Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

302. Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Cottrell)¹

Saigon , October 15, 1962 .

Dear Cot: I have received your letter of September 11² which listed eleven questions asked by Ed Rice about Viet-Nam.

These are, as you know, some (but not all) of the complex and broad questions to which we are constantly seeking the answers and which we are attempting to cover as completely as possible in our reporting. The replies below are therefore but brief treatments of subjects which our reporting deals with in more detail. They are numbered to correspond with the numbers of your questions.

1. Because of the nature of a guerrilla warfare in which the enemy not only mingles with the friendly or uncommitted population but is frequently indistinguishable from such population in dress or manner, aerial bombing and strafing present recognized problems. The Operations Control Center uses the utmost care in selecting and cross-checking its targets against all available intelligence and we are constantly trying to refine these procedures. They are, in fact, as rigid and restrictive as any enforced in any combat area. Furthermore, there is no doubt in my mind that President Diem, the Vietnamese Air Force Commander and all others concerned are fully aware of the harmful effects, political, psychological, and military, of misdirected or inaccurate bombing. They are trying as hard as we to keep these to the absolute minimum. As to the effect of an air stake on the people in a VC-occupied village, we can assume it is not good. But so long as the VC conceal themselves among non-combatants, some of these will suffer, too. On the other hand, all available intelligence shows that the VC are being hurt by air operations and that the populace is not being driven into the communists’ arms by them. So far, then, aerial bombing has done considerably more good than harm and the continued improvement in intelligence will further reduce the margin for error. Vietnamese tactical air support of army operations and its role in the relief of beleaguered hamlets have increased greatly during the past year, and in such operations the danger to a non-VC populace is greatly reduced. There are no indications that napalm is resented more than the rockets, bombs, or machine guns used by the Vietnamese air force in tactical operations. On the general subject of VC versus civil casualties see our telegram 376.³ For an account of the care exercised in bombing see also Bill Trueheartʼs letter of September 7 . …

2. In some cases the arming of hamlet militia has been delayed on the grounds that the local authorities were still in the process of determining the reliability of those they propose to arm, a position difficult to quarrel with. The usual pattern in the case of completed strategic hamlets seems to be to give the hamlet militia a small arsenal consisting of shotguns and old French weapons and to improve these gradually as better arms become available and the hamlet organization develops. It thus happens that strategic hamlets are sometimes attacked while they still have inadequate arms with which to defend themselves. Two points should be noted in this connection, however:

a. An attempt is frequently made to protect insufficiently armed hamlets through the assignment of civil guard or SDC personnel.

b. One of the primary VC sources of arms in the past has been weapons captured from friendly Vietnamese forces. The chances of such losses occurring are, of course, increased when the Personnel in question are inadequately trained or their loyalty has been inadequately checked. But we know of no case where a hamlet had to show its willingness to withstand a VC attack in order to become eligible for weapons. This, obviously, would be nonsensical.

3. Many of Ed Riceʼs questions are phrased in terms of villages and villagers when I believe that hamlets and their inhabitants are meant. To clarify, Vietnamese provinces are divided into districts, which are in turn divided into villages. (In some of the larger, more sparsely populated provinces there is an intermediate unit called the canton.) Villages are primarily administrative subdivisions of a district. Their councils are appointed, usually by the district chief. Several hamlets are usually found within the village area, one of which may also be the village headquarters. Most of the people therefore are grouped in the hamlets, which are the smallest and most numerous unit of habitation-not in the villages. There has as yet been no attempt to arrange for the free election of village councils, but it is the avowed goal of the strategic hamlet program to provide that each hamlet council be so elected. Elections have not yet been held in all of the strategic hamlets on the grounds that many are not yet ready for them. As to whether they are really “free,” I can only report that balloting is secret and there is a choice of candidates. Instructions to hamlet cadres insist on these two elements but point out that if the cadre has done his job well, the proper candidates will be elected. Despite this paradox, there appears no doubt that a real thrust toward free elections at the hamlet level is being felt and that perhaps as much progress in this direction is currently being made as could be hoped for.

4. It is true that the poorest inhabitants are bearing the brunt of unpaid work on strategic hamlet defenses. Those who are better off are also called on to make their contribution but can do so by giving cash or hiring someone else to do the necessary work. In defense of the procedure it might be noted:

a. That most of the strategic hamlets established to date have been financed without direct U.S. support and with limited means;

b. That the construction labor is a temporary contribution which does result in increased protection for the inhabitant and thereby directly benefits those working on the project;

c. In the case of current clear-and-hold operations and those which are expected to be initiated with increasing frequency in the future, we are hoping the GVN will provide minimal remuneration for work accomplished, perhaps compensation in kind with PL 480⁴ commodities.

5. The government does have an inspection service for dealing with corruption, among officials in the provinces. There also exists a Presidentʼs “letter box” to which complaints alleging misconduct may be addressed. While this machinery may not be adequate, there is evidence that efforts are being made to eliminate lower and middle level abuses. In the press there is a constant campaign devoted to exposing misdeeds, and editorial comment calling on the people to denounce, and on the government to punish, all cases of official corruption.

