and the Secretary of State, both of whom are earnestly determined to carry out the American commitment to Vietnam, must have the tools to do their part of the job. President Kennedy is a political leader. He is carrying out a program which, as Mr. Nhu had observed, was bound to create concern and, as time goes on, impatience in the United States. Nonetheless, the President is determined to continue with the effort in Vietnam and to continue to generate the kind of leadership which will give that effort the necessary kind of support in the United States. At the present time, the program does have such support.

Next year is an election year in the United States and as the campaign heats up, it will become more and more necessary that the President have the necessary tools to insure a continuance of American public support for the effort in Vietnam. Just as in Vietnam, the opposition will look for weaknesses or for situations which can be interpreted as weaknesses, with which to criticize either the program of the Administration or its implementation.

Mr. Manning said he was not referring to the question of images or public relations in the normal sense, but to the fact that the existence in Vietnam of an American press corps free to observe and report on the American involvement was a tool which it was essential that the President have in dealing with public criticism of this policy. If an attempt were made to handcuff the press corps and prevent them from filling their traditional role of reporting to the American public, this would give the critics of the policy a tremendous advantage, and it would make it extremely difficult for the President to answer the critics and maintain public support of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Mr. Manning said he agreed that there had been much progress in Vietnam that had not completely come through to the American people. He said it was not necessary that the United States and Vietnamese Governments simply accept that situation. Instead, we should seek ways to get the news of the progress through to the American public.

But is necessary that Mr. Nhu understand that, in spite of the sometimes obnoxious reporting from Saigon, the state of United States public opinion on the Vietnamese program is not bad. The President r still has public support for his policy despite the criticisms that have been levied at those policies. Mr. Nhu said he was glad to hear that, and observed that because we are facing hell, all the forces of hell are leagued against us.

Mr. Manning said that he had, since his arrival in Saigon, met with the American correspondents. As Mr. Nhu would doubtless expect, the correspondents were passionate in their views. Mr. Manning said that he wished in all candor to tell Mr. Nhu what the correspondents are concerned about. The correspondents, and some of their superiors, with whom Mr. Manning had spoken before coming to Vietnam, are deeply fearful that the Government of Vietnam has, or is about to embark on, a campaign here of physical and technical harassment of the correspondents, or of expulsion.

Mr. Manning said that he had come to Vietnam mainly to listen rather than to talk. But in view of the concern of the correspondents he hoped strongly that he would be able to take back to Washington with him certain knowledge as to whether or not the fears of the correspondents were justified. Mr. Manning said he thought it possible that the correspondents, because of their passionate, emotional involvement, may be magnifying one incident out of proportion. But their concern, whether justified or not, was real, and was to some extent shared by their superiors elsewhere.

Mr. Nhu said that there was a need on both sides for wisdom. He said that it was his very firm impression that the Government of Vietnam was being oppressed by the U.S. press rather than the American correspondents being oppressed by the Vietnamese Government.

If, in fact, the American correspondents in Saigon think that the Government of Vietnam could oppress them, then the correspondents are unrealistic indeed. The Government of Vietnam is weak and in no position to oppress the American correspondents. The fears of the correspondents are based on passion, not on reality. Mr. Nhu said that an examination of the press despatches from Saigon for the past several years would show that the American correspondents have systematically and consistently been extremely critical of the Vietnamese Government. That is the permanent frame of mind of the American correspondents. As a result, the Government of Vietnam has not only to cope with its hot war, but also a continuing cold war with the American correspondents in Saigon. There is no use to go on with the fight. The American correspondents have succeeded in isolating the Government of Vietnam and then presenting us as monsters to the American people and to the world. Mr. Nhu asked “What do we want, to win the war or to lose the war?” Mr. Nhu said he had asked the American correspondents not to judge the situation in Vietnam only in its local context, but to view it as part of a world problem of underdeveloped countries engaged in the fight against communism. In Vietnam it is a hot war. The United States is involved in that war because it is in the interest of the United States to see that the war is won, not because it is in the interest of the family of President Diem. In World War II the United States had no intention of glorifying or stabilizing the Stalin regime. Yet the United States assisted the Stalin regime because it wanted to use all available tools in the fight against Hitler.

