Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

18. Memorandum From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

CINCPAC 3010 Ser 0079

Honolulu, January 25, 1963.

SUBJ

• Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam (CPSVN)

REF

• (a) CINCPAC Record of Sixth Secretary of Defense Conference of 23 July 1962, dtd 26 July 1962 (Item No.2)²
• (b) JCS Msg 5455, DTG 262318Z July 1962³
• (c) OSD Msg DEF 923923, DTG 222243Z January 1963⁴

ENCL

• (1) Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam

1. Pursuant to directives in references (a) and (b), subject plan has been prepared to provide for bringing the counterinsurgency effort to a successful conclusion, withdrawing U.S. special military assistance, and developing within GVN a capability to defend against the continuing threat in Southeast Asia.

2. The primary limiting factor in developing this plan was the GVN capability to provide necessary trained personnel within a short period of time to efficiently assume those special functions now being executed by U.S. military personnel. Shortages of junior leaders, pilots and personnel with special skills will exist to some extent into FY 65. However, such shortages are not considered of sufficient magnitude to affect the feasibility of the plan.

3. Concurrent with the development of this plan, it was necessary to revise the FY 63 MAP to support the intensified counterinsurgency effort. As the plan developed it became apparent it could not be treated apart from MAP. Therefore, the period covered by the plan was extended through FY 68 to show the cost and phasing of forces in relationship with the FY 63-68 MAP. It is emphasized that the Comprehensive Plan has been developed using factors based on in-country experience to date and is subject to change. Order of magnitude dollar figures have been used in some cases, particularly with respect to construction. It does not represent a refined detailed program. This will be accomplished during the development of the FY 64-69 MAP.

4. The Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program (Switchback) is an important counterinsurgency force, complementary to other programs in SVN and has been integrated into the Comprehensive Plan. However, experience on the ground has shown that this program is not susceptible to MAP procedures and should be treated as a separate but related program.

5. To defeat the insurgency by the end of 1965 and effect early withdrawal of U.S. special military assistance, it will be necessary to accelerate training, equipment deliveries, and combat operations. Comparing the DOD dollar guidelines provided in reference (c) with the Comprehensive Plan costs extended through FY 69, the net difference is about 66 million dollars. The preponderance of the increase is required in FY 64.

6. The plan has been developed by COMUSMACV, coordinated with the SVN Country Team and concurred in by the Ambassador.

7. It is recommended that:

a. The Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam be approved as the basis for the development of the FY 64-69 MAP for South Vietnam.⁵

b. Switchback be funded from sources outside of PACOMMAP.

c. Administration of Switchback funds be accomplished through DA channels, and authority be granted to dispense funds in an unvouchered manner and without compliance with a number of requirements that cannot be observed in an operation of this nature.

H.D. Felt

[Enclosure]

Memorandum From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harking) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)⁶

Saigon, January 19, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam

1. References:

a.

JCS Msg 5455, DTG 262318Z Jul 62.

b.

CINCPAC Msg DTG 140428Z Aug 62.⁷

c.

OSD Wash DC Msg DTG 082316Z Jan 63.⁸

d.

CINCPAC Msg DT-G 100910Z Jan 63.⁹

2. In compliance with instructions contained references a. and b., an outline Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam (CPSVN) covering the period FY 63-68 is hereby provided.

3. In view of the close relationship between this plan and the Military Assistance Plan, they should not continue to be treated as separate entities.

4. Consideration of the source and method of funding Switchback has been included in the plan, as well as the relationship of the CIDG Program to the GVN military and paramilitary forces.

5. It is recommended that:

a. The Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam (CPSVN) be approved as the basis for preparation of the FY 64-69 MAP for South Vietnam.

b. Funding of Switchback in FY 64 and future years not be funded by the Vietnam MA Program.

c. Funds to support Switchback be administered through DA channels.

6. The US Ambassador concurs.

Paul D. Harkins

[Subenclosure]

COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Requirement

During the Secretary of Defense Conference of 23 July 1962 in Hawaii, action was directed to develop a Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam (CPSVN), looking ahead for three years and covering requirements in all categories of Government of Vietnam (GVN) military personnel, training and equipment. The plan was to be designed to meet the GVN military needs on an orderly basis so that, as US special military support assistance is withdrawn, the GVN would have developed the skills and the means to assume the total military responsibility.

