276. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric)1
Dear Mr. Secretary: In the attachment to your August 27 memorandum to Mr. Johnson2 (who is on leave), you outlined the assumptions on which the Secretary of Defense had based a recommendation to the President3 that he approve a trial program of chemical crop destruction in Viet Cong territory in Phu Yen Province. One of the two assumptions was that the Montagnards had abandoned the target area [Page 621] in recent months. Actually, our Embassy at Saigon has reported that very few refugees had come out of the mountains of Phu Yen, that most of those requesting assistance were ethnic Vietnamese, and that indications were lacking that they were from the proposed target area (Saigonʼs telegram 129, August 84). Since this appears to negate a basic assumption underlying the DOD recommendation, you may wish to reconsider it.
We nevertheless posed to Ambassador Nolting the two numbered questions you listed, as well as the additional question as to whether the time is not passed when the operation could be successfully carried out against this yearʼs rice harvest (Deptel to Saigon 212, August 275). He has replied that it has indeed already passed (Saigonʼs 233, September 16). In replying to your numbered questions, he indicated: (1) that the crops in question would importantly benefit the Viet Cong, but will still help support the Montagnards in the area, as the Viet Cong rarely confiscate the entire crop of any one plot; and (2) it is assumed that loss of its share of the crop would hurt the Viet Cong, but that not enough is known in detail about the Viet Congʼs planned operations to say that this proposed crop destruction would have seriously set them back.
You will note, from Ambassador Noltingʼs reply, that he would like us now to consider authorizing the working out of an alternate target area, and that the question of authorizing release of chemicals for use in ground operations, in place of more laborious methods of crop destruction, has been raised.
It is our view that it would be inappropriate to approve Ambassador Noltingʼs proposals, at least at this stage when Viet Cong and the general populace are closely intermingled. We propose to prepare and seek DOD concurrence for a reply in that sense.
Sincerely,
- Source: Washington National Records center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542 Vietnam 1962, 370.64. Secret.↩
- The attachment to the August 27 memorandum of transmittal is a one-page memorandum from Gilpatric to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also dated August 27, along the lines summarized here. (Department of State, Central Files, 951K.8158/8-2762)↩
- See Document 262.↩
- Not printed. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series)↩
- The two questions were: 1) would the rice land benefit primarily the Viet Cong? and 2) would the denial of food seriously upset their operations? (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/8-862)↩
- Telegram 233 reported that the crop target areas were controlled by the Viet Cong, but that any crop destruction in Vietnam would cause temporary hardship to the population. (Ibid., 751K.00/9-162)↩