Mr. Nhu asked why the American correspondents never try to see him. He said that he would be happy to talk with them and try to convey to them a better understanding of the real situation. Mr. Mecklin asked if Mr. Nhu would consider holding a press conference. Mr. Nhu said he did not like press conferences but some of the correspondents could come together if they wished. Mr. Manning pointed out that such a meeting need not be a formal press conference on the record and Mr. Nhu agreed that a background conference would suit him better. Mr. Nhu said he was prepared to receive the correspondents and to talk with them upon any issue in complete candor and honesty. He said that all issues could be considered and that the correspondents could insult him if they wished. Mr. Nhu said he would not mind if he were insulted for he considered that the correspondents, although their attitude might be wrong, were actually comrades-in-arms in the struggle against communism. Mr. Nhu said that in dealing with the American correspondents it was good to remember the Biblical observation, “ …³ in the House of the Lord there are many Houses”.

Mr. Nhu said he knew that the American correspondents carried a very bad opinion of him. He knew that the correspondents considered him basically anti-American, and that they thought that he was constantly seeking to deceive them. If this were so, asked Mr. Nhu, what would be “my reason for living?” Mr. Nhu said that one correspondent in a recent Newsweek issue said that Nhu spent all his time reading poetry, but in the same article charged him with controlling everything in Vietnam, the Government, the police, the army, everything.⁴ Mr. Nhu said that neither charge was true. Mr. Nhu said that so far as poetry was concerned, he supposed that the idea stemmed from a conversation he had once with a reporter in which Mr. Nhu referred to Moses and to the lonely and solitary role he had had to fill in leading the children of Israel to the Promised Land. In this connection, Mr. Nhu had mentioned a French poem.

Mr. Nhu said that Moses had not really been lonely because he had God with him. But, said Mr. Nhu, “I do not feel a divine presence in the American leadership”. When the correspondent asked why, Mr. Nhu replied because he found the American press to be very inhuman in its treatment of him. Mr. Manning said that it was unnecessary for r Mr. Nhu to be concerned at the charge that he read poetry, for many Americans admired poetry. Mr. Nhu said he had only been joking.

Mr. Manning said that he agreed with Mr. Nhu on one important point. That point was that the present state of mind of the American correspondents is grounded on passion. This being so, the problem was not a technical one of press treatment, but a problem of tone. It was not a question of giving to the reporters access to more complete information, but of somehow affecting their treatment of the information already available to them. Mr. Nhu said that this was true, that the problems with the correspondents were all long-standing and old problems but that what had changed in recent times was the tone. Mr. Nhu then apologized for not speaking English and said it would be possible to establish greater intimacy if he spoke English.

Mr. Manning said that he was not proposing that either the Vietnamese Government or the American Government get into the business of holding the hands of the correspondents. They were, and should be, on their own. But perhaps some small things could be done to improve the present atmosphere. If anything could improve that atmosphere, Mr. Manning said that he thought it would be the readmission to Vietnam of Mr. Robinson, the NBC correspondent.

Mr. Manning asked if Mr. Nhu had yet seen the cable which Mr. Robinson recently sent to President Diem.⁵ Mr. Nhu said he had just read the cable

Mr. Nhu said that he presently believed that the correspondents should be allowed to come freely to Vietnam, and in greater numbers than were now present. But Mr. Nhu asked that each reporter observe self-discipline. Without self-discipline on the part of the correspondents Mr. Nhu said, it was impossible to do anything constructive about the present situation. Mr. Nhu asked Mr. Manning to tell the American correspondents on his behalf that he asks of them nothing but objective, fair reporting. He did not ask them to tell lies favorable to the interest of the Government of Vietnam. Mr. Nhu said he would personally tell the correspondents that when he saw them.

Mr. Manning said that he wished he could offer some over-night solution to the problem created by the hostility between the correspondents and the Government of Vietnam. But he had no solution to offer. He thought that what was needed was time, and he believed that the solution to the present situation would be a slow process of evolution. However, Mr. Manning added he believed that in the end the facts of the situation as seen by both the Government of Vietnam and the American government would prevail and would provide American public opinion with a balanced and accurate picture of the Vietnamese situation.