2. Guidance

The CPSVN was developed by COMUSMACV based on the following CINCPAC guidance:

a. Objective

Develop a capability within military and pare-military forces of the GVN by the end of CY 65 that will help the GVN to achieve the strength necessary to exercise permanent and continued sovereignty over that part of Vietnam which lies below the demarcation line without the need for continued US special military assistance.

b. Assumptions

(1) The insurgency will be under control at the end of three years (end of CY 65).

(2) Extensive US support will continue to be required during the three year period, both to bring the insurgency under control and to prepare GVN forces for early take-over of US activities.

(3) Previous MAP funding ceilings for SVN are not applicable. Program those items essential to do the job.

3. Concept

a. General

To accomplish the objective of the CPSVN and bring the insurgency under control, several programs are developing along parallel lines and will become integrated and mutually supporting as the ultimate objective is achieved. Concurrent with the development of the CPSVN, the FY 63 MAP was revised to support the intensified counterinsurgency effort and has now become the FY 63 portion of the CPSVN. The FY 64-68 portion of the CPSVN constitutes an outline plan which will serve as the basis for the refinement and development of the FY 64-69 MAP.

b. National Campaign Plan (NCP)

The NCP establishes a concept for conducting an aggressive offensive campaign against the Viet Cong (VC) on a national basis. Tactical operations are being intensified with the view toward drawing the VC into areas where they can be destroyed. Areas within each province which are controlled by the GVN will be expanded through continuous operations, moving into uncontrolled areas immediately adjacent to controlled areas, consolidating, annexing, and expanding again. Those areas which are not controlled by the GVN will be subjected to continuous pressure by the military forces until they can be brought under martial law. Every effort will be made by all available forces in each province to maintain continuous pressure on the VC requiring them to keep moving until they are forced to stand and fight or surrender. The NCP stresses that operations will use every conceivable means to intensify offensive action. Close and rapid follow-up of military successes will be made by civic action teams. All programs will be integrated to support the NCP. The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), Civil Guard (CG), Self Defense Corps (SDC), Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG), and Strategic Hamlet Program will be brought into play in the consolidation effort to organize and secure rural communities and to restore normal GVN control with civil law and order throughout SVN. To have a better appreciation of the over-all concept it is necessary to examine the relationship of the Strategic Hamlet Program and the CIDG.

c. The Strategic Hamlet Program

Strategic Hamlet operations consist of the civil-military measures necessary to gain or maintain security of village and hamlet communities and establish presence of the government among the people. This program is conducted in those areas where GVN control and authority are reasonably well established and recognized by the people. The basic purpose is to isolate the people from the VC physically and ideologically. This is accomplished by providing the people the means for self protection from VC reprisals and denying the VC information, recruits, food and shelter. All agencies of the GVN must contribute to these operations. Plans provide for the civil consolidation of security gained initially by military action.

d. The Civilian Irregular Defense Group Program

Concurrently with the development of the Strategic Hamlet Program, the CIDG Program is being developed in those areas of SVN where GVN authority is not recognized by the people and the efforts by RVNAF to establish law and order would be actively resisted. This is not to imply that these people are necessarily sympathetic to the VC. They are ethnic tribes and minority groups who have not previously been under governmental controls. Thus, they are prime targets for the VC as a source of food, shelter, labor and intelligence. The CIDG program was initiated in 1961 for the purpose of clearing and holding specified VC controlled areas of SVN through the motivation, organization, training and arming of these non-GVN controlled groups. Responsibility for this program is currently being passed [less than 1 line not declassified] to COMUSMACV, under Switchback and is being executed by USA Special Forces. CIDG forces may reach a peak strength of 100,000 by July 1964, [1-1/2 lines not declassified]. The source of CIDG personnel and responsibilities for the program are portrayed at Enclosure (1).¹⁰

e. Transition and Disposition of SVN Forces

There will be a “phase down” of CIDG forces as the areas in which they operate come under GVN control. Concurrent with this “phase down” the SDC and/or CG will establish GVN control in these areas. The CIDG personnel will then either be absorbed into the National Police, SDC, CG, RVNAF or demobilized. Subsequent to the period of the insurgency, steps will be taken to revert from martial law and re-establish civil law and order as quickly as possible. At this time military and pare-military forces will revert to their peacetime role and the National Police Force will assume the task of maintaining civil law and order. The above concept is portrayed graphically at Enclosure (2).

