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  4. Document 105

105. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Heavner) to the Director (Wood)1

Washington, May 2, 1963 .

SUBECT

  • Forrestal Meeting on Contingencies
(1)
Forrestal indicated that shortly after your return2 he will want a checklist of things which we have asked or which in the future we might ask Diem to do. He seems to be thinking of a large paper which would include various means of pressuring Diem as well as requesting him to do various things. He specifically asked that we include in the [Page 262] paper alternative means of applying economic and fiscal pressures. (I briefly mentioned some of the alternatives we have debated here, and at his request, gave him a rundown on the current status of the CI fund negotiations.) I have asked Jim3 to draft up the various alternatives which we have for pressuring Diem on the economic side, giving both pros and cons and likely GVN responses.4
(2)

As you know, he also wants a new paper on what to do if Diem passes from the scene.5 He was not aware of the existence of the 1961 contingency plan,6 which I took with me as you suggested.

CIA has been wamping up some drafts on this. They appear to regard brother Nhu as the most likely if not the most appealing prospect for a successor. This disturbs me personally, because I think Nhu is a sure loser. He is so cordially hated by all and sundry that I think he could not possibly lead the Vietnamese to victory against the VC. Moreover, his anti-American bias seems much stronger than that of Diem; I doubt that we could work with him even as well as we do with the old boy. Finally, I don’t think this intellectual acrobat has the grip or the stamina or the practicality required to take and hold power.

I think you might want to discuss this both in Honolulu and Saigon. Our present plan which calls for constitutional succession backed or followed by a military leader is still valid. Saigon has not suggested any alteration, but I gather their thinking is moving away from that solution and in the direction of supporting brother Nhu.

(3)
Most of the meeting7 was taken up with a discussion of how best to get political intelligence on the military establishment, particularly at the middle levels of Major and Colonel. A plan tentatively agreed upon is to designate whether [sic] MAAG advisers as political reporters in addition to their regular duties. Their job would be to evaluate the political tendencies and loyalties of the military establishment, or that part of it within their ken, and if it ever became necessary, to use their influence as directed by the Ambassador.
[Page 263]

It was pointed out, repointed out, and repeatedly emphasized that the great danger in this plan would be GVN discovery of the effort. The reporting channel, as I understand it, would be through General Harkins to the station chief and the Ambassador, rather than plugging CIA into the machine at any other lower or lateral level.

General Krulak was present at the meeting, and he will discuss the matter at Honolulu. I recommend that you talk to him about it.

  1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 67 D 54, Pol 15 Govt. Secret; Limit Distribution.↩
  2. On May 4, Wood traveled to Honolulu for the Secretary of Defense Conference on Vietnam at CINCPAC headquarters on May 6. After the conference, he went on to Vietnam for the remainder of the month for discussions with the Vietnam Country Team.↩
  3. James M. Montgomery of the Vietnam Working Group.↩
  4. On May 20, Heavner sent an 18-page memorandum to Hilsman listing the reforms which the United States had urged Diem to implement since 1960, as well as “actions which we might consider pressing Diem to take”. Projected reforms listed by Heavner included recognition of a legal opposition, delegation of presidential authority, acceptance of additional U.S. direction of the economic and social aspects of the strategic hamlet program, land reform, and measures to increase income for Vietnamese farmers. With the exception of some possible flexibility on the question of allowing the price of rice to rise, Heavner noted that Diem was unlikely to respond favorably to any of the proposed reforms. (Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 67 D 54, Pol 15 Govt)↩
  5. Enclosure to Document 133.↩
  6. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. I, Document 181.↩
  7. No further record of this meeting has been found.↩