169. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
1168. Deptel 1207.2 I opened meeting with President Diem by saying that I had sought during recent days, in conversations with him and with Thuan (who was also present), to emphasize gravity with which my government regarded Buddhist situation. I had now received new instructions which went somewhat further than what I had been saying. I then handed him a paper,3 unsigned and headed “Memorandum,” which contained a paraphrase of most of reftel. In handing paper over I emphasized that I had not discussed it with anyone.
President read paper carefully, and without any comment except to ask for translation of word “reluctantly”. When he had finished reading, he handed paper to Thuan and sat in silence until Thuan had finished.
Diem then began an exchange with Thuan in Vietnamese, at the end of which Thuan said that the President wanted to point out that any statement by the United States at this juncture would be disastrous for the negotiations with the Buddhists which he expected would begin this evening or tomorrow morning. I pointed out that this was well understood in Washington and I gave him a copy of yesterday’s statement by Department Spokesman,4 to effect that US did not want to comment with negotiations in the offing.
Referring to point in suggested communique about banning of public processions by any religious group, Diem pointed out that tomorrow, June 13, is the Fete de Dieu (Corpus Christi), that Catholic processions were scheduled and indeed this was only day in religious calendar on which Catholic liturgy prescribes processions. If he banned them tomorrow, resentment of Catholics would be strong. I explained to president that burden of my demarche was in first three paragraphs of memorandum; remainder was argumentation and a suggestion for a communique. I doubted that Washington had considered the Fete de Dieu angle, but in any case the sentence to which he referred was put in, I was sure, to provide a rationale for temporary banning of Buddhist processions and demonstrations. With regard to tomorrow, he would have to decide whether to permit the Catholic [Page 386] processions, taking into account the expected effect on public order and on the negotiations with the Buddhists. I noted that, although Catholics would doubtless resent the banning of their processions, the gesture might be all the more appreciated by the Buddhists.
There was, rather surprisingly, no further discussion of substance of memorandum. Diem said [he] would have to reflect on it and would not, in any case, wish to take a decision until discussion with Buddhists had begun. I said that I had not expected an immediate reply but asked if I could expect that he or Thuan would keep me informed as discussions with Buddhists proceeded. He agreed.
Before leaving, I mentioned three items of information which I said had given me some concern: (1) A report that arrests were continuing June 11 in Danang and Hue. I thought it would be most regrettable if the authorities were retaliating against people involved in recent demonstrations. Diem did not reply but Thuan later told me that he would personally look into report. (2) I understood that some Vietnamese authorities (actually Minister of Interior, as I later told Thuan) were considering prosecuting for murder persons who had assisted bonze to cremate himself yesterday. Diem said he understood other persons had assisted bonze to cover himself with gasoline and had set fire to him. I said that I had talked to two eye witnesses who saw bonze set fire to himself but, whatever the facts, any action against others involved would be a very grave mistake. Thuan later said he would see to it that this idea was killed. (3) I had heard that entry to Saigon from the provinces had been barred to all monks. President and Thuan acknowledged that this was so and said that they considered it dangerous to public safety to permit bonzes to converge on Saigon at this particular time. I said that the public safety was of course his responsibility and I did not press the point.
Meeting with Diem lasted less than an hour.
Later, in Thuan’s office, he told me he had had a very serious (he called it climactic) conversation with President at mid-day, in which he had pressed President very hard to face facts and adopt conciliatory posture. He thought he had had some success. He said that he had emphasized to President that many people were afraid to tell him the truth but that he, Thuan, considered that it was his duty to tell the President “everything” and he had proceeded to do so.
Comment: Department’s instructions could not have been more timely, coming just before negotiations begin. They are of course very strong medicine and will be very hard for Diem to take.5 I would not [Page 387] care to predict outcome, but I believe we can be satisfied that we have done everything reasonably possible to get President Diem to save himself.
It is obviously vital that there be no leaks about this latest move and I am taking strictest precautions at this end.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution.↩
- Document 167.↩
- No copy of this paper has been found.↩
- Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Transcripts of Department of State News Briefings)↩
- According to a memorandum for the record prepared in the White House on June 14, President Kennedy was unaware of the memorandum conveyed to Diem by Trueheart on June 12, on instructions from the Department, until it was summarized by the CIA in the President’s Intelligence Checklist on June 14. “The President noticed that Diem has been threatened with a formal statement of disassociation. He wants to be absolutely sure that no further threats are made and no formal statement is made without his own personal approval.” (Kennedy Library, National Security tales, Chester V. Clifton Series, President’s Intelligence Checklist)↩