4. Force objectives for South Vietnam

Force objectives for SVN should provide the capability to defeat the current insurgency with US special military assistance; defeat any new insurgency threat which may arise after phase down and withdrawal of US special military assistance; and provide an initial defense against overt invasion until outside forces can be introduced. Total SVN forces contemplated under the CPSVN increase to a possible peak strength of 575,000 in FY 64 as portrayed at Enclosure (3). However, it is emphasized that this peak strength will probably not be reached as the CIDG will be continually demobilized or absorbed by the CG and SDC as the GVN control expands. There is a rapid decrease commencing in FY 65 as the CIDG is replaced by GVN forces and the paramilitary forces are phased down. After withdrawal of US special military assistance no significant reductions in levels or in number and types of RVNAF units are contemplated in view of the threat of re-insurgency and overt aggression. This threat will probably continue for an extended period of time unless there occurs an unforeseen change in international attitudes resulting in a definite relaxing of tensions and cold war activities throughout Southeast Asia.

a. RVNAF

The RVNAF force structure shown at Enclosure (4) can be supported by the currently authorized (by JCS for MAP support) strength of 225,000, except during FY 64 and FY 65. During these years it will be necessary to provide a maximum of 6,000 additional spaces to accommodate an increased number of trainees, students, and patients (pipeline), additional logistical and administrative support units, and for minor changes in combat forces. Increases in pipeline personnel are necessary to support an intensified training program and provide for higher patient density during peak fighting period. After FY 65 the strength level can be reduced to 224,000, primarily as a result of a decrease in pipeline personnel. It should be noted that this strength is 6,000 less than that contained in the FY 63-68 MAP.

(1) The Army is being reorganized as a four corps force of nine divisions. By eliminating the restoration of the fourth rifle company previously planned for each infantry battalion, and making other adjustments, sufficient spaces can be generated during FY 63 and FY 64 to expand the training base, round out logistical and administrative support forces and provide minor augmentations for combat units. An additional 5,000 spaces above the original MAP figure of 204,000 in FY 64 will be required to provide adequate pipeline spaces to maintain unit operational effectiveness. A reduction to 202,000 by end FY 66 can be made in view of decreased requirements for pipeline personnel.

(2) Major changes in the Navy force structure are the deletion of a high speed transport (APD), the addition of a River Escort Group and five Coastal Surveillance Command Centers (CSCC), and increased personnel for the Junk Force. The River Escort Group will provide protection for essential cargo traffic in the delta area. The CSCC are required to control the Junk Fleet of 644 junks and coordinate the coastal surveillance effort.

(3) The Air Force structure has been revised to place increased emphasis on the counterinsurgency effort in the FY 63-65 time frame. A third fighter squadron is activated in FY 63 rather than FY 65. Augmentation of the liaison capability has been expanded from three squadrons (66 aircraft) to four squadrons (80 aircraft) in FY 64. The number of helicopter squadrons is increased from two to four in FY 65, rather than waiting until FY 68 to achieve an increased capability. The introduction of jet fighter aircraft has been slipped from FY 65 to FY 66 and the total number of squadrons has been increased from one to two by FY 67. The initial introduction of jet aircraft in FY 63 in the form of four RT-33s and two T-33s is dependent upon the lifting of the State Department suspension stemming from the Geneva Accords.