6. Most strategic hamlets do not involve relocation. The most common practice is simply to build fences around the existing settlement. In some cases those outside the perimeter are moved within, but they continue to work their own land and remain within easy walking distance of it. On the other hand, some combat hamlets, such as those in Operation Sunrise, involve relocation. Our experience so far has been that it was both wise and necessary to move the villagers into combat hamlets in the Sunrise operation, which was carried out in an area which had been held by the VC. By relocating these people they were brought back under GVN control, the logistic support they provided the VC was reduced, and they were offered a better and more secure life. On the basis of this experience and similar situations in other provinces we support the combat hamlet regroupment concept.

7. ARVN and civil guard misbehavior is a chronic problem, but here again the trend is an encouraging one. Military civic action is still just getting off the ground, but the concept of the good soldier as a friend of the people is being accepted. Foraging in VC areas will undoubtedly continue, and there is probably little that can be done about it at this time. On the other hand, outright crimes are usually punished when an officer hears about them. Additional fundamental progress is primarily an educational matter, and this is a slow procedure. The SDC, being the least disciplined organization, most removed from regular units and most in contact with the people in the hamlets, is, as you pointed out, the worst offender. I personally believe their low pay is a contributing element in this problem. Their 900 piasters per month salary was originally set up when the SDC was considered to be a part-time organization. It has since clearly become an onerous, dangerous full-time job. While squad and platoon leaders have recently been given small increases, the SDC continues to bear the brunt of VC pressure, continues to receive the lowest pay, and continues to have the fewest fringe benefits. A problem arises in finding the necessary piasters to raise SDC pay, however. As in the case of hamlet labor, we are considering augmenting their compensation by PL 480 commodities.

8. The answer to question number 8 is contained in a number of recent economic reports, particularly airgrams 134 and 140.⁵ As the question suggests, some basic reforms are needed. Plans are currently underway to distribute large quantities of fertilizer to Vietnamese farmers. The details, including the question of whether or not free distribution should be made, are currently under discussion.

9. I do not consider that a serious problem arises from any impression that we are replacing the French in their colonial rule. This is, of course, a theme on which communist propaganda has relied heavily, but it may be expected that such propaganda will continue despite any action on our part. It is also true that as Westerners in an Asiatic land we have a physical resemblance to the French and other European colonizers. There is, however, general recognition of our fundamental differences from the former French administration, namely, that we have not infringed on the sovereignty of the Vietnamese government or people, that our actions are directed toward assisting them, and our programs are largely carried out by the Vietnamese themselves. Many of these same considerations are true with respect to the question of whether the American presence here has reached a counter-productive level. I believe that it is generally recognized that we are here to assist. In light of the difficult conditions under which both the Americans and Vietnamese are operating, the evidences of faction have been remarkably slight.

10. The role of northerners in the GVN is less a source of criticism than it was several years ago. While regionalism is still very much present in the Vietnamese mentality, and a native of one area is quick to make slighting generalizations about those from another, the past years have had an homogenizing effect. Thus, I do not think Diemʼs administration is handicapped by the use of northerners.

Diemʼs alleged favoritism of Catholics is more of a problem, for many actions take place which are unjustified and are attributed to his own favoritism of Catholics. A current source of concern in this area is a report that the Phu Yen province chief, with whom we have worked exceptionally well, is to be relieved because of his failure to get along with a very active Catholic priest in the province.⁶ There are reports that many officials in the government and officers in the army believe the only way to get ahead is to be or become a Catholic. It may well be that the alleged favoring of Catholics is based less on what the policy actually is, however, than on what those involved believe it to be.

There remains the presence and insidious influence of the Can Lao in the government. The Can Lao, however, seems to have lost momentum during the past year or two. It is no longer the feared machinery for intrigue and inquisition, for individual success or failure, that it used to be. The factions within it are more divided today than they have been previously. Ngo Dinh Canʼs Central Viet-Nam wing is probably even more estranged from Ngo Dinh Nhuʼs Southern branch than it was in the past and various favored groups outside the Can Lao have come into being. The party still maintains its military groupings and economic interests, however, and these undoubtedly are a source of insecurity and irritation on the part of businessmen and army officers.

11. The answer to question 11 may be found in the portion of our weekly progress report cable number 313 which deals with a breakdown of VC and GVN control of areas here.⁷

With personal best wishes to Ed & you.

Sincerely,

Fritz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-1562. Confidential; Official-Informal. According to another copy, this letter was drafted by Barbour and Robert T. Burke of the Political Section on October 4 and cleared by Manfull and Trueheart. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: ERC 67 A 677, 350 GVN)
2. Document 282.
3. Dated October 3. It stated that incident and casualty figures were only two of many factors taken in assessing the progress of the war. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-362)
4. Formally entitled the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, enacted July 10, 1954, P.L. 480 provided for the donation of U.S. agricultural surpluses to friendly governments; for text see 68 Stat. 454.
5. Airgram 134, September 13, transmitted a paper on Vietnamʼs economic problems and suggested possible remedies. (Department of State, Central Files, 851K.00/9-1362) Airgram 140, September 17, transmitted a political and economic assessment of the situation in Vietnam at that time. (Ibid., 751K.00/9-1762)
6. I have just been told that Maj. Dong (Phu Yen Prov. Chief) is to remain with Diemʼs full support. FEN. [Footnote in the source text.]
7. Dated September 18. This Task Force Saigon weekly progress report stated that the Government controlled 49% of the population; the Viet Cong 9%, and the rest remained in dispute. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/9-1862)