160. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
1136. CINCPAC for POLAD. For Hilsman from Trueheart. Embtel 1135.2 President received me at 5 PM this afternoon (June 8) within minutes after my request. He was throughout two hour interview entirely relaxed and friendly, and he permitted frequent interruptions [Page 367] in a way that is rare for him. Unfortunately, I have no reason to believe that anything I said to him moved him. Opened by giving him French text of Women’s Solidarity Movement (WSM) resolution. He read it line by line as if he had never seen it before. (Nothing he said subsequently indicated prior knowledge.) I went on to explain that I had been profoundly disappointed to see this resolution. I had understood that GVN commission under Vice President had achieved large measure of agreement with Buddhist leaders on their demands (late in conversation he himself summarized terms of agreement very much as Thuan had given them to me), and that among other things it had been understood that there would be a truce (detente) on propaganda from both sides pending final settlement. WSM resolution seemed to me a violation of this. I wanted therefore to ask if he would disavow it, would dissociate GVN from it. I feared that otherwise we might see renewal of agitation and demonstrations bringing on government repressive measures and in effect loss of all that had been achieved in past week. I pointed out also that if this came to pass my government would very likely consider that GVN was at fault and would have to dissociate itself from GVN actions—as it had already done in denying that USAF planes had been used in lifting troops to Hue (Diem confirmed that he had read Department’s statement).3
Diem said at once that he could not disavow WSM resolution. In light of his later remarks, I fear that the general sentiments of resolution are close to his own. However, he limited himself to saying that it was necessary to warn people against extremists who were misusing affair to further their own interests. (He rarely referred to VC in frequent repetitions of this theme.)
I then turned to report I had from Helble that Buddhists still in pagoda at Hue were not being allowed to receive food or medical attention from outside. Diem said he was sure this could not be true and he promptly telephoned Minister of Interior and asked for report. It had not been received by time I left. (Helble subsequently reported that some food was brought into pagoda late this morning but no doctors had entered permitted or not.)4
I also said I had heard reports that GVN planes had dropped leaflets over Hue yesterday which had agitated populace. I was not sure of facts but wondered if he knew of it. Diem said he did not and was sure report was incorrect. Helble subsequently informed me that leaflets were in fact dropped and that one of them consisted of strong attack on bonze Tri Quang—generally considered leader of Hue demonstrations-followed [Page 368] by passage demanding [arrest?] of bonze Khiet—octogenarian nominal leader—who is really in charge. This sounds rather more inflammatory than WSM resolution and I shall follow up.
Remainder of conversation consisted largely of Diem’s exposition of GVN position. Main points of this are outlined below. In general, it was a hard line and, although he said he was ready to continue talks with Buddhists, neither his attitude nor his words suggested that he saw this as solution. at least until Buddhists “found themselves isolated”.
Diem considers that Buddhists have themselves violated propaganda truce. Many bonzes, he said, are continuing to distribute tracts and to pass out tendentious information to foreign press. He brushed aside my argument that there has not been time for word to filter down on Buddhists’ side and charged that BonzeThich Minh (principal negotiator from Hue) was passing out line that government has capitulated.
At one point in long conversation, Diem charged in terms [sic] that Buddhists had been negotiating in bad faith.
Diem also believes that troubles in Hue stem primarily from ineptitude of local GVN officials. But fault is not their actions on May 8 but rather that prior to that date they had given too much encouragement to “certain” Buddhist elements. Thereafter their delinquencies consisted in not carrying out effective security measures and in not filing prompt reports on what had happened. It was not until May 24, for example, that chief medical official completed report showing that May 8 deaths resulted from concussion rather than fragmentation grenades.
I asked Diem if he was saying that, if disturbances resumed, stronger measures should be used. He replied “the necessary measures”. Public order had of course to be maintained. He went on to say things which suggested to me that he believes that improved situation in last few days is result of more effective security measures. He may of course be right but, in any event, he is clearly giving higher priority to security measures than to negotiations for immediate future.
In course of discussion I used every argument I could muster to persuade him that only satisfactory solution, at least from US point of view, was peaceful one, through negotiations. I also said quite flatly that, in my opinion, author of resolution (well known to both of us to be Madame Nhu) was seeking to undermine agreement already reached. Finally, I expressed resentment at reference in resolution to “those inclined to take Vietnam for a satellite of a foreign power”. This phraseology, I said, we had learned to translate as “USA”. All this he received with equanimity.
[Page 369]At end of meeting I repeated arguments used at beginning and asked him to reconsider question of disavowing resolution. He did not reply-and this is only possibly bright spot I have to report.
For the moment, I would recommend that Department make no statement and that we watch events for a day or so. It may be that Diem will react belatedly to my arguments today—he sometimes does. Or it may be that WSM resolution will not have effect on negotiations that I anticipate. In any event, there seems to be no advantage in precipitate action. I will of course be doing what I can with Thuan to try to keep negotiations on the track.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC. Received at 2:47 p.m., June 8.↩
- See footnote 3. Document 157.↩
- On June 6, Department of State Spokesman Lincoln White stated at a press conference that “no US planes or personnel have been involved in any way in the transport of troops or police to Hue.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Transcripts of Department of State News Briefings)↩
- The reports from Helble cited here and below apparently were made by telephone.↩