b. Paramilitary Forces

During FY 63-65 the paramilitary elements will be expanded as indicated in Enclosure (4) in accordance with the time phased requirements of clear and hold operations and the Strategic Hamlet Program. The CG and SDC will be increased to maximum strengths in FY 64 of 101,000 for the CG (current authorization 90,000) and 122,000 for the SDC (current authorization 80,000). Requirements for this phased build up include the need to formalize GVN control in areas in which the CIDG elements have achieved a reasonable degree of security. After FY 65 it is expected that the CG strength will be phased downward as it assumes the role of a provincial force to counter reinsurgency. The SDC will be reduced after FY 65 by transfer to the National Police Force and demobilization. A total of 4,600 junk sailors will be required to man the 644 junks.

c. Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG)

Total planned US supported SVN forces include the CIDG as shown on Enclosure (4). The CIDG is an important counterinsurgency force which is complementary to RVNAF, SDC, and CG. With respect to the CIDG, the 18 months between end FY 64 and end CY 65 must be considered the maximum effort “phase down” months for the CIDG, during which time the strength of these forces is reduced from a ceiling of 116,000 to a theoretical zero.

d. Hamlet Militia

The strategic hamlet kits programmed for FY 63 and FY 64 will provide ordnance materiel support for approximately 201.6 thousand hamlet militia personnel. Subsequent to FY 65, this force will rapidly decline in strength, and weapons will be withdrawn as civil law and order is restored.

5. Personnel Training Feasibility

a. Training proposed in the CPSVN is adequate to provide the personnel required to execute the plan within the three-year period. Shortages of personnel in critical categories of pilots, junior leaders and special skills will exist to some extent during the three-year period, but they are not considered sufficient to affect the feasibility of the plan.

b. Specific requirements for critical categories of personnel are listed below:

(1) Helicopter Pilots: Availability of helicopter pilots in FY 63 for two squadrons totaling 22 aircraft will be five short of the optimum requirement of 64. The 108 pilots required to permit increase of the total aircraft in the two squadrons to 40 in FY 64 will be available. The 228 pilots required to permit increase to four helicopter squadrons in FY 65 will be available.

(2) Pilots—All Other: This requirement will increase to a peak of 572 in FY 65. Sufficient pilots to meet this requirement will be available by mid-FY 65 (end CY 64). This category includes approximately 180 command control pilot positions.

(3) ARVN Officers and NCO’s: The peak requirement for ARVN officers is 15,837 in FY 64 and can be supported. The peak requirement for ARVNNCO’s is 35,743 in FY 64 and can be supported.

(4) CG Officers and NCO’s: The peak requirement for CG officers and NCO’s is 5,513 and 20,330 respectively in FY 64 and FY 65. Sufficient officers will be available by mid-FY 64. Shortage of NCO’s in mid-FY 64 will approximate 30%. This will be reduced to a 5% shortage by mid-FY 65 and thereafter planned availability will match requirements.

(5) SDC Platoon and Squad Leaders: The peak requirement for platoon leaders will increase to 5,080 by mid-FY 65, and for SDC squad leaders to 9,240 in mid-FY 65. Sufficient platoon leaders and squad leaders will be available to meet the requirement.

(6) VNN Officers and Petty Officers: The requirement for VNN officers is about 700 in FY 65 and thereafter. By FY 65, 90% of the required officers will be available, with the remainder becoming available in the first part of FY 66. The availability of petty officers matches requirements at 1,860 in FY 65 and the supply will meet the demand as it rises to a maximum of about 1900 in FY 68.

(7) VNMC Officers and NCO’s: The Marine Brigade will reach its required strength of 270 officers and 990 NCO’s in FY 63.

(8) ARVN Troposcatter Units: It is planned that the ARVN will take over operation of the US troposcatter system in FY 66. The requirement for troposcatter operators and related radio-relay operator-repairmen at that time is 600. A 19% shortage of ARVN troposcatter personnel will exist in FY 66. Off-shore schooling is the only source for the training and it is not feasible to plan on producing trained personnel at a faster rate. The shortage should be corrected by mid-FY 67.

(9) Medical Officers:

(a) The requirement for medical officers is 890. At the end of FY 65 a 39% shortage will exist, with this shortage being reduced to 23% at the end of FY 68.

