Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963

153. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, June 5, 1963, 1 p.m.

1107. For Hilsman from Trueheart. Embtel 1104.² Thuan called me before breakfast this morning and asked me to come to his house at 8 AM. He said that since seeing me yesterday afternoon he had been involved continuously in a series of separate talks with President, Nhu and Hue Bonze Thich Thien Minh, whom he described as Deputy to Bonze Tri Quang with full power to negotiate with government. He wanted to inform me of these talks, which he believed held out real hope of prompt solution of problem, but he asked that I keep this information for time being strictly to myself in U.S. Mission and that I request Department to limit dissemination of information to greatest possible degree.

Thuan said that in his talks with Minh tentative agreement had been reached on five Buddhist demands. If after seeing President again this morning Thuan was able to assure Minh that there was “good chance” of GVN endorsement of Minh-Thuan agreement, a sort of truce would be put into effect immediately.

This truce would involve Buddhist undertaking to cease all demonstrations and agitation, while GVN would remove not only troops but all uniformed personnel from vicinity of pagodas. In addition there would be a stand-fast on propaganda. Buddhists would stop passing out tracts and GVN would cease radio and press propaganda, e.g., “spontaneous” declarations of support for GVN from obscure Buddhist groups in provinces. Thuan said that Minh had to return to Hue today, as his “delegation of powers expired today”. Although Thuan did not say so, this suggests that negotiations took place in framework of Buddhist ultimatum of some sort. Substance of agreement as described by Thuan is as follows:

1. Flags. Buddhists recognize the superiority of national flag and agree to display it outside pagodas on official, non-religious holidays. On religious holidays national flag and religious flag will be displayed outside pagodas; any number of religious flags may be displayed inside.

2. Decree Law No. 10. GVN disclaims responsibility for this law which was promulgated under Bao Dai and suggests that Buddhists “through normal channels” ask National Assembly to amend it. Under questioning, Thuan admitted that what this really meant was that GVN would see to it that National Assembly passed a new law. (This may be a crucial concession because, according to some reports, Law No. 10 is grievance to which Buddhist leadership attaches most importance. New law would presumably put Buddhists on absolutely equal footing with Catholics in terms of ownership of property, etc.)

3. Right to worship and propagate creed. Buddhists accept that this is guaranteed by Constitution and government to undertake corrective action promptly if Buddhists will specify where Constitution not being respected.

4. Stop arbitrary arrests of Buddhists in Hue. GVN denies that there have been such arrests but undertakes to investigate any specific case cited by Buddhists.

5. Compensation for families of May 8 victims. This is not actually a question of compensation but of GVN acceptance of responsibility and/or punishment of guilty officials. Thuan said that payments of 10,000 plasters had already been made and GVN perfectly prepared to pay more but this had been ex gratia payment involving no acceptance of GVN responsibility. Thuan said that he and Minh had agreed that May 8 meeting had been unauthorized and also that some officials had misused their powers. GVN promised an investigation.

Thuan said that he was very hopeful that President would accept above and that truce would go into effect promptly. Pending action to implement agreement.

Thuan was vague about just how agreement would be implemented. In particular, it was not clear whether it would be a behind the-scenes or a publicly announced agreement. (On form, GVN would prefer the former.) Thuan did say that agreement would have to be put before Vice President’s new commission which would then recommend its formal acceptance by President. Commission, incidentally, did not in fact meet yesterday, owing to fact that Thuan (and Luong) fully occupied in backstage negotiations with Buddhists.

In response to my question, Thuan said that he had no doubt about Minh’s authority to speak for Buddhists in center and he was sure that anything acceptable to Buddhists in center would also be accepted in south-this notwithstanding his previous complaint about lack of Buddhist hierarchy.

Since reported agreement is not very different from what GVN has probably been prepared to accept all along, I am inclined to think that Thuan may not have fully disclosed GVN concessions. For example, I had to draw out of him the fact that GVN undertook to support change in law by National Assembly. I would not be surprised if there were other hidden features, such as government undertaking to wink at more extensive use of Buddhist flags than indicated above or to punish or remove specific officials guilty of abuses.

I am keeping my fingers crossed on all of this but meanwhile request that Thuan’s confidence be respected.

Trueheart

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 S VIET. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.
2. Document 151.