Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

307. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, October 22, 1962—4:06 p.m.

466. For Ambassador Nolting from Harriman. Your 443² indicates that you and I are not on the same wavelength. The Presidentʼs position is already doubly engaged, not only by his personal letter to Diem,³ but also by Laos settlement which must be made to achieve US objectives as far as possible. In making settlement we have made it plain to all concerned that we consider it not as ending all conflict, but transferring conflict from military to political area. In this conflict we have a right to expect full support and assistance from GVN as ally as well as a signatory. From your messages I gained the impression that you do not consider Diemʼs attitude towards Laos of prime importance.

What happens in Laos will have substantial influence on South Viet-Nam and therefore I have asked you to make Diem understand the importance we place upon it and the fact that we have a right to ask him as an ally to cooperate in matters which so vitally affect our efforts to keep South Viet-Nam free. This is also true of Cambodia where GVN is continuing to aggravate situation to our mutual disadvantage.

I am relieved to learn from your 449 that Diem is beginning to recognize his obligations toward the President.⁴ If, however, this does not occur, your are instructed to make another approach along lines of Deptel 459 or in whatever manner in your judgment you consider most appropriate. We have never suggested application sanctions, and you are not to give any implication that US has any idea of applying them. When you talk to Diem you should talk as an ally to another expecting support due us and may inform him you are speaking under instructions.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10-2262. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Harriman.
2. Document 306.
3. See Document 238.
4. Telegram 449, October 20, reported that Thuan had indicated there was a chance that Diem would change his mind about breaking relations with Laos. (Department of State, Central Files, 651J.51K/10-2062)