(b) The requirement has been developed using modified US standards. By these standards the situation appears critical throughout the planning years. However, the military forces have above average medical support when compared to in-country civilian standards.

(c) The sole source of medical officers is from the Saigon Medical School. At present ARVN takes approximately 50% of the 80 doctors trained annually. If more were taken by the military, it would be at the expense of the civilian population.

6. Planned Phase-Out of US Forces and Activities

a. Activation of RVNAF units listed below will permit relief of US units indicated:

Unit	Year To Be Operational	To Be Equipped by Transfer From US Units	Permits Relief of US Unit
ARVN Troposcatter Radio Unit	1966	Yes, Incl Tropo system	1 Army Troposcatter Co
2 VNAF CH-34C Helo Sqdn	1965	No, 40 MAP a/c	2 Army H-21 Sqdns
Ln Sqdn (U/E increase and activation of 4th Sqdn)	1964	Yes, 3 L-20 (and 20 L-19 unless Cessna 185 is acceptable)	Equivalent Army Element

b. As indicated in Enclosure (5), the phase-out of the US special military assistance is envisioned as generally occurring during the period July 1965-June 1966, with earlier phase-down (or phase-out where feasible) of US units and activities taking place concurrently as RVNAF becomes sufficiently proficient and qualified to assume their functions. The major commands of USMACV stationed in SVN primarily for the purpose of providing special military assistance which will not be required after the US objectives in SVN have been met are:

(1) The US Marine Element which provides helicopter transportation support.

(2) The 2d Air Division which provides the USAF portion of the special military assistance support performed in SVN. This support includes such major contributions as operation “Farmgate” (Fighter), “Mule Train” (Transportation), and “Able Mable” (Reconnaissance). It also provides USAF administration and logistical support for USAF personnel and equipment engaged in special military assistance to

(3) US Army Support Group Vietnam (USASGV) which provides the US Army portion of the special military assistance support for SVN (except that performed by MAAG and Headquarters MACV) including helicopter and fixed wing air transportation, signal communications, and special forces. It also provides US administrative and logistical support for assigned and attached personnel and equipment engaged in the special military assistance.

(4) Headquarters Support Activity Saigon (HSAS) which provides administrative support to the US Headquarters and other US government sponsored agencies and activities located in Saigon.

c. No increase in MAAG Vietnam is proposed during the three-year period through FY 65 except for 127 civic action medical personnel. MAAG strength will be reduced by one-half after FY 65. The reduced strength contemplates the minimum essential personnel required to continue necessary advisory and military assistance functions, and to assume those functions in SVN currently executed by Headquarters USMACV and HSAS, which are assumed to be phased out at that time.

7. Cost Data

a. The FY 63 MAP was revised to provide support of the objectives of the CPSVN in accordance with the concept in paragraph 3 above. The revised FY 63 MAP, held within the OSD-approved fund ceiling of 187 million for FY 63 was forwarded to OSD on January 1963.¹¹

b. Order of magnitude costs ($ millions) of the CPSVN in comparison with the original FY 63-68 MAP are as shown in Enclosure (6) and summarized below:

	FY 63	FY 64	FY 65	FY 66	FY 67	FY 68	Total
CPSVN (a)	187	218	153	138	169	113	978
Original MAP (a)	187	130	114	119	127	133	810
Difference	0	+88	+39	+19	+42	-20	+168
CIDG (b)	8	24					32

(a) Packing, crating, handling and transportation (PCHT) costs excluded.

(b) Funded FY 63 by OSD MAP Contingency Reserve. Source FY 64 funds unresolved.

c. Matériel Costs

(1) The following tabulation reflects the materiel cost comparison between the original MAP and CPSVN:

	FY 63	FY 64	FY 65	FY 66	FY 67	FY 68	Total
CPSVN	139	174	132	129	152	106	832
Original MAP	139	113	98	109	117	124	700
Difference	0	+61	+34	+20	+35	-18	+132

(2) Increases in costs throughout the plan years are generally attributable to the earlier acquisition of major items of material, increased usage rates, and to the costs of intensified training programs. The additional material costs are particularly evident in the Air Force program as a result of the earlier acquisition of aircraft and the increased aircraft flying hour authorizations. Increased training ammunition requirements are due to the training program placing increased emphasis on completing required courses; increased availability of trainees; and, in the later plan years, an extensive replacement training program.