Mr. Manning said that he was in a position to go back to the United States and to see a number of influential and fair minded editors and to discuss with them candidly the situation in Vietnam. He would convey to them the fact that it was necessary to view developments in Vietnam in the total world context. He would convey to them the need in the complex Vietnam situation for self-discipline on the part of the American correspondents. Mr. Manning said he did not know what the results of his efforts would be but that he thought it both necessary and wise to make the effort.

Mr. Nhu said that he thought the change might take place overnight. He said the Americans were capable of that. He said he did not think that it was really a political problem but was instead a kind of hysteria—a disease.

Mr. Manning said he did not think it was that bad. Certainly the American correspondents were motivated by passion but he thought their involvement still was somewhat short of hysteria.

Mr. Nhu said that he had an example which he thought would illustrate the present situation. When Ambassador Nolting returned (and Mr. Nhu said he admired Ambassador Nolting greatly in having the courage to return at all), the Ambassador had made a statement at the airport. At this point, Mr. Nhu digressed to say that he was not being critical of Mr. Trueheart for whom he had great sympathy in view of the way everything fell in on him during Ambassador Nolting’s absence. Mr. Nhu then reverted to the Nolting statement and said that some of the Cabinet Ministers were not much pleased by it.

Some of his colleagues criticized the statement as not clear cut. However, Mr. Nhu said, he personally thought it was a very good statement because Ambassador Nolting had said exactly what he thought. Mr. Nhu had asked his colleagues whether they expected the Americans to say what they did not think. Mr. Nhu said the Vietnamese had no right to expect such a thing. He personally thought the statement was excellent because it was an honest statement of Ambassador Nolting’s views.

Mr. Nhu said that we need only be sincere in order to win the war. He asked how a little country like Vietnam, underdeveloped and with a population of only 14,000,000, could hope to stand up to the world communist colossus. He asked if the Vietnamese people could assume this burden on their narrow shoulders. He said such an effort would be pure folly except with the assistance of sincere friends. For this reason, Mr. Nhu said, U.S. aid was extremely important to Vietnam. But, he asked, how many Vietnamese die and get crippled everyday? Mr. Nhu said that what the GVN wanted was understanding, that Vietnam was an underdeveloped and not an advanced country, and the actions of the government be judged in that context. Also, it should be understood that President Diem does not promise much and that his few promises are given slowly and only after long consideration. But once a promise is given, it is always honored completely.

Mr. Mecklin said that his office was under daily pressure from NBC to obtain the readmission of Mr. Robinson. He asked what word he could give to NBC.

Mr. Nhu said that he could not promise the result, but that he personally had no objection to the readmission of Mr. Robinson, and that he, Mr. Nhu, would try to obtain permission for Robinson to return to Vietnam, provided that Robinson would give the GVN too a chance to be heard in the world. That would be only fair play, he said. Mr. Mecklin said that it would be very good if Mr. Robinson could return in time for Mr. Nhu’s meeting with the press.

Mr. Nhu said he was always prepared to meet with the correspondents provided they did not distort his remarks. He said he was not too keen about interviews on the record because it seemed to him that in such interviews it was always necessary to play a defensive role. Mr. Nhu said he preferred to talk with the correspondents on a background only basis because this would permit full and free discussions on all issues. Mr. Nhu said that he liked full and free discussions because he was sincere.

Mr. Nhu said he knew there had been mistakes made by the GVN. Still he was prepared to recognize these mistakes because only through correcting errors could progress be made. Vietnam must either progress or die. Vietnam could not stand still. Therefore, Mr. Nhu said, he was willing to do whatever must be done to make progress.

Mr. Manning said that despite the ofttimes unfavorable coverage by the American correspondents of the Vietnam situation, it is a fact that an understanding and sense of involvement in the Vietnam situation is deeply embedded in the American mind. At least in part this is so because of the casualties which Americans have suffered in Vietnam, as slight as those casualties are in comparison to the sufferings of the Vietnamese people. Although the American casualties in some way constitute a great political liability, they also have the result of getting the United States really committed to success in Vietnam just as we were committed in Korea. The United States Government is determined to carry out its commitment to the Vietnamese.