(3) Significant materiel changes contributing to net cost increases are as indicated below:

(a) FY 64—Increases in operational ammunition required for intensified combat; acceleration of communication equipment from FY 68 to FY 64 to permit relief of the US troposcatter unit FY 66; material for 2053 strategic hamlet kits, early funding for 40 CH-34 helicopters. Significant decreases involved in the changed cost include the deletion of: F-86 aircraft, war reserve ammunition, previously planned addition of a fourth rifle company to each infantry battalion, and an additional airborne battalion.

(b) FY 65—Acquisition of 10 F5 A/B aircraft; and deletion of two F86F attrition aircraft with Follow-On Spares (FOS).

(c) FY 66—Acquisition of 19 F5 A/B aircraft, and deletion of two F86F attrition aircraft and FOS and cancellation of an APD activation.

(d) FY 67—Acquisition of 11 F5 A/B aircraft and 16 RF-5B aircraft; and the deletion of 20 CH-34 helicopters.

(e) FY 68—Deletion of 18 F-104G aircraft and advance funding FY 64 troposcatter equipment

d. Construction Costs.

(1) The difference in the cost of the construction program is summarized in the following table

	FY 63	FY 64	FY 65	FY 66	FY 67	FY 68	Total
CPSVN	29.3	26.0	4.6	1.0	9.7	.5	71.1
Original MAP	29.3	3.0	4.4	.5	.5	.5	38.2
Difference	0	+23.0	+.2	+.5	+9.2	+.0	+32.9

(2) The construction programs in the Revised FY 63 MAP and FY 63 CPSVN are the same, except for minor revisions to be made by deviation without increasing the total cost.

(3) As indicated in the above table, there is a significant increase in the construction program during the period FY 64-68. The major increases occur in FY 64 and FY 67. The increase in FY 64 is generated by the following requirements:

(a) Construct facilities at three major Navy installations.

(b) Construct one airfield in the delta area and complete airfield construction at Da Nang.

(c) Improve two airfields in the delta area and two in Central SVN.

(d) Provide miscellaneous support facilities at seven airfields.

(4) The increased cost in FY 67 is to construct a jet-capable airfield in east Central SVN.

e. Training Costs.

(1) A comparison of training costs is reflected in the following

	FY 63	FY 64	FY 65	FY 66	FY 67	FY 68	Total
CPSVN	18.7	18.1	16.3	7.9	7.4	5.9	74.3
Original MAP	18.7	14.4	11.2	9.6	9.0	8.2	71.1
Difference	0	+3.7	+5.1	-1.7	-1.6	-2.3	+3.2

(2) For FY 63, except for deviations which may be necessary to meet operational considerations during the balance of the fiscal year, the requirements of the approved FY 63 MAP and the CPSVN are identical.

(3) The increase in FY 64 and FY 65 is attributable to accelerated training for officers, NCOs, specialists, and technicians with particular emphasis on junior leaders, pilots and communications personnel.

(4) The decreases in the FY 66-68 period are attributable to a phase-down of MAAG personnel and the training of pilots and communications personnel now planned for FY 64-65.

f. Support of CIDG

The CIDG is not susceptible to MAP support procedures. Selected groups receive support from other US sources and experience on the ground clearly indicates that the concept of irregular warfare must be designed to immediately exploit local politico-military successes in the battle for the people. The arming, training and support of irregulars must be carried out with the ultimate in flexibility of funding (to include necessary deviations) and administrative support. Current MAP lead times and administrative practices are unacceptable if the successes gained by the CIDG program to date are to be continued and exploited to the maximum degree.