Mr. Nhu expressed his deep appreciation of this statement and said that he would relay it to the other Ministers in the GVN. Mr. Nhu said the other Ministers were, at the present time, very much “intoxicated” with the idea that the United States is slowly preparing for a withdrawal from Vietnam.

Mr. Nhu said that he once had a conversation with Admiral Felt in which the Admiral told him not to fear American imperialism but to be confident that the Americans would withdraw when their assistance was no longer needed. Mr. Nhu said that the Vietnamese fear was exactly the opposite of what Admiral Felt apparently thought. The Vietnamese did not fear that the Americans would implant themselves in Vietnam, but feared instead an American withdrawal before Vietnam could survive alone. But Mr. Nhu said, if Americans and Vietnamese are to live together in great numbers they must have a modus vivendi. Mr. Nhu said that before the GVN had given agreement to the introduction of 10,000 to 12,000 American troops, he had told General Taylor that the American soldiers would be bored to death without the amusements to which they were accustomed. He urged General Taylor to make full provision for regular rotation to Hong Kong and other places for relaxation. Mr. Nhu said his advice had not been heeded. He said there was still a great need for such a rotation program at short intervals and that it would be a very good and important psychological move if the United States were to institute such a program.

Mr. Nhu said that another psychological problem stemmed from the fact that the Americans in Vietnam did not feel that their losses and their sacrifices were understood by the American people. Mr. Nhu wondered if it would not be good to “magnify” the American casualties.

Mr. Manning said he understood the point but felt that if the casualties were “magnified” there would be a risk of making an even greater problem. Mr. Nhu said he recognized that danger and observed that his wife wrote to the families of all U.S. soldiers killed in Vietnam.

Mr. Nhu referred to the ad which appeared in American newspapers recently calling for a US. withdrawal from the war in Vietnam.⁶ He said that a certain group of American intellectuals look upon the Vietnam war as a dirty war. It was a dirty war, but it was dirty for the communists, not the GVN side. Mr. Nhu said it was astonishing to him that a group of American intellectuals could still believe that the American soldiers were involved in Vietnam in fighting a dirty war.

Mr. Nhu said the communists realized themselves that they are fighting a dirty war. He referred to a recent Viet Cong Battalion Commander who had defected and had informed the GVN that the communists keep the location of their units secret from all except Battalion Commanders, in order to prevent the troops from escaping.

Mr. Manning said that he appreciated this chance to discuss so many different subjects so candidly. He hoped that he would be able to return to the United States with some sense of assurance for the President that the press situation in Vietnam would settle down and not give an additional weapon to the critics of the President’s Vietnam policy. Mr. Manning said he wanted to stress that if anything occurs to prevent American correspondents from covering the Vietnam situation, it would constitute an extreme danger to the continuity of the President’s policy. Mr. Manning said that in the kind of operation upon which the United States was embarked in Vietnam, the reporting of the American correspondents played an essential role. The position of the correspondents was analogous to that of building inspectors. The American public expected that they would be there to observe and comment and criticize. Their recommendations are not always accepted nor always believed but the existence of the correspondents and their ability to report on the American involvement is a deeply important psychological and political fact both in Washington and for the American public in general.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, 7/1/63-7/20/63. Secret. Drafted by Wright. The source text bears the incorrect date June 17. Manning was sent to Vietnam by President Kennedy to investigate and report on the type of problems relating to American journalists which had led to the telegram sent to the President by a group of journalists on July 7, Document 211.
2. Reference is presumably to the letter from the Government of Vietnam to the International Control Commission, dated October 24, 1961, charging North Vietnam with a massive infiltration of agents into the south for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Vietnam. Regarding the U.S. attitude toward the release of this letter by the Government of Vietnam, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. I, Document 262.
3. Ellipsis in the source text.
4. Newsweek, July 15, 1963, p. 37.
5. Not found.
6. Reference is to an advertisement which ran in the June 27 edition of The New York Times; see footnote 5, Document 193.