g. Piaster Support

The proposed increase in force levels in FY 64 will cost an estimated additional 846 million plasters (an equivalent of $11.6 million at 73 to 1) and represents a 3% increase in the GVN national budget. The estimate was made using a straight line projection and costs per person derived from the CY 63 GVN budget applied to the FY 64 force levels. The estimate included the plaster cost of maintaining the RVNAF, CG, SDC and Junk Force; but excluded the cost of the strategic hamlet program since it is monitored by USOM. A major portion of the plaster cost of maintaining the RVNAF is borne by the counterpart fund and a significant, though minor, part of the cost is borne by the GVN. All of the plaster cost for the maintenance and support of the CG, SDC and the Junk Force is borne by the GVN and is a real part of the cost of the counterinsurgency effort. In view of the fact that generation of counterpart plasters from US AID Programs for the first few months of this fiscal year has lagged behind last year’s rate and that the CPSVN requires additional plasters in FY 64, the GVN will have to undertake an additional amount of deficit financing. Such financing may raise the inflationary pressure on the plaster and increase the possibility that further inflation will occur. This risk is small when compared to the over-all magnitude of the effort involved in SVN.

8. Summary

a. To prosecute the counterinsurgency effort to a successful conclusion and develop a GVN capability to defend against the continuing threat in Southeast Asia, it is necessary to temporarily increase the SVN force levels, provide essential equipment, and develop a GVN military posture similar to that contained in the CPSVN. The cost of such a program will be roughly the same as that contained in the CPSVN, but spread over a longer period of time. Therefore, to accomplish the ultimate objective of the CPSVN, early withdrawal of US special military assistance, the major costs of the program must be compressed into the FY 63-65 time frame. This is pointed out in the following table which compares the DOD dollar guideline with the CPSVN costs:

CPSVN-DOD Dollar Guidelines Cost Comparison

	FY 63	FY 64	FY 65	FY 66	FY 67	FY 68	Total
CPSVN (a)	218	153	138	169	113	110(b)	901
DOD Guidelines	160	165	160	150	140	122(b)	897
Difference	+58	-12	-22	+19	-27	-12	+4
PCHT Added	+11	+11	+11	+11	+10	+8	+62
Difference	+69	-1	-11	+30	-17	-4	+66

(a) Excludes PCHT

(b) Estimated by CINCPAC

b. It is emphasized that the Comprehensive Plan has been developed using factors based on in-country experience to date and is. subject to change. Order of magnitude dollar figures have been used in some cases, particularly with respect to construction. It does not represent a refined detailed program. This will be accomplished during the development of the FY 64-69 MAP.

[Here follow the enclosures: 1. “Chart, Non-MAP Supported Paramilitary Operations in SVN”, 2. “Chart, SVN Forces-Mix and Integration”, 3. “Graph, Total US Supported SVN Forces”, 4. “Table, Force Structure”, 5. “Table, Forecast of Phase-out of US Forces”, and 6. “Chart, Cost Comparison”.]

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files:FRC 69 A 3131, Vietnam 380 thru 381 1963. Secret.
2. See vol. II, Document 546.
3. Not found.
4. In telegram DEF 923923, January 22, the Department of Defense transmitted to CINCPAC preliminary fiscal year 1965-1968 dollar guidelines for military assistance programs for countries in the East Asia area, including Vietnam. (Washington National Records Center, RG 319, U.S. Army Message Center Microfilm, Reel 11225)
5. On March 7, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended adoption of the Comprehensive Plan; see Document 51.
6. Confidential.
7. Not found.
8. In telegram 082316Z to CINCPAC, January 8, the Department of Defense asked for CINCPAC comment on proposed FY 63-FY 64 funding from MAP contingency reserves. (Washington National Records Center, RG 319, U.S. Army Message Center Microfilm, Reel 11208)
9. In telegram 100910Z, January 10,CINCPAC reported to JCS that preparations were being made for the scheduled visit to Vietnam by General Wheeler and a JCS team. CINCPAC also commented on the continuing impact of the Ap Bac battle, and pointed to contrasting successes on the part of the South Vietnamese army. (Washington National Records Center, RG 319, U.S. Army Message Center Microfilm, Reel 11254)
10. None of the enclosures is printed.
11